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INTRODUCTION 
I. The Problem of the Dissertation 
A. Statement of Purpose.--Tha problem of the dissertation 
is to discover and expound the main features of the Christian 
theology of Borden Parker Bowne, end to relate them to historic 
Christian doctrine. 
The intention of the writer is, therefore, twofold: (1) to 
present as systematically as possible the Christian theology 
of Bowne, and (2) to indicate the relation of his thought to 
the various traditional formulations of Christian theology. 
The writer seeks simply to expound Bowne's treatment of 
Christian doctrine end to indicate the relation of his solutions 
to traditional solutions. The writer does not intend to 
weigh the doctrinal "soundness" or truth of Bowne's views, but 
he will appraise the nature end significance of his theological 
contribution. The primary goal remains that of discovering 
and expounding his theology and relating it to historic 
Christian thought. 
Broadly speaking, a further purpose of the writer is 
to lay a foundation for much needed work in the study of 
Methodist theology in the period of the late nineteenth end 
early twentieth centuries, Borden Parker Bowne has not been 
2 
dealt with in this perspective (i.e. as a theologian). He is 
widely recognized as the source of the so-called "personalist" 
movement in American Methodist theology, yet no full-scale 
investigation or exposition of his specifically doctrinal 
positions has been undertaken. The writer sees this work as 
a necessary prolegomenon to critical evaluation. As Bowne 
wrote no systematic treatise in the area of theology, such a 
study is a necessary first step in the scholarly appraisal of 
the general movement of Methodist theology in the peat century, 
especially as it relates to the traditional viewpoints of 
Boston University and its School of Theology. 
B. mature of the Problem.-•Commentatora have recognized 
the deep religious interests of Borden Parker Bowne, 1 but he 
hea not been seriously studied as e Christian apologist or 
theologian. Only Albert c. Knudson, who consciously ordered 
his own theological work around many of the problems raised 
by Bowne, may be said to have acknowledged thoroughly this facet 
of Bowne's contribution. 2 Yet Knudson's own work failed to 
cell widespread attention to the contributions of Bowne as a 
1. Borden Parker Bowne, 1847-1910, was Professor of Philosophy 
and Dean of the Graduate School of Boston University. 
2. Cf. A.C. Knudson, "A Personalistic Approach to Theology," 
in V. Farm (ad.), Contemporar~ American Theology (New York: 
Round Table Press, 1932), I, 17-241. 
3 
theologian or apologist. 
The variety of viewpoints among Bowne's students has 
contributed to confusion as to precisely what was his main 
interest. George A. Coe (1862- 195:0 lifting up the elilpiriciSlD 
of Bowne, became prominent in the field of psychology of 
religion. Ralph Tyler Flewelling (1871- ) has emphasized 
the international and historical as well as the aesthetic 
dimensions of personalism as a movement. 1 Francis J. McConnell 
(1871-1953), Bowne's biographer and by Bowne's account "the 
2 
one who knows me best•, abandoned what promised to become a 
brilliant career in theology and education to become an 
outstanding bishop·in the Methodist Episcopal Church. McConnell 
did much to popularize Bowne's immanentalism and also his 
teacher's notions on the relation of Christ to revelation,3 
but he was not able to produce a systematic theology. Edgar 
Sheffield Brightman, (1884-1953), the first to occupy the 
Borden P. Bowne Chair in Philosophy in the Graduate School 
of Boston University, carried on Bowne•s basic convictions 
in metaphysics, but altered certain theological concepts 
radically. Brightman's finitism, arrived at after his 
struggles with the problem of evil, has no specific roots 
1. Cf. Flewelling's writings in The Personalist, a journal 
edited by him at the University·ot Southern California. 
2. Charles Parkhurst, Zions Herald, 88(1910), 488. 
3. Ct. F<J. McConnell, The christlike God, (New York: Abingdon 
Preas, 1927). 
4 
in Bowne's thought where the problem is solved by an appeal 
1 to raith rather than reason. 
While these students pursued diverse paths, and 
presented a variety or interpretations or their teacher, 
they all recognized a fundamental strain or Christian 
thought in the work or Bowne. None stressed his doctrinal 
views in theology. This ambivalence is evident even in 
Knudson, who most correctly could be called the "theologian" 
among Bowne's prominent students. Knudson asserted that 
"Bowne was a philosopher, not a theologian in the narrower 
2 
sense of the term." But, Knudson continues, " ••• his 
philosophy was of the theological type, and it is in the 
theological rield that he has perhaps exercised his greatest 
inrluence.n3 Earlier, in 1917, Knudson clearly assigned the 
role or "apologist" to Bowne, but also demurred at the 
designation of "theologian". 
In the strict sense or the term, he was 
not a theologian, he wrote no work on 
apologetics. And yet in a sense he was 
the great apologist or his age. No man 
in his time laid a rir.mer roundation ror 
Christian belier than he, and none 
pursued more relentlessly ev~ry intellectual 
roe of sound reliiious lire.~ 
1. cr. E.S. Brightman, A Philosophy or Religion, (New York: 
Prentice •Hall, 1940). 
2. A.C. Knudson, 8 Bowne as a Theologian," Zions Herald, 
112(1934), 1057. 
3~ Ibid. 4. r:1r. Ilil.udson, 8 Borden Parker Bowne,"''Bostonia, 18(1917), 
. 66-67. 
On another occasion, Knudson referred to Bowne as "the first 
Methodist who may be properly called a creative thinker in 
the field of philosophical theology.nl 
Francis J. McConnell, in his "Memorial Address•2 delivered 
to the student body of Boston University at the memorial 
service for Bowne in 1910, discussed his teacher's thought 
under several headings, one of which was "Bowne as Theologian." 
It is in this address, while speaking of Bowne's Christology, 
"tbat\.; McConnell characterized him as "the most orthodox of the 
orthodox." In other articles, MCConnell noted Bowne's lack 
of "interest or respect for some venerated and venerable 
theological doc trines • • •, •3 but RJl.ll;htlfld out that Bowne's 
ultimate aim of rationalizing religious experience and 
moralizing "immoral" doctrines put him squarely in the 
theological arena as an apologist. 
Others have emphasized this feature of Bowne's thought. 
Henry Kalloch Rowe 
religion for those 
characterized him as "the maker of modern 
4 
who think." Flewelling has said that 
"Bowne did more than any other man in his generation to 
increase the intellectual credit of church institutions and 
l~ A.C. Knudson, "Bowne and Barth," Zions Herald, 113(1935), 296. 
2. F.J. McConnell, "M&morial Address: Borden P. Bowne," Zions 
Herald, 88(1910), 491-494; also Boatonia, ll(October, 1916), 
3-19. 3.~.~-~~~t "Bowne 1n American Ethical Progress,• 
· Personalist, 2~(1947), 244-245. · 4. H.f. Rowe, Modern Pathfinders of Christianity, (New York: 
Fleming H. Revell co., 1928), p. 2So. 
6 
to stem the tide of materialism.•1 George A. Coe outlined 
what he felt to be his teacher's contribution: 
His whole life-endeavor can be summed up in 
this: that he strove to raise religion to a 
high plane of ethical purpose and clear thinking, 
and to set forth and defend the rationality of 
its fundamental concepts. In his endeavor to 
elevate and rationalize religion he took the 
part of a progressive, and to many he gave 
the impression of being a radical; but as 
a defender of the relisious conception of' the 
world he appeared as a conservative in philosophy. 
In his hands theology was neither speculation 
in the divine mysteries nor yet the defense of 
authordtative dogma; but, rather rati~nal 
reflection upon religious experience. 
A report of an address by Bowne in 1909 reveals the 
presence among his auditors of some confusion as to the 
essential nature of his work. The editor of Zions Herald 
commented: 
The ••• paper ••• was listened to with great 
satisfaction by the large company of ministers 
present, so1ue of whom, perhaps, were not tully 
aware that this learned philosopher held so 
strongly, as he certainly3does, to the essentials of the evangelical faith. 
Misunderstanding of Bowne's intention was widespread in 
his own day. One result was the so-called •heresy trial• of 
1904. George A. Cooke, a Methodist preacher, preferred the 
heresy charges against Bowne in the New York East Annual 
in American Personalism II: 1. R.T. Flewelling, •studies 
Boston Personal! • 
2. G.A. Coe; •Borden Part~~~ 31( 1950). 350. Methodist Review, 
92(1910), 516. 
3. Editorial, Zions Herald, 87(1909), 1383. 
7 
Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Cooke saw 
Bowne's apologetical approach as a threat to Christian faith. 
Even William James of Harvard was involved inadvertently in 
the affair by mentioning, in his Varieties of Religious 
Experience, Bowne's effectiveness as an apologist. Said James, 
"See how the ancient spirit of ~thodism evaporates under those 
wonderfully able rationalistic booklets (which everyone should 
read) of a philosopher like Professor Bowne.•1 While Bowne 
emphatically repudiated the implications of this statement in 
a private letter to James,2 Cooke included the damaging 
remark in a pamphlet attack with this comment: "As I understand 
it, to call a man a rationalist is a genteel way of saying 
that he is what is popularly known as an infidel."3 
Regardless of the status of "orthodoxy," Bowne definitely 
engaged in a most spirited discussion of Christian theological 
problems both in his basic writings and in his published 
articles and sennons. Warren Steinkraus, who has characterized 
Bowne as "a philosopher deeply interested in and sympathetic 
with religion, specifically the doctrines or The Methodist 
l. William James, The Varieties of Rel~ous Experience. (New 
York: Longmans, Green, and co., Z19 192$}, p. $o2n. 
2. Ct. F.J. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, (New York: Abingdon 
Press, 1929), p. 275; also R.T. Flewelling, •studies in 
American Persona1iam II: Boston Persona1ism,"''Persona1ist, 
31 (1950), 341-351. 3. G.A. Cooke, The Present and the Fubure of Methodism: An 
Examination of the Teachin s of Professor Borden P. Bowne, 
o~:~cu 
8 
l Church," has illustrated this interest by noting that of 
Bowne's one hundred and thirty-four known articles, almost 
half--sixty-eight-- were written for publication in the 
such as Zions Herald and The 
-
denominational periodicals 
2 Methodist Review. or his seventeen books, six deal 
specifically with Christian doctrinal problems: The Christian 
Revelation, 1896; The Christian Lite, 1899; The A tonert,ent, 
1900; The Immanence of God, l90S; Studies in Christianity, 
1909; and ~e Essence of Religion, 1910 (posthumous). 
It is to be noted that Bowne's doctrinal books, which 
are in part revisions of journal articles and sermons, began 
to appear quite late in his career. His first book, Studies 
in Theism, was publishad in 1679. .<'McConnell has indica ted 
that about 189S Bowne telt that the "battle" with evolution 
and lll8chanism had been fought through and so "he turned his 
strength to the defense or the new methods or biblical 
n3 study • • • It is to be noted that the Hi~ Mitchell 
affair, regarding defense of higher criticism of the Bible, 
began in l89S. Bowne himself, expressing his increasing 
doctrinal concerns, said in 1896, "It is definitely settled 
1. W.E. Steinkraus, "From an Old Notebook," Personalist, 
34Cl9S3), 372. . 
2. Ibid., p. 372. Steinkraus used Hildebrand's bibliography 
found in F.J. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne. My own 
research uncovered 149 articles tristeaa of 134. 
3. F.J. McConnell; "Borden Parker Bowne," Methodist Review, 
105(1922), 344. 
9 
at last that whoever has words of eternal life, science and 
philosophy have them not."1 His earlier philosophical and 
ethical writings sought to strengthen the foundations of 
belief; in his later writings, he sought to infuse specific 
doctrine with contemporary understanding and meaning. 
A clear statement of the intent of Bowne's work is 
found in the writings of his student George A. Coe. Coe, 
writing in 1937, felt that Bowne's philosophy 
was inspired and guided by a theological 
purpose. In some church circles he was 
regarded as a radical thinker and dangerous 
to orthodoxy, but this opinion was superficial. 
There was, indeed, something of the happy 
iconoclast in him; he did use a harsh broom 
upon crude ideas that students brought to the 
classroom, and he laughed some sorts of 
ignorant orthodoxy out of court. Yet his own 
interest, as he himself realized, was to provide 
an epistemological and metaphysical basis for 
the main theses of orthodoxy. His phil~sophy 
was in reality theological apologetics. 
II. Definitions 
It is necessary to define the key words used in this 
dissertation. The purpose of the study as noted above is 
an attempt both to clarify the intent of Bowne and, at the 
same time, organize his writing under the historic Christian 
cateeories. 
l. B.P. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 19o9), p. 23. · · 
2. G.A. Coe, •My Own Little Theater,'' ed. V. Ferm, Religion 
in Transition, 1937, p. 100. 
10 
A. Theology.-• The word "theology" is derived from the 
I , 
Greek wo:i'ds f;6()S (God) and >toyo.s (word). Edgar Sheffield 
Brightman suggests that a simple expression--11 theory about 
God11 --is adequate. 1 Most of the history of philosophy has 
been an attempt to arrive at a definition of God. In this 
sense philosophy may be "theological". But, as Brightman 
notes, it is generally recognized that philosophy should be 
distinguished from theology. The distinction Brightman 
makes is clear. 
For philosophy of religion, all religious beliefs 
and experiences, of whatever sort or kind, are 
considered as the primary source material for 
interpretation. For theology, the historical 
beliefs of the theologian's own religious community 
are the primary sources •••• If the theologian 
maintains his ideal as thus set up, he is a 
philosopher of religion engaged in a peculiarly 
thorough and critical philosophical interpretation2 of the subject matter of some one religious faith. 
A more extensive treatment of the problem of definition 
of "theology" is found in the writing of Emil Brunner.3 
Brunner traces the development of the word 9'oAoyf a. from 
its use by Greek poets to speak of divine things. The 
precise meaning has changed through Stoicism, Philonic, 
Patristic, Medieval, and Reformation thought. 
1. E.S. Brightman, Philosophy of Religion (New York: 
Henry Holt Co., 1946), p. 23. 
2. Ibid., p. 24. 
3. ~ Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God, Do~atics I, 
trans. Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth Press, 1 9), 89-91. 
11 
Today the term has the meaning "as the ell-inclusive 
term for the intellectual work which deals with the Bible 
and the Church."l The rise of independent theological 
disciplines, biblical criticism, church history, history of 
dogma, and so forth, led to this inclusive use of the word 
"theology." Dogmatics, or systematic theology, is one of the 
disciplines of theology proper. 
s. Paul Schilling's working definition of theology, 
stated in the course of unpublished lectures at Boston University 
School of Theology, is normative for this study. 
Christian theology is the thoughtful inquiry into 
and exposition of the meaning and validity of the 
Christian faith. It seeks through critical exam• 
instion to discover the most coherent interpretation 
of Christian hlstoryyand experience, and so to 
formulate the truth-content of the Christian religion 
in terms capable of intelligible expression and 
reasonable defense. 
B. Theism.--"Theism" is a technical word indicating that 
"God is the cosmic source of all nature and of all value 
experience."2 It is simply a term expressing a system of 
theistic framework. Actually the terms "philosophy of 
religion" and "theology" are usually embraced in the inclusive 
word "theism." 
In historical development, the term "theism" was used 
in a popular sense to distinguish a philosophical approach 
to the interpretation of life and the world from an unscientific 
1. Ibid., p. 90. 
2. tlrl'ghtman, .21!· .£!.!•• p. 538. 
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and literalistic "theological" approach. Bowne's use of 
the term is to be understood in this light. Reacting both 
to speculative philosophy which had generally rejected 
theistic belief on the one hand, and literalistic and 
moribund American theology which had compromised the true 
dignity of the word "theology," Bowne embraced "theism" as 
a meaningful word. To the philosophically inclined, it made 
possible the philosophic method without sacrificing 
intellectual integrity. To the theologian, it meant that 
the concerns of theology were being taken seriously. 
The term today has far more technical meaning than in 
the hey-day of this movement. Were Bowne writing today, 
he probably would use the more popular contemporary term 
"philosophical theology." 
C. Classical Categories.--The approach of the dissertation 
is to deal with the inchoate and hitherto unorganized theology 
of Bowne under the classical categories of apologetics, 
dogmatics, and ethics. 
1. Apologetics 
An important word in this dissertation is 11 apologist, 11 
) / 
In the Greek, the word a..JTo Aoy1~iterally means "from the 
logos" or "from reason." In Greek law it came to be the 
technical word for the defendant's reply to the speech of the 
) I 
prosecution. The ti-7TOAO'(C6..1 was the personal statement in 
/ 
answer to the K.DvTa..yopt.ct-. Plato 1 a version of Socrates' 
defense is correctly titled Apolog;y. 
' 
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It is not difficult to see how this word came to have 
usefulness in the Christian tradition. "Thus, in view of 
persecution or slander, the Christian Church naturally 
produced literary apologies. The word has never quite 
lost this connotation of standing on the defensive end 
rebutting criticism."1 Origen uses the word as meaning the 
general defense of Christian faith. 2 Throughout the history 
of Christian doctrine it has been used many time~, most 
prominently by Anselm: Apologia contra insipientem Gaunelonem 
(c. 1100); the Lutheran theologians: Apology for the Augsburg 
Confession (1531); Newman: Apologia pro vita sua, (1864); 
and Bruce: Apologetics: or Christianity Defensively Stated 
(1892). 
As it has developed in Christian theology, apologetics 
has come to have a precise meaning, namely, the meaningful 
and persuasive presentation of the main arguments for the 
Christian faith. As such, it has become one of the main 
elements of theology, along with dogmatics end ethics. 
H.R. Mackintosh, in the Encyclopaedia Brittanice (1910), 
asserts that "apologetics, in theology, /Is 7 the systematic 
- -
statement of the grounds which Christians allege for belief 
in Lit leas!? a supernatural revelation and a divine 
1. H.R. Mackintosh, "Apologetics," Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 
(1910-1911), II, 189. 
2. Origen, Contra Celsus II. 65, v. 19. 
.. 
1 
redemption." In the same context, the author has 
characterized the work of the apologist: 
The modern apologist must do ephemeral work 
--unless it should chance that he proves to 
be the skirmisher, pioneering for a modified 
dogmatic, He holds a watching brief. While 
he must beware of hasty speech, he has often to 
plead that new knowledge does not really 
threaten faith; or that it is not genuinely 
established knowledge at all; or else, that 
faith has mistaken its own grounds, and will 
gain szrength by concentrating on its true 
field. 
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With these things in mind, the definition to be used 
in this dissertation will be as follows: The Christian 
apologist is he who seeks to defend the basic tenets of 
Christian faith through (1) a confrontation with the critics 
of the Christian proclamation and a rebuttal of their 
arguments; (2) an urgent re-examination of the Christian 
faith in the light of the attacks upon it by its critics; 
and (3) a vigorous re-affirmation of the essential 
ingredients of sound Christian faith and a restatement of 
those beliefs in a persuasive context. In this situation, 
the apologist is indeed a "skirmisher" and is often forced 
into extreme positions which ultimately distort both his 
own implicit faith and create misunderstanding on the part 
of those who look to him for defense. It will be seen that 
1. Mackintosh, op. cit., p, 192b. 
2. ~·· p. 192b. 
this situation prevailed in the case of Professor Bowne. 
2. Dogmatics 
15 
Commonly understood, "dogma" is the expression of faith 
as outlined in the historic confessions of the Christian 
Church. Dogma is that which has been designated as reliable 
and authoritative teaching (doctrine) over against mere 
opinion. J.L. Neve, a Lutheran historian, speaks of "dogma" 
as "the tangible results of fundamental Christian thought on 
matters of divine revelation."1 Karl Barth regards dogmatics 
as "the self-test to which the Christian Church puts herself 
in respect of the content of her peculiar language about God."2 
The great themes of the Christian faith--God, Man, 
Jesus Christ, and Salvation--are the subject matter of 
Christian "dogma" in the creeds and the historical theology 
of the Church. Borden Parker Bowne wrote no "dogmatics" in 
the precise sense of the term. But his interest in the 
theology of the Church was broad and active. 
The nature of his orthodoxy or his deviation from 
normative Christian doctrines cannot be determined by a 
casual reading of Theism or his philosophical works. Only 
his collections of essays, Studies in Christianity, and 
1. J. L. Neve and 0. w. Heick, A Histort of Christian Thought 
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 194 ), I, 1. 
2. Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God, trans. o. T. 
Thomson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936), Vol. I, part I, 1. 
The Essence of Religion, deal more or less explicitly 
with dogmatic questions.! Even in these books, however, 
there is no attempt to be thorough or systematic in the 
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presentation or Christian doctrine. Our method or procedure 
necessarily will be selective, organizing pertinent themes 
of Bowne's writings and letters into systematic form. 
). Ethics 
Ethics forms the third main section of theology 
following apologetics and dogmatics. The word "ethics" 
)~ 
comes from the Greek word >J()b.J , which may be translated 
"custom, usage, or habit." In the plural it has the meaning 
of the Latin "mores"--the character or disposition of 
someone or some group of persons.2 Along with this objective 
element, the word carries a subjective connotation implying 
a "conscious feeling at home in the customs" or mores of 
a society and "an approval by conscience of the habits."3 
Dorner defines "Christian ethics" as "the scientific 
representation of the truths of Christianity in their 
1. B.P. Bowne's The Essence of Religion, might have been 
named The Essence or Christianity had not William 
Adams Brown published a book with the same title in 
1902. cr. The Essence of Christianity: A Study in the 
History of Definition, (New Yorki Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1902). 
2. Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1909), p. 303. 
). I.A. Dorner, "Ethics", Religious Encyclopaedia, (ed. 
Philip Scharr, New York: Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1894), 
p. 764. 
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practical application to individual life as duties and 
1 ideals." As a theological discipline, it may be distinguished 
from dogmatics and apologetics only in emphasis, This is 
particularly true of a system like Bowne's in which the thread 
which runs throughout all theolog7 is a strong moral emphasis. 
III. Limitations 
The development of this dissertation is limited by three 
major considerations: Bowne's own methods of writing and 
presentation of his material; the fact that most of his 
correspondence is lost; and finally the fact that Methodist 
historians generaLly have failed to deal with the apologetic 
nature of Methodist--especially the so-called "Boston"--
theology at the turn of the century,2 
As has been indicated above, slightly more than one half 
of Bowne's writings are on specific doctrinal problems, Yet 
throughout this entire corpus one finds a rather sharp 
distinction between philosophical and theological approaches, 
despite his fundamental conception of the unity of both. 
Bowne had a way of writing highly technical philosophical 
articles, obviously aimed at the intellectual or the mechanistic 
temper of his time, On the other hand, when written in the 
theological vein, his work often had a homiletical ring to it, 
1. !£!£., p. 774· 
2. Including Sheldon, Warren, at al. 
3. cr. above, p. 8. 
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In a most revealing comment, Bishop McConnell, writing in his 
autobiography, quotes Bowne as saying; 
"I wish," he said, "that I had an extra 
head that I might screw on and off. I 
could then have one for my own work and 
another to help preachers in various 1 directions they ought to know about." 
Confusion about the intentions of Bowne has arisen from 
the fact of this apparent dualism. Philosophers were skeptical 
of his religious interests and religionists suspected his 
philosophy. He stood against the prevailing mechanism and 
naive scientism of much 19th century philosophy on the one 
hand and the extreme biblicism and irrational literalism of 
panicky religionists on the other. 
Bowne raised his voice against both of 
these oversimplifications and incurred 
criticism from both sides. By the 
scientist and the materialistic philoso-
pher he was dubbed a mere theologian in 
spite of the logic of his argument; by the 
theologian he was called t~ account in the 
last of the heresy trials. 
As a result of this situation, a researcher must be 
careful to remember the context of particular statements. 
For example, under the pressures of the 1904 heresy trial, 
Bowne made affirmations which, as will be illustrated, 
do not find extensive support in his more thoughtful 
1. F.J. McConnell, By the Way, (New York: Abingdon Press, 
1952), p. 92. 
2. R.T. Flewelling, "Brightman: Ex Umbras in Lucem," 
Personalist, 34(1953), 343. 
presentations. The same is true of his scathing attacks 
on some forms of scientific materia1ism. 1 
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The second limitation is the fact that most of Bowne's 
correspondence is scattered or lost. The most consistent 
collection is the correspondence between Bowne and the late 
Bishop Lewis Hartman, then a student in the Graduate Department 
of Boston University. 2 These letters, covering the years 
1906 to 1909, touch on a variety of subjects, some doctrinal, 
some philosophical, and quite a few ecclesiastical. A 
handful of letters from Bowne to Rev. James Mudge, longtime 
secretary of the New England Annual Conference of the 
Methodist Episcopal Church, is to be found in the New England 
Historical Society Library. But beyond these sources, there 
seems to be nothing extant. Bowne, apparently, did not want 
his contribution to be judged by anything except his 
published writings. McConnell recalls that 
before he died, Bowne had read me passages 
from letters and other papers that would have 
been interesting, but I discovered, after he 
passed away, that he had burned all of them. 
I took this to mean he did not want them left 
for anyone 1 s use, and that he would not have 
approved a book about himself except one 
that dealt §hiefly with his life work in 
philosophy. 
1. Cf. B.P. Bowne, "The Pra~er Test Improved", Zions Herald, 
54(1877), 401,409; also Shall We Kill our Advanced 
Scientists?", 55(1878), 57. 
2. This correspondence is in the Boston University School of 
Theology Library and is used with the permission of Mr. 
Richard Hartman. 
3. F.J. McConna1l, By the Way, p. 258. 
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The third limitation to this study is the fact that 
very little research has yet been done in the area of 
Methodist theology at the turn of the century. While Miley, 
Sheldon, Warren, Curtis and other Methodist writers have 
had a widespread influence in Methodist thought, they are 
practically unknown outside the circle of specialists in 
this field, Bowne himself has been dealt with to a 
considerable extent in research under philosophical categories, 
but not primarily as a theological figure, Methodist 
theologians and historians have not been interested until 
relatively lately in the theological work of Methodist 
thinkers of the period under discussion, 
American Methodism has never been considered 
a particularly fruitful field for the student 
of historical theology or of the history of 
ideas, This has been the case even with 
Methodist historians, especially those writing 
from the twentieth century perspective,l 
These limitations are not ultimately destructive to the 
central problem of the dis~cr~~~iun, but they are to be kept 
in mind in any appraisal of Bowne's work. His own method was 
to speak to two conditions and therefore it often necessitates 
care in appropriation; his personal papers, which might have 
cast considerable light on obscure problems, are lost; and, 
finally, there has been very little background material 
1. L.H. Scott, "Methodist Theology in America in the Nineteenth 
Century," Religion in Life, 25(1956), 87. 
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published for an understanding in depth of this particular 
period in theological history. 
IV. Previous Research in the Field 
While Bowne's own work fells almost clearly into two 
parts--theological and philosophical--a survey of the 
literature on Bowne indicates the degree of the leek of 
interest in the theological or apologetic side of the man. 
Despite the fact that Bowne himself devoted considerable 
effort to theological questions, not one doctoral dissertation 
to date bas dealt with the specifically Christian doctrinal 
problems contained in his writings. Some dissertations have 
dealt in passing with specific problems, as Edward Ramsdell's 
important Pragmatic Elements in the Epistemology of Borden 
P. Bowne, (1932).1 Ramsdell gives some attention to the 
problem of religious knowledge but deals with it within the 
larger context of his argument. Other dissertations on Bowne 
have dealt with more philosophical considerations. Strickland, 2 
Queen,3 and Piper4 have written on the problem of personality. 
1. E.T. Ramsdell, Pragmatic Ele~ents in the Epistemology of 
Borden P. Bowne, Boston University Ph.D. dissertation, 1932. 
2. F.L. Strickland, Personalism: Th~ Philosophy of Free 
3Salfhood 1 Boston University Ph.D4 dissertation, 1905. 
3· M.B . . QUeen, Personalism and Practical Judgment: A Critique 
of Conceptions of Personality Held by Borden P. Bowne and 
E.S. Brightman, Columbia University Ph.D. dissertation, 1951. 
4• R.F. Piper, Metaphysics of Personality, Boston University 
Ph.D. dissertation, 1920. 
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Kessler1 has written on the problem of monism and pluralism 
in Bowne. Jones 2 shows the relationship of Bowne to Lotze, 
while Cleland) relates him to Berkeley. Isacksen4 discusses 
the relation of ethics to metaphysics in Bowne, but does 
not deal with the theological implications. Franquiz5 writes 
on the problem of change and identity, Hildebrand6 on the 
speculative significance of freedom, Ross7 deals with Bowne 
in passing on the problem of evil. Straton8 has written an 
illuminating study of the theistic implications in the 
personalistic movement, but deals only with the philosophical 
books of Bowne and does not treat the Christian doctrinal 
writings. 
Only a few published articles have dealt with the 
theological-apologetical side of Bowne. Earliest was the 
McConnell address before the Boston University student body 
1. B.P. Kessler, Personalistic Monism Versus Pluralism, 
Boston University Ph.D. dissertation, 1905. 
2. G.H:.' Jones, Lotze and Bowne, Jena, 1909. 
3. G. Cleland, The Relation of Bowne to Berkele , Boston 
University Ph.D. dissertation, 19 l. 
4. F.R. Isacksen, The Interdependence of Bowne's Ethics and 
Metaphysics, Boston University JII.A.thesis, 1930. 
5. J.A. Franquiz, Bowne's Treatment of Problem of Chan e and 
Identity, Boston University Ph.D. Dissertation, 9 • 
6. C.D. Hildebrand, Borden P. Bowne's Teaching O}ncerning the 
Speculative Significance of Freedom, Boston University Ph.D. 
dissertation, 1929. 
7. F.H. Ross, The Problem of Natural Evil in Bowne, Knudson, 
Brightman, Yale University Ph.D. dissertation, 1935. 
8. G.b. Straton, ~elief in the Personality of God, Columbia 
University Ph.D. dissertation, 1956. ---
at Bowne's memorial service. This address, published in 
Zions Herald, contained a section entitled "Bowne as 
Theologian. 111 Another early evaluation was the memorial 
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address delivered to the student body of the School of 
Theology of Boston University by George A. Coe.2 George 
Elliott, editor of The Methodist Review, collated excerpts 
from the "heresy" trial and published them under the title 
"The Orthodoxy of Bowne" in 1922.3 While Elliott did not 
attempt to editorialize, he obviously sought to illustrate 
Bowne's doctrinal correctness on major theological issues. 
Accordingly, Elliott's article is an important document in 
this research. 
As would be expected, Knudson's writings provide a 
good source of information in this area. Ramsdell asserts 
that Knudson's Philosophy of Personalism is "an independent 
presentation of the personalistic philosophy, but it is clear 
that it is intended primarily as a presentation of that 
philosophy as found in the writings of Bowne."4 However, 
Knudson's explicit definitions of Bowne's doctrinal positions 
1. F.J. McConnell, "Memorial Address: Borden P. Bowne," 
Zions Herald, 88(1910), 491-494. 
2. G.A. Coe, "Borden Parker Bowne," Methodist Review, 
92(1910), 513-524. 
3. G. Elliott, ed., "The Orthodoxy of Bowne," Methodist 
Review, 105(1922), 399-413. 
4• E.T. Ramsdell, op. cit., p. 3, note. 
are quite rare. In 1934, he published an article entitled 
"Bowne as a Theologian, 111 but was hesitant to push that 
designation too far. The next year, he used the occasion 
of a review of Karl Barth's shifting position to compare 
theological perspectives and here also used Bowne as a foil 
for the argument of rational versus "irrational" approaches 
to revelation. 2 However, in 1937, Knudson wrote what is the 
most definitive piece of work in this area in a very brief 
article for The Personalist.3 The article, "Bowne in American 
Theological Education," clearly outlines Bowne's position with 
regard to apologetics, the personality of God, the person 
and work of Christ, the Christian life, the Incarnation, and 
the Atonement. It will be one of the purposes of this 
dissertation to amplify what Knudson has outlined in his 
sketchy article. 
v. The Methodology of the Dissertation 
Essentially, the plan of this dissertation is to survey 
Bowne's theological and doctrinal work and to organize his 
main theses under the traditional theological categories--
1. A.C. Knuu<:loLJ, "l:lowLJe as a 'l'heologian," Zions Herald, 
112(1934), 1057. 
2. -A-.G·."-Knud&on, "Bowne and Barth," Zions Herald, 113(1935), 
296-297. 
3 • .J....C......KlJ.ud&on, "Bowne in American Theological Education," 
i'ersonalist, 28(1947), 247-256. 
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apologetics, dogmatics, and ethics, Apologetics deals with 
the justification of method, the basic implications of theology 
for contemporary thought, and the problem of religious 
knowledge. Dogmatics is the statement of Christian belief 
without necessary reference to apologetic functions, Ethics 
is the exposition of the application of Christian faith 
to life and work. Together these categories may be called 
"systematic theology." With careful attention to Bowne's 
own writings, this study will seek to present as clear 
a "systematic theology" as is possible from the sources. 
This, of course, is a proper prolegomenon to any evaluation 
of Bowne aa an apologist or theologian. 
The primary sources will be, of course, the doctrinal 
and philosophical writings of Borden Parker Bowne. Other 
important sources will include the record of the so-called 
"heresy trial" of 1904, the available correspondence, 
published and unpublished, and the wide literature on the 
"personalistic" movement in theology, especially in the 
writings of Knudson, Brightman, Flewelling, McConnell, 
Coe, and DeWolf. 
1. Cf. P. J. Tillich, Systematic Theola~~ I (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1951), . 
PART ONE: APOLOGETICS 
I. The Relation of Philosophy to Theology 
A. Bowne's Philosophical Position.--The designation of 
the work of Borden Parker Bowne as "personalism" is misleading. 
As the name of a system it was used as early as 1865 by John 
Grote, in his Exploratio Philosophica, end by Charles 
Reaouvier in 1903. 1 Bowne himself accepted the term with 
2 
some misgivings rather late in his career. His system 
actually almost defies naming. He once spoke of his work 
as "Ksntisnized Berkelianism,"3 a description which is ambiguous 
at best. The most extended discussion of the problem of 
names is to be found in s letter he wrote to his wife, Kate. 
It is herd to classify me with accuracy. I am 
s theistic idealist, a Personalist, s transcen-
dental empiricist, en idealistic realist, end 
s realistic idealist; but ell of these phrases 
need to be interpreted. They cannot be made out 
from the dictionary. Neither can I well be 
celled s disciple of any one. I largely agree 
with Lotze, but I transcend him. I hold half 
1. A careful study of the origins of this term is found tn 
L. Herold DeWolf, "Personalism in the History of Western 
Philosophy," Philosophical Forum, 12(1954), 29-51. 
2. F.J.·:·KcConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, p. 131. 
3. Bowne, M!taShtsios (Rev. ed.; Boston: Boston University 
Press, Z 89_7 94ZJ, P• 423. 
of Kant's system but sharply dissent from the 
rest. There is a strong smack of Berkeley's 
philosophy with a complete rejection of his 
theory of knowledge. I am a Personalist, the 1 first of the clan in any thoroughgoing sense. 
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The survey of his philosophical position in this chapter 
aims to make some of these comparisons mere clear. For the 
purposes of exposition, his position is here divided into 
three sections: epistemology, metaphysics, and theism. By 
his own suggestion, epistemology and metaphystds represent 
the whole of the philosophical enterprise. The former deals 
with how we know and the latter with what we know. Theism 
is an extension of metaphysics. More precisely, his 
metaphysics is "theistic." Since Bowne's influence in the 
area of theism was so profound, it will be treated as the 
third major section of his philosophical position. 
1. Epistemology. 
The essential question of epistemology is this: "Is 
the mind active or passive in knowledge?" 2 For Bowne the 
answer is unequivocal. The mind is active. In his system 
there can be no distinction between thinking and consciousness 
because consciousness is simply "the accompaniment of all 
mental states.n3 Consciousness is neither a Lockian "tabula 
1. Unsigned editorial, "America's Greatest Philosopher and 
His Faith," Zions Herald, 99(1921), 41. 
2. B.P. Bowne, Theo of Thou t and Knowled e, (New York: 
2nd ed.; American Book Co., 1 9 19 , P• 4· 
3. Ibid., p. 19. 
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rasa" nor some form of spatial state into which thoughts 
and impressions are somehow placed. Ultimately it is apparent 
how central is the epistemological problem for Bowne because 
the question of how we come to rational consciousness is 
identical with the question of how we get or think objects 
of thought and knowledge. 
The error which Bowne sought to correct was the notion 
that the mind had either to create its objects (Berkeley) or 
simply to perceive them as sensations (Locke). His solution 
was an epistemological dualism. By this he meant that we 
are to understand the knowledge process as having a clear 
distinction between thought the product snd thoue:ht the 
process. The former, the product, is objectively valid. The 
latter, the process, is no part of the object. 1 "Objective 
reference," the assertion that thought refers to things 
beyond itself, becomes an important item in the epistemic 
solution. 
strairht to 
The very nature of thought is that "it goes 
2 
things." Thought's aim is the truth of knowledge. 
It always has reference to something beyond its own processes. 
Thought is objectively valid and no part of the object. The 
dualistic solution seeks to avoid the pitfalls of both a 
naive sense-empiricism and an absolute idealism. 
1. Ibid., p. 17. 
2. Ibid., p. 9. 
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McConnell emphasized this "realistic" side of Bowne. 
When the question of the idea!ity of the universe is under 
discussion, Bowne's ultimate metaphysics! idealism in no 
way contradicts the objectively real nature of the "outside 
world." The work of the mind is simp!y to make spontaneous 
thought more profound and exact. For Bowne, the mind does 
not create but organizes. 
a. The fundamental conditions of judgment. 
Bowne insisted upon three fundamental conditions of 
judgment as the presupposition of all thought. They are (1) 
the unity and identity of the thinking self; (2) tne law of 
identity atld .contl!Adtct!ozu '_li~d (3) the fact of connection 
among the objects of thought. These conditions are designated 
as the psychological, logical and ontological conditions of 
thought. Bowne suggested that they could be celled subjective, 
formal, end objective. 
(1) The psychological condition.--The unity end identity 
of the thinking self is the first presupposition of thoueht 
and judgment. The self must be one and it must be abiding. 
Writes Bowne, "I am not thoughts but I think, and I who now 
l think am the same who thought Y"'Sterday." The idea that 
the self could be anything else but abiding and unitary is 
nonsense. He takes particular pains to point out Hums's 
1. ~·· p. 28. 
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mistake in this matter, i.e. denying the self while assuming 
it in order to express its own denial. This condition of 
thought is an "analytically necessary condition" and an 
"unparalleled mystery of consciousness."l It enables us to 
distinguish between events of consciousness by positing a 
conscious subject which embraces events in the "unity of 
its own consciousness."2 
(2) The logical condition.•-The law of identity and 
contradiction means simply that terms have fixed meanings 
end are used consistently. In classical expression, A is A 
and not B. Without this merely formal and logical condition, 
thought would be impossible. Bowne calls this a "negative 
principle of thought."3 
(3) The ontological condition.--The fact of connection 
between objects of thought is the third condition of judgment 
for Bowne. This is "the positive principle" which assumes 
"rational and systematic connection among the elements of 
that independent order which thought must assume if it is to 
be more than a meaningless ••ntal event."4 Bowne is simply 
insisting that thought cannot escape making metaphysical 
assumptions about its objects and their systematic relations; 
indeed, thought is made possible by the very fact of the 
1. Ibid., p. 22. 
2. ma .. P· 21. 
3. !D!Q., P• 33. 
4· Ib!'a:. 
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"rational and systematic connection" among the elements: of 
that order. 
Bowne is quite clear that these fundamental conditions 
of judgment or thought do not give us objects, but only the 
conditions of having and dealing with objects in general. 
One might say that these presup)ositions are the framework 
of judgment, the "given" of the thought process without 
which thought would be impossible. 
b. The self in the knowledge process. 
(1) As the presupposition of judgment.--Having established 
the "analytical necessity" or the presuppositions of judgment, 
Bowne proceeds to demomstrate the role of the self in thought. 
'!'he problem is: How does the mind get its objects? 
For Bowne, sensory experience is a "joint-product." 
~ense experience is not a product of thought, but a datum 
for the rational nature. "We cannot have objects at will, 
or vary their properties at our pleasure." 1 If the sense 
experience were not given it could not be produced. But, as 
soon as a sensation becomes anything for thought, an implicit 
rational activity takes place. tiense experience presupposes 
thinking activity. "tiensations become anything for thought 
2 
only throush the action of thought itself." The presupposi-
tions of judgment are involved, defining with reference to 
l. Ibid., P• 37. 
2. Ibid., P• 38. 
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permanent meaning, distinguishing from the flowing impressions. 
In one of his most incisive expressions, Bowne writes, "The 
color sensation must become a sensation of color." 1 
Thus the self is affirmed as an active agent in the 
knowledge process. Bowne insists that impressions of 
sensations "become anything for the intelligence only through 
a constitutive, organizing, classifying sctivity of thought 
upon the impressions."2 
The existence of the object is not a knowledge 
of the object. The object itself cannot pass 
bodily into consciousness, and consciousness 
cannot expand itself and embrace the existing 
object. The mind can do nothing ~ut think, and 
the object can do nothing but be. 
Here is a clear-cut distinction between this type of idealism 
snd what is generally called "realism." Broadly speaking, 
realism is the contention that the knowing mind does not 
create any part of its object. Bowne's position is that 
there is no such thing as a "known" object without the 
organizing activity of the mind. 
(2) In the attainment of knowledge.--Since the world 
of things exists for us only as the mind reconstructs it as 
the world of thought, the next question is: How does the 
mind do this? In the first place, we must be warned that 
Bowne rejects the radical phenomenalism of Kant at this point. 
1. Ibid., p. 40. 
2. 'Ibid •• pp. 44-45. 
3. Ibid., P• 49. 
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He feels that Kant's thoroughgoing phenomenalism ultimately 
leads to the denial even of self as real. 
Where 
be no 
among 
there is no perceiving subject there can 
phenomena; and when we put the subject 
the phenomena, the doctrine itself disappear·s.l 
For Bowne, the self is "the surest item of knowledge we 
2 possess." As discussed above, the self is the presupposition 
even of judgment and without the self knowledge is impossible. 
Sensations which come into the ken of the percipient 
mind are given. At this point, Bowne is realistic with 
regard to the epistemic process. However, he rejects various 
empirical solutions by suggesting that the sensations are no 
more than mere sensations and nothing for thought until they 
become a part of an implicit rational activity. In one 
instructive analogy, Bowne compares sensations to the notes 
of a telegrapher's key, In themselves they convey mere 
signification. Meaning is not explicit. However, meaning 
is supplied by the rational activity of the perceiving aelf.3 
"Knowledge is nothing which can be imported ready-made into a 
passive mind, but the mind must actively construct knowledge 
for itself."4 
1. B.P. Bowne, Personalism, p. 88. 
2. Ibid., p. 88. 
3. Ibid., p. 66. 
4• Ibid., p. 64. 
c. Categories of knowledge. 
How the mind does this is one of the unparalleled 
mysteries of existence. Apparently the mind "organizes" 
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the date of sense under certain "immanent mental principles." 
These "principles"--categories, to use the classical term--
are the "norms by which the mind proceeds, implici t·1t·· or 
explicitly, in fixing, defining, and relating its objects."1 
The categories are unpicturable organic principles by 
which experience and·thought are built up. They are not 
"pigeon holes" or the tools of thinking. Bowne is very 
careful to distinguish his form of categorical epistemology 
from sense empiricism. 
The categories themselves ere not something which 
precede the mind end found its possibility. They 
are rather modes of mental operation. They are the 
forms which the mind gives to its experience, but 
the mind is not to be understood through them. 
Rather they are to be unders~ood through the mind's 
living experience of itself. 
Bowne suggests that viewed from this perspective his system 
might be called "transcendental empiricism" to distinguish 
it from traditional sense empiricism. 
The categories Bowne divides into two groups, 
"phenomenal" and "metaphysical." The former ere those 
presented to the senses and the latter are those which give 
us a world of things but cannot be presented to the senses 
1. B.P. Bowbe, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 59. 
2. B.P. ·Bowne, Personalism, p. 105. 
1 
at all. 
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The "phenomenal" categories are time, number, space, 
motion, and quantity. The metaphysical categories are 
being, quality, identity, causality, necessity, possibility, 
2 
end purpose. 
Bowne warns that the positing of these categories does 
not mean that any one of us makes cosmic reality. He was 
quite insistent that reality exists in its own right. But 
for him the question remains: How does the existent nature 
become an object of knowledge for us? ·The mind weaves the 
"flimsy and unsubstantial materiel" of sensation into a solid 
and abiding world. 
My thought of nature has ill it an objective 
reference, so that I am grasping a content 
independent of my thought; nevertheless, both 
the form and contents of nature, so far as they 
exist for me, are my own product.3 
It is only through these immanent principles of the under-
standing that any knowledge of en objectively existing 
nature can possibly arise. 
d. Dualism of thought and thing. 
The dualism of thought end thing is "ineradicable."4 
1. B.P. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowled!'e, p. 97. 
2. The category of purpose for Bowne is not antithetical to the 
category of causality. The "true antithesis" for him is to 
be found between mechanical ana volitional causation. The 
former is caught in infinite regress, while the latter is 
saved by the cete~ory of purpose end becomes integral to 
Bowne's metaphysics. 
3. Ibid., P• 114. 
4• !OIQ., PP• 296, 309. 
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Bowne asserts that our thoughts cannot be understood in 
relation to things either as their source (subjective ideal-
ism) or as their product (sensationalism), There are two 
orders of movement, one subjective and the other objective, 
He distinguishes them by the terms "thought" and "thing." 
Thought is our conscious life while the latter is not depend-
ant upon us, but exists for all, 
If knowledge is at all possible, there must be some 
relation between the two, The double order must be harmon!-
ous and parallel. The problem will not be solved either with 
a parallelism, as in Leibnitz, or with a simple monism. In 
the former case, "the conception of two entities, mutually 
independent yet groundlessly parallel, is impossible,nl In 
the latter case, a simple monism of thought and thing fails 
to account for errors in judgment. The attempts to explain 
the knowledge process by these avenues simply "leave the 
epistemological dualism of human thought and cosmic being as 
undeniable as ever."2 
e. The self-active person as a catepory, 
In this apparent impasse, Bowne proposes a solution to 
the dilemma, 
Our thoughts are not things, but are valid for 
things; nevertheless, we must at last come down 
to a thinker whose thoughts are things; that is, 
1. Ibid., p. 310, 
2, Ibid,, pp, 306, 309. 
to a thinfer whose objects ere his realized 
thoughts. 
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Only thus can the antithesis of thought end thing be mediated 
end transcended. In this way Bowne reeci,es what he calls_ 
"a true monism which provides for, while it transcends, the 
2 finite dualism." 
The self-active person becomes the ultimate category. 
Things, as products of the creative thought, 
are commensurable with our intelligence and 
are essentially knowable. Both human minds 
end cosmic things must be traced to a co~mon 
source in the creative thought and will.J 
Thus epistemological considerations ha,,e led Bowne 
directly into metaphysics. He affirms a theistic solution 
to the knowledge process in order logically to solve the 
problems of parallelism and dualism or thought and thing, 
subjective end objective,reference, end the category of 
purpose as an extension of causality. 
Bowne's particular form of epistemological speculation 
can be described only by the rather ambiguous term he himself 
proposed, "transcendental empiricism." He seeks to avoid the 
absolute idealism of Hegel as well as the subjective idealism 
of Berkeley. Yet he borrows from both. He is realistic 
"in affirming en objective cosmic system independent of finite 
thinking," but he is also idealistic 11 in maintaining that this 
1. Ibid., P• 310. 
2. !b!a., p. 314. 
3. Ibid •. 
-
system is essentially phenomenal, and exists only in and for, 
as well as through, intelligence."1 
f. Structural fallacies. 
Oneof the characteristic features of Bowne's thought was 
a careful use of logical process. He was not simply a 
"logician" but a thinker who used the tools of clear thinking 
in the service of experience. In an illuminating phrase, 
Bowne suggested that the approach of the philosopher or theolo-
gian to his task of studying the world was not unlike that of 
the surgeon at the operating table. The object of the thinker 
or the surgeon is given, it is not imagined. But to handle it 
properly, and safely, the surgeon and the thinker must "ster-
ilize their instruments." For Bowne this process of "ster-
ilization" meant rigorous attention to clear and logical think-
ing as the presupposition of attaining truth. 
Bowne acknowledges that both philosophy and theology are 
hindered by common-sense propositions which have become 
sanctified as self-evidently true. He calls them "structural 
fallacies," indicating that they are "so inevitable to un-
trained thought that (they) may be called structural, or at 
least constitutional."2 One might venture to suggest that most 
of Bowne's constructive contribution to theology focuses 
around his attention to these fallacies in contemporary 
1. Ibid., pp. 342-343. 
2. Ibid., p. 239 • 
........... 
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thought of his time. His life-long polemic against Herbert 
Spencer is but en extension of his criticism of the fallacy 
of the universal; his attack upon some forms of theology 
represents criticism of theology which relies too heavily 
upon universals, abstractions, end language as definitive 
of revelation. 
Because criticism of these "fallacies" figures so 
prominently in his work, it is proper that their nature 
should be noted here as en integral element of his contri-
bution to the problem of knowledge. 
(1) The fallacy of the universel.--This fallacy centers 
in the misuse of the necessary logical process of universal-
ization. Simply stated, the fallacy "consists in mistaking 
class terms for things, and in identifying the processes of 
our classifying thought with the processes of reality."l 
In thought, the plurality and differences of the facts 
"disappear in the unity and simplicity of the class term."2 
Then we assume (1) that facts themselves have been identified 
end (2) that we have found the true essence of the facts or 
the "original" from which they proceed. Bowne expresses the 
danger neatly when he writes that "• •• harmless logical 
subordination becomes a fatal ontological implicetion."3 
1. Ibid., P• 244. 
2. rora .• P· 245. 3. Ibid., p. 247· 
-· 
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This fallacy is particularly obvious in evolutionary specula• 
tion. The process becomes objective while the facts become 
insignificant. In the course of this dissertation, specific 
examples of this fallacy and others will be noted. 
(2) The fallacy of abstraction.--This is the fallacy of 
universals applied to principles instead of concepts. "As 
the concept may be valid for things without being the thing, 
so principles may be valid for things without being the thing."1 
The use of this fallacy is particularly evident in the "ethical 
casuist, the religious disciplinarian, and the social reformer." 
The general principles are rarely in dispute; but, the prac-
tical question ia how the generalities shall be applied in 
actual situations. Facts must be dealt with as facts. "The 
fallacy of the abstract has always been the great weakness of 
moral reform."2 Men always seem to have less difficulty 
defining abstract principles, than in the application of 
specific programs. 
Moses on the mountain holding up his hand is 
doubtless an important factor, but nothing 
will ever be done until J 0 shua goes down into 
the valley and brings things to pass.-' 
(3) The fallacy of language.--The third "structural 
fallacy" is our tendency to identify the word with the thing 
1. Ibid,, P• 251. 
2. Ib!'Q., p. 254. )'. Ibid., P• 255. 
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so that to change the word is to change the thing. rhis is 
a particularly crucial matter in theology which uses the 
language of metaphor more than any other science. In an 
incisive phrase, Bowne writes,"l good part of traditional 
. 1 
theology is an exegesis of misunderstood metaphors." As will 
be indicated in later chapters, Bowne's contribution to 
theology in his generation was the attempt to get behind the 
metaphorical expression of great religious ideas to discover 
the essential truth which created historical metaphors. 
Another form of this same fallacy is often found in pseudo-
science, a field of human imagination which made Bowne furious. 
This variation consists in the idea that 11 a new name means 
a new thing."2 
It is characteristic of Bowne that his attention to 
clear thinking should not stop with a warning about the 
necessity of logical processes. These "structural" fallacies 
are more subtle than the "familiar fallacies of logical 
treatises." According to Bowne, these structural fallacies 
have wrought, and still work, the greatest 
ravage and devastation in human thinking, 
reducing a very large part of speculation 
and discussion to tedious and sterile 
formalisms and verbal disputes---sterile3 that is, of good, but sadly prolific of evil. 
1. Ibid., P• 261. 
2. 1'6Id •• p. 262. 
3. !Did., p. 263. 
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2. Metaphysha. 
Having dealt with the problem of "how we can know" in 
his epistemology, Bowne turned to the question "what can we 
know." The nature of reality is the subject of his major 
philosophical work, Metaphysics, first published in 1882 and 
revised in 1898.1 With his 'r.heory of Tpought and~Knowledge, 
published in 1897, Bowne sought in the publication of the 
revised edition of the Metaphysics to complete his philosophi-
cal presentation. He commented in the introduction to the 
revised edition, 
My previous work, the Theory of Thought and 
Knowledge, finds its complet<j.bJa;, in this. The 
two together give an outline of the problems · 
of speculative thought, and "set forth a . 
general way of looking at things, which, I trust, 
will be found consistent with it~elf and with 
the general facts of experience. 
After epistemology has established the formal prin-
ciples of thought, "it remains for metaphysics to fix their 
ontological form and significance."3 Beginning with the 
data of experience and the constructs of spontaneous 
thought, the metaphysician asks what elements are needed to 
enable the mind to reach an adequate interpretatio~ of the 
nature of reality. 
Some elements of experience are given in sense-intuition 
1. B.P. Bowne, Meta~hys~cs,,"~Rev. act.; Boston: Boston University 
Press, L!B<J.§/194 ). ,,, . · . 
2. Ibid., P• ix. 
3, Ibid., p. 2. 
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while others are given only in thought. Those given to the 
senses are called appearances or phenomena. Those given to 
thought ere commonly called noumena or reality. Both are 
Rreal" but do not have the same kind of reality. The 
phenomena are reel in that they are not illusions of a person. 
but rather parts of a common sense-experience. On the other 
hand. the "noumenaft are real in the sense that they have 
causality and substantiality. For Bowne. then. the "task of 
metaphysics" may be conceived as "an attempt by a study of 
phenomenal reality to pass to a consistent and adequate 
1 
conception of the causal reality." 
He divides his work into the classical divisions of 
metaphysics: ontology. cosmology. and psychology. Because 
our first sense-intuition is existence. he begins with the 
discussion of the nature of being. 
a. Ontologz, 
(1) Being and thing.--Bowne rejects both abstract and 
ftlumpish" concepts of "being:~ The notion of being ia• for 
him. purely formal. Any doctrine of "pure being" in the 
Thomistic sense is rejected as incapable of real existence 
and inadequate to the functions it has to perform. Popular 
concepts of being as a "core of reality" or a reality that is 
a compound of "beingft and "power" are rejected as simply 
1. ~·· p. 9. 
products of sense bondage or the attempt to be logical with-
out the justification of experience. In a characteristic 
phrase, Bowne writes, "Being is not measured by yards or 
bushels.•1 
How then does one define "being?" Those things exist 
which act. Causality is the determining factor in the 
definition of existence, not a "lumpish notion of being" or 
an abstract logical concept. Things do not exist because 
of a certain quality of "reality.• They are existing because 
they are acting. 
The "essence" of a thing is not to be distinguished 
from its "existence." Bowne suggests that the questions, 
"what is the thing?" and "What is its nature?" are identical 
2 questions. The nature of a "thing" is defined simply by 
its activity. 
L'h!J rule or law whic~ determines the form 
and sequence of a thing's activities represents 
to our thought the nature of the thing, or 
expresses its true essence. It is in ~his law 
that the definiteness of a thing is to be found; 
and it is under this general form of a law 
determining the form and sequence of activit~ 
that we must think of the nature of a thing. 
Things are ontologioally "concrete formulas of action.•4 
Bowne's definition of "thing" is simply an expression of 
l. Ibid., p. 26. 
2. ~ •• p. 30. 
3. ~., P• 30. 
4• Ibid., p. 31. 
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this causal ontology. A theory of being which finds the 
essence of a thing in some simple quality does not provide 
for activity or change, making necessary the introduction of 
some additional element in the definition. On the other hand, 
if an ontology based on simple quality does make provision 
~ change, then it is faced with the problem of identity 
through change. 1 The problem is to find sn ontology which 
provides change and identity. 11The theory which finds the 
essence of a thing in a law which governs both its co-existence 
and its sequent manifestations does make provision for activity, 
and, in some sense, for identity."2 
Bowne is driven to this position by the logic of his 
argument. He admits that lsw is not and cannot be a "thing." 
He is not an absolute idealist in the sense of the term as 
used in some German philosophy which came to equate thought 
and thing. For Bowne, there is "an ineffable difference 
between thought and thing."3 He maintains a skepticism 
about the natura of reality throughout this discussion. 
Whether a thing is ultimately a quality or a law, in any event 
it can appear to our minds only as we conceive it. Because 
that is so, a thing can be described only as the ~aw of its 
activity. 
1. cr. ibid., p. 39. 
2. Ibid:;-p. 40. 
3· I'i5Id., . '·· .. 
- .. 
To know this law is to know the thing in itself, 
or in its inmost essence. The only insoluble 
question in such a esse is how the law can be 
set in reality or made substantial; end this 1 question does not belong to human philosophy. 
(2) Change end identity.-- Having defined 11 thing11 as its 
lew of activity, Bowne now turns to the problem of permanence. 
This is the most common element of our notion of a thing. 
"We think of a thing as active, but still more as abiding."2 
Beginning with an analysis of the two classical discus-
sions of the problem, he summarizes the answers of both 
Elastic end Hereclitien philosophy. The Elastics, with a 
basel principle of being, emphasized the lew of identity 
end thereby provided for permanence. The Heraclitics, on 
the other hand, with a basal principle of becoming, provided 
for change. The problem for metaphysics is the "reconcil-
iation of change end identity."3 
He ventures a definition of change. "In its scientific 
end philosophic sense, Lit implie~7 causal continuity of 
being, end Zii7 identical with becoming."4 As in his 
discussion of "being," Bowne emphatically rejects any notion 
of a "changeless substance with changing states." Aristotelian 
notions of potential and actual existence do not help. 
1. Ibid., p. 43. 
2. Ibid., p. 44· 
3. Ibid •• p. 50. 
4• Ibid., P• 47. 
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Apparently Aristotle is shut up in the Heraclitian flux in 
which identity is impossible. But wthe Heraclitic must not 
triumph.wl 
Although forced to posit a stream of change and affirm 
that "being is process,"2 Bowne suggests that the identity of 
a thing consists simply in the continuity and constancy of 
its law of change. So identity does not consist in the change-
lessness of its substance. The Heraclitic triumphs only in 
a system of impersonal ontology. 
The doctrine of change is made intelligible only with 
ref•rence to an "abiding intelligence.") 
Something must stand apart from the flow, or 
endure through it, before change can be con-
ceived. Hence, as a matter of theory, we must 
have, at least, an abiding or permanent knower, 
to make the theory intelligible; and, as a 
matter of consciousness, we have immediate 
experience of spch a knowing subject--the 
conscious self.'~-
In this view, permanence and identity are simply products of 
the agent's own activity, consc1ousness.5 Thus Bowne has 
solved the Eleatic-Heraclitic dilemma by treating the 
ontological problem from the point of view of consciousness 
or personality. "Instead ••• of interpreting personality 
from the side of ontology, we must rather interpret ontology 
1. Ibid., p. 60. 
2. Ibid., p. 53. 
3. IDI<r •• Po 60. 
4· Ibid •. 
5. Ibid., Po 64· 
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1 from the side of personality." Because we must have identity 
and recognize change, the· problem is forced upon us. The two 
cannot be reconciled on an impersonal plene. As abstract 
principles they are in mutual contradiction. Only as "con-
crete manifestations of living intelligence" which is the 
source of reconciliation of both is the problem resolved. 
To a study of this personal source we now turn. 
(3) Causality and world-ground.--It is necessary to 
distinguish two types of "causality"--that in the inductive 
sense end as metaphysical efficiency. The former is simply 
the description of antecedent causes end is, according to 
Bowne, a misleading use of the word. It tends ultimately to 
the association of antecedent causes with metaphysical 
2 
causality. Obviously it leads in the direction of infinite 
regress. A classic example of this is Bowne's description 
of the psychologist who sets out to "investigate inductively 
the interaction of mind and body, and who fails to perceive 
that, inductively, the causality is mutual."3 The inductive 
inquiry must be distinguished from the metaphysical. Bowne 
seeks to define metaphysical causality, the agency by which 
phenomenal conditions are brought about. 
1. Ibid., P• 66. 
2. cr:-ibid., p. 69. 
3. Ibid-;--
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Interaction, as it is commonly understood, is rejected 
because it "cannot be conceived as a transitive causality 
nl d playing between things • • • Tra itional theories of 
interaction 
derive all their force from the conviction 
that there must be causality somewhere, 
added to the naive assumption of sense-
thought that the objects of perception are 
true ontological beings, and that they ~re 
the only realities in the neighborhood. 
However, interaction of two mutually independent things 
and antecedent and consequent is possible with reference to 
a "mediating third.n3 This form of causality Bowne calls 
"volitional self-determination." It may freely posit the 
dependent and continuous interaction. It may d~termine 
the direction of consequents by antecedents. But "such 
interaction is throughout a self-determination and is not 
forced upon it from without."4 As both being and causality 
are seen to be meaningless abstractions without reference 
to concrete intelligence, Bowne affirms that these categories 
are categories of the intellect and realized only in and 
through the activity of the intellect. 
Interaction between the many must be replaced 
by immanent action in the one. Impersonal 
causality vanishes hopelessly in the Heraclitic 
1. Ibid., P• 83. 
2. Ibid. 1 P• 79. 
3. ID!d., P• ~3. 
4· !'6'Ia.' 
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Fltik. The impersonal itself falls asunder into 
a plurality either in space or time, and we 
seek in vain for any substantial bond. Living, 
active intelligence is the condition both of 
conceptual and of metaphysical unity. Volitional 
causality, that is, intelligence itself in set, 
is the only conceptio~ of metaphysical causality 
in which we can rest. 
Having "exhausted the notion of substance in cause" and 
affirmed the belief that only agents can lay claim to exist-
2 
ence, Bowne proceeds to postulate a world-ground as a causal 
agent. "The infinit.e, then, is not to be viewed as a passive 
substance, but as a unitary and indivisible agent."3 The 
only solution in which we may rest is that of the finite 
being created by the infinite. "The world-ground.muit be 
conceived as free and active intelligcnce."4 
The world depends unpicturably upon God, as our 
thoughts depend unpicturably upon the mind, and 
God is in the world as the mind is in its thought, 
not as a pervading aura or spatial presence, but 
as that active subject by which all things exist.5 
b. CosmolopjY. 
(1) Space and time.--In his discussion of space in 
Theory of Thought and Knowledge, Bowne made quite clear the 
fact that space, whatever else it -y be, is· primarily "a 
mental principle according to which the mind projects and 
1. Ibid., p. 92. 
2. Ibid. i p. 94· 
3· 'Dii(i.' •' . 
4· 'Dii(i., p. 111. 5. !'~)"fa'., p. 119. 
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1 
relates the objects of exter~el experience." The category 
of space is an immanent mental principle in the activity of 
the mind itself. But Bowne does not suggest that we are 
bound here in a Berkelian type of solipsism. He suggests 
discussing varieties of cosmological solutions to the space 
problem before drawing any definite conclusions. 
He proposes three pos"sible positions. The first view 
of space is that it is sui generis, independent of all things, 
including causal reality. 2 This view is simply an inconaist-
•D:dv metaphor borrowed from sense-experience. If space is 
real, then by our previous definition it would have to be 
active to exist. Simply calling it "nothing" still leaves 
the problem untouched. Finally, this theory leads to a 
hopeless dualism.3 
If space be a reality apart from things, it 
is something uncreated and eternal. No one 
would be hardy enough to maintain a proper 
creation of space conceived of as an infinite 
void, fpr no meaning can be attached to the 
phrase.4 . 
A second view sees space as "a certain order of relations 
among realities."5 Bowne indicates that this view leaves 
no unity in spaoe,6 and in fact makes it impossible for a 
1. Ibid., p. l~lj.; of. The or~ of Thoug!J.t and Knowledge, pp. 73-77. 
2. Ibid., .. . ,_' I ,. 
3. TEiiil.' p. 191. 
4· TEiiil •• p. 131. 5. Ibid., p. 134· 
6. Ibid., p. 135· 
- --
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single thing to exist in space at all. The view is impossible 
because formal relations exist only for thought. 
The third view of space makes it a 11 form of intuition 
. and not a mode of existence."1 
We have merely discovered that there is something 
deeper than space, and that spatial phenomena ere 
nothing in which we can rest as ontologically 
ultimate, or as existing apart from mind. Apparent 
reality exists spatially; but proper ontological 
reality exi~ts spacelessly and without spatial 
predicates. 
Cosmologically, we are thrust into a conclusion in 
which the world is one only for and in the divine thought; 
and the world has its place, not in space, but in the divine 
mind. "Thus we are introduced to a world of unpicturable 
relations and of impenetrable mystery."3 
Time, like space, is almost always viewed by the common-
sense perspective' as sui generis. Just as we always run 
aground when we try to picture space, so we do the same 
when we attempt to picture time, for "we replace temporal 
sequence by spatial sequence."4 
The problem here, as with space, is to "distinguish 
between time as "the form of experience" (upon which we all 
agree) and time as a "self-sufficient notion."5 
1. Ibid., p. 137. 
2~ Ibid., p. 143. 
). Ibid., p. 150. 
4~ Ibid., p. 165. 5. Ibid., p. 166. 
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TiMe as the form of experience is universal. But, as 
Bowne has established in his epistemology, "these relations 
are established by the mind itself, and if there were not 
something non-temporal in the mind they could not exist for 
us at sll."1 The conception of sequence is not the same as 
the sequence of conceptions. The awareness of time is timeless 
in the same sense as the ides of space is spaceless. Time, 
therefore, cannot be viewed as a substantive fact but simply 
the realizing activity of the mind of the creator for whom the 
cosmic process has temporal form. "Nothing will meet the 
case except the conception of the absolute person, which 
freely posits s changing world-order without being himself 
involved in the change."2 
(2) Matter, force and motion.--If the phenomenslity of 
space is accepted, the natural iMplication is that all that 
appears in space or in spatial form will itself be phenomenal. 
Thus it is that Bowne criticizes the nsense advocates" to 
whom matter, in the apparent bodies about us, and the move-
ments of the bodies, are ontologicslly real. 
In dealing with this ares of his cosmology, Bowne speaks 
of the "uncertainty of physical metaphysics.") Matter, for 
instance, is no problem on the sense plane. He concedes 
1. Ibid., P• 173. 
2. !b!i., p~ 190. 
3· Ibid., P• 198. 
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that mechanical and physical laws seem to explain adequately 
the nature of physteal phenomena, but he warns thatthis is 
.. 
the limitation of such laws. 
"Being there must be, no doubt, but it does not follow 
that it can be thought in the form ot lumps." 1 In dealing 
with matter, force, and motion we are dealing with phenomena, 
"and not with the essential dynamics of the system." These 
things !Ire unintelligible without fundamental causality. 
Matter is not a. lump, force is not inherent in an atom, and 
motion is unintelligible without the intuition of motion 
itself. The "true efficient causality lies in a realm into 
which science as such has neither the call nor the power to 
2 
penetrate." 
The material world, in which mechanics must be viewed 
as only a science of phenomena, is not simply a compound of 
atoms and their inherent forces, but is rather "the product 
of one infinite, omnipresent, eternal energy by which it is 
continually supported, and from which it incessantly pro-
ceeds. "3 
(3) Nature.--The idea of "nature" is supplied by thought 
to give totality, system, completeness to the whole of ex-
perience. Bowne suggests that it might well be called by 
1. Ibid., p. 198. 
2. ~ •• p. 242. 
3. Ibid., P• 243. 
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other classical names such as "cosmos" or"universe ."1 But 
it is primarily an idea of reason rather than a fact of 
experience. "Experience," says Bowne, "keeps us among 
"2 details • • • • The idea of nature enables us to give em-
bracing meaning to the world as we understand it. 
Nature may be viewed in three ways. First, it may be 
understood as "physical." ~~en this is the case, 
sppee and time, then, furnish the scene; 
matter furnishes the existence; and force 
manifesting i t~elf in motion, furnishes 
the causality. 
Bowne attacks this concept as being simply the superficial 
judgment of the "sense-tribe.• 
Secondly, nature may be viewed as "mechanical." But · 
this common-sense and popular view is attacked on the ground 
that all mechanistic theories of nature are ultimately 
tautologies. Elements such as apace, time, matter, and 
motion explain nothing themselves without taking into account 
concrete forms, relations, laws, and products which emerge 
in interaction. The component factors of a great poem ere 
simply the individual letters of the alphabet, but they do 
not explain either the organization or the meanings of the 
words.4 
Finally, nature may be viewed as the order of law. This 
1. Ibid., 
2. Ibid. 
p. 244. 
3. 1'6TcJ •• p. 
4· 1'6TcJ •• p. 
247-
256. 
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is the only definition of nature in which Bowne will rest. 
"The only definition of nature which criticism can allow is, 
the sum-total and system of phenomena which are subject to 
law.•1 The definition of nature is the sum-total of spatial 
phenomena and their laws. There is no causation in this 
definition nor is there any necessity. It is simply the 
observable phenomenal world. 
To explain what he means, Bowne borrows the Scholastic 
phrase natura naturata, which may be translated simply as 
nature as it is revealed, nature qua nature. An inadequate 
view of nature would be represented by the phrase natura 
naturans, which means •nature 1 naturing'~" This, says Bowne, 
"represents only bad meta~~ysics" and "is simply an idol of 
the sense tribe or of the metaphysical den.•2 
In dealing with the problem of evolution, he asserts 
that the doctrine is merely a description of the phenomenal 
order.3 In harmony with his definition of nature, when 
evolution becomes a "theory of causation" it then is a 
"piece of bad metaphysics produced by bad logic.•4 
Bowne's discussion of the relations of the supernatural 
order to the natural order, and of miracles, will be dealt 
with in a later chapter. 
1. Ibid., p. 262. 
2. ibid., ). YDIQ., p. 272. 4. Ibid., p. 276. 
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c. Psychology. 
(1) Soul and body.•-Bowne deals with the "metaphysics 
of mind" in much the same way as with the "metaphysics of 
nature." Neither involves a study of details, but only of 
"fundamental conceptions on which the doctrine • • • rests."l 
As in his discussion of ontology and cosmology, Bowne does 
not concern himself with the details of a descriptive ex-
position, but only with the basic notions upon which a 
psychology might rest. 
The soul is defined by its activity. "Experience is 
owned: and the owning self which thinks and feels and wills 
we call the soul."2 The reality of the soul is not to be 
found in a materialistic or a vitalistic metaphysics, but 
in the extension of conclusions reached in Bowne's ontology. 
A thing is real because it is able to assert itself in 
activity. 
Things do n·ot have being or substance, but 
they act, and by virtue of this activity 
they acquire the right to be considered as 
existing. In like manner the soul has no 
being in it; but it knows itself as active 
and as acted upon; and in this fact and 
knowledg~ it has the only possible mark of 
reality • .:l 
The soul and body interact under organic form. Bowne 
sees the organism as a "kind of link betwee6 the inorganic 
1. Ibid., p. 299. 
2. Ibid., p. 300. 
3. Ibid., p. 335. 
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physical and the mental," 1 He refuses to be pushed into a 
simple psychic materialism or a crude parallelism. Such 
mind-body solutions run grave risk of being merely descriptive 
or even structural fallacies, Bowne is insistent that the 
connection between soul and body is "logical, not dynamic; 
and any dynamic relation which we may affirm must be seen 
to be only a form of speech."2 
In this view the soul is posited by the 
infinite, and the body is simply an order or 
system of phenomena connected with the soul 
which reproduces to some extent features of 
the general phenomenal order, and which also 
expresses an .. order of concomitance .with ·the 
mental life , • , • The concomitance is the only 
interaction there is; and its determining 
ground must be sought in the plan and agency 
of the infinite. Only in this sense of a 
physical concomitance is it permissible to 
speak of a physical basis of thought, or Qf 
a physical foundation of mental activity,J 
(2} Freedom and necessity,--Bowne notes that common 
sense posits a strong argument for freedom in the so-called 
"moral argument," that freedom is the manifest implication 
of our sense of responsibility and other facets of the moral 
nature, But the argument from the moral nature is indeed not 
the only one, In fact, Bo~ne is emphatic that the assumption 
of freedom is a necessary factor.of rationality itself. "The 
l. Ibid,, p, 355. 
2. !Did., p. 369. 
3. TO!d., p. 368. 
l denial of freedom must lead to the collapse of reason." 
Freedom is defined by Bowne as "the power of self-
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direction, the power to form plans, purposes, ideals, and 
to work for their realization."2 There are certain limits 
placed on freedom by the mind's own nature and by the nature 
of things. There is no such thing as abstract freedom even 
as there is no abstract necessity. Bowne turns to experience 
for support. 
Here we find a certain measure of self-control 
and a certain order of uniformity. The former 
represents the only concrete notion of freedom 
which we possess; and the latter r~presents the 
only concrete notion of necessity. Any~hing 
beyond this is abstract and fictitious. 
In a scheme of necessity, error becomes cosmic and 
necessary, and reason is overwhelmed in skepticism.4 Thus 
"metaphysical necessity" must be replaced by what Bowne 
calls· "uniformity administered by freedom for the attainment 
of rational ends."5 
Here in the unity o:f the free Creator, in the 
unity o:f his plan, and in his ever-working will 
is the only place where the world has unity, 
completeness, and systematic connection. Any 
necessity other than this is found in our re-
lation to the uniformities of the system and is 
1. Ibid., p. 405. (One of the important studies o:f Bowne is 
~ebrand's Speculative Significance of Freedom. Boston 
University Ph.D. dissertation, 1929. J 
2. Ibid.. ' 
3· TiiTd., p. 411 
4· YbTd •• p. 407. 
5. Ibid., P• 418. 
relative to ourselves. We cell it necessary 
beceus1, so fer as we ere concerned, it is 
fixed. 
3. Theism. 
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In his epistemology end metaphysics, Bowne has shown 
the necessity of a self-directing end intelligent world-
ground. This was a bold hypothesis in a generation in Which 
there was little conversation between religion and science. 
His philosophy made it possible to reconstruct religious 
faith along rational lines in s generation in which religion 
was sometimes seen only as the proper study of anthropology. 
"Theistic speculation," writes Bowne, "has suffered greatly 
in the pest from failure to understand its own problem, and 
from having no just conception of philosophic method. 112 
It was his hope to show that "without a theistic faith we 
must stand as dumb and helpless before the deeper questions 
of thought and life as a Papuan or a Pategonian before an 
eclipse."3 
"Theism" was a popular name for philosophical discussion 
about the origins of religion and the metaphysics of creation, 
world, man, and so forth. Were Bowne writing today he would 
probably call his "theism" by the more popular contemporary 
phrase "philosophical theology." The word "theology" was in 
1. Ibid., p. 418. 
2. Bowne4 Theism (2nd ed.; New York: American Book Company, 
3. t;~~~tl?~2,l,. p. 43. 
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eclipse in the late years of the nineteenth century and the 
word "theism" was less offensive to the specu~ative temper. 
It carried no connotations of the sectarian religious disputes 
then current. 
a. God as personal world-ground. 
In his Metaphysics Bowne establishes the nature of the 
world'-ground as "personal." Only the category of intelligence 
can adequately answer the problems raised by change and 
identity, unity and plurality, and, indeed, all existence. 
The world-ground is thus the source of being. "When we come 
to intelligence we must stop in our regress and understand it 
1' 
as intelligence." Only living intelligence can be "sufficient 
reason" in Bowne's system. Since 11 lofic forbids us to ask a 
sufficient reason for. a sufficient reason,•• 2 intelligence 
accepts itself. 
Intelligence implies personality. This does not mean 
a crude anthropomorphism. Bowne constantly warns his readers 
to be cautious at this point.3 Personality means only "self-
knowledge and self-control." 
.Where these are present we have personal being; where 
they are absent the being is impersonal. Selfhood, 
self-knowledge and self-direction are the essence 
of personality; and these have no imp~ication of 
corporeality or dependent limitation.4 
1. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 428. 
2. Bowne, Theism, p. 169. 
3. cr., 121£., p. 169. 
4· 1£1£·· p. 162. 
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So the world-ground is to be understood as "personal." 
(1) The source or the rinite in all its determinations; 
immanence and transcendencee--Bowne was a bitter opponent or 
all forms of pantheism. He established theism as the only 
acceptable alternative. Pantheism makes the world a part 
of God or a necessary consequence or the divine nature. 
1 Theism holds that the world is a free act and creation of God. 
Pantheism generally regards God as world-substance while theism 
regards God as world-cause oli' first-cause. But, as Bowne 
outlines extensively elsewhere, "to explain the universe we 
need not a substance, but an agent; not substantiality, but 
causality."2 
On this view, the world is no part of God, nor an 
emanation from God, The finite (the world) is not produced 
from God but produced~ God--that is, created. 
Only creation can reconcile the substantial 
reality of the finite with the unity of the 
infinite. For the finite, if real, is an 
agent, and as such it cannot be made out jf 
anything, but is posited by the infinite. 
This dependence of all finite things upon God is, in Bowne's 
terms, "metaphysical immanence. 114 As such, this relation 
has neither moral significance nor spatial meaning. We all 
live and move and have our being in God, but there is no 
1. cr., Theism, p. 199. 
2. Ibid., p. 201. 
3. Ibid •. 
4. Ibid., P• 246. 
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particular spiritual or moral understanding involved in this 
type of immanence, It is simply the rational philosophical 
implication of careful speculative thought, 
In his generation faced with a great deal of pseudo-
science and naive religion, Bowne's strictures regarding the 
meaning of immanence and transcendence took on particular 
significance. In expressing the relation of the source of 
the finite and the dependence of the finite on that source, 
Bowne outlines his conception of the transcendent-immanent 
nature of the world-ground: 
The One cannot be conceived as the sum of the 
many, nor as the stuff out of which the many are 
made, neither does it depend on the many; but, 
conversely, the many depend on it, In this 
sense the One is transcendent. Again, the 
many are not spatially outside of the One, 
nor a pendulous appendage of the One; but the 
One is the ever-present power in and through 
which the many exist, In this sense the One is 
immanent. In any other sense the terms are 
words without any meaning.l 
(2) The causal source of substantiality: eternal 
creation.--The problem of time and creation is a common one 
in the history of philosophy. One possibility is to make 
creation only a temporal predicate. By affirmation of an 
"~mpty" time before the creative act, the act is made to seem 
more like an act. This view has the advantage of seeming to 
make creation more clearly an act of will than a doctrine 
1. ~·· p. 245. 
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which would make creation simply a consequence of divine 
nature, Bowne, however, notes that the temporal theory 
merely aids the imagination but confuses the intellect. The 
notion of temporal creation, for example, ~inevitably va1a•a 
the absurd question, "What was God doing in eternity before 
creation?" One recalls Calvin's acid reply to the same query: 
"God was preparing Hell for those who ask that questionl" 
If the Creator is free, then he is eternally free. His 
freedom did not temporally follow his existence but freedom 
is coexistent with his being. There is no incompatibility 
in the notion of eternal creation with divine freedom on the 
one hand or with finite dependence on the other. Eternal 
creation means, simply, "the dependence of the world upon 
God."l 
(3) Teleology: purposive creation.--Just as God as 
World-ground ~epresents the source of the finite world and 
the causality of the substantial world, so also does this 
World-ground express purpose and direction. "A cosmic 
movement without direction and aim could not be the outcome 
2 
of a self-respecting intelligence." 
Bowne notes that "observation discovers no supreme 
end."3 It is impossible to find any aim of the cosmic 
1. Ibid., p. 222 
2. Ibid., p. 230. 
3. Ibid., p. 231. 
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movement in the development of the world-ground. To do so 
would, in effect, reduce it to temporal existence. However, 
there is a sufficient world-goal to be found in the realm 
of moral law and moral persons. Here theistic philosophy 
enters the ethical realm and wimplies notions foreign to 
metaphysics."1 
Concerning the motive of creation, Bowne simply affirms 
that pure speculation can say nothing positive. Tpe only 
matter upon which he would insist is that the motive for 
creation must not lie in any lack or imperfection in the 
2 Creator. For a positive suggestion, Bowne turns to our 
own moral and religious nature. Here, he discovers we refuse 
to be satisfied with any lower motive than ethical love. But 
this is not without complications: 
This fact, together with the positive teachings 
of Christianity, has led to many attempts to 
deduce the system as an outcome of love; but the 
success has been very slight. We are so little 
able to tell !_priori what that love implies 
that we cannot even adjust a large part of actual 
experience to the conception of any kind of love, 
ethical or otherwise. It only remains that we 
believe in love as the source of creation and the 
essence of the divine nature, without,being in 
any way able to fix its implications.-
In discussing the aim of his theism, Bowne hopes "to be 
allowed, if not compelled, to identify the One of speculation 
1. Ibid., p. 231. 
2. Ibid., p. 233. 
3. Ibid., P• 63. 
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1 
with the God of religion." In his theistic framework, he 
has made possible this identification. 
b. Arguments for the existence of God. 
Bowne distinguishes between two classes of arguments for 
the existence of God. They are, first, the inductive arguments, 
including the arguments from ontology, order, teleology, and 
finite intelligence; and, second, the speculative arguments, 
from epistemology and metaphysics. 
The "inductive" arguments "infer intelligence from 
implications" apparent in the world's order, in the natural 
processes which apparently are for ends, and in the existence 
of finite intelligence. The "speculative" arguments are those 
which argue from the reason itself, e.g. from the nature of 
knowledge and from the results of metaphysical criticism. 
Inductive arguments are the most common and most easily under-
stood by the layman. By the same token, they are most often 
misused or distorted. Speculative arguments "are highly 
abstract and demand some measure of training and reflective 
2 power for their comprehension." Bowne admits that the former 
will always be the favorite with popular thought while the 
latter arguments will never be popular. 
(1) Inductive arguments.--(a) The argument from order: 
This argument is drawn from the "obvious and impressive 
1. Ibid., p. 63. 
2. Ibid., p. 65. 
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illustrations of the changeless laws of the world."l 
Inductively there ere only two possible hypotheses--mechanism 
and intelligence, necessity or self-directing reason. 
The letter is adequate end is not far-fetched and 
violent. It assimilates the facts to our own 
experience, end offers the only ground of order 
of which thet experience furnishes any suggestion. 
It we adopt this view, all the facts become 
luminous and consequent.2 
(b) The argument from design: This is similar to the 
argument from order end in the more "subtle minds" it will be 
synonymous. The argument begins by showing that many processes 
in nature are determined by their ends. 
There is concurrence of many factors in a 
common result; and this result, toward which 
they all tend, is viewed as· the final cause 
of their concurrence.J 
With mechanistic philosophers, the design argument is often 
used to teach an external making, again betraying a meta-
physics with an untenable conception of metaphysical prin-
ciples. In a particularly sharp comment, Bowne wrote: 
Under the influence of this fancy, the design 
argument has been much belabored. It has been 
called the carpenter theory--a phrase which, 
while missing the true nature of the argument, 
does most happaly reveal the wooden nature of 
the criticism. 
His positive use of this doctrine is the same as in the 
1. Ibid., p. 67. 
2o 'Ibfa:. 1 P• 70o 
3. I'6'!'0:., p. 86. 
4· lbfa:. 
68 
argument from order, namely, the introduction of the concept 
of' intelligence in the world-ground. 
An end, as such, cannot act except as a conception 
in the consciousness of some agent which wills 
that and. The end, as result, is effect, not 
cause. Hence activity for ends demarcds a pre-
conceiving intell~gence as its necessary im-
plication or condition.l 
(c) The argument from finite intelligence: This is the 
argument that finite intelligence cannot be deduced from an 
unintelligible world-ground. The problem for a mechanist is 
how to deduce the conscious from the unconscious, 
the intelligent from the non-intelligent, the 
purposive from the non-purposive, and freedom from 
necessity. 
(2) Speculative arguments.--(a) The argument !'rom 
epistemology: This argument is the intention of his episte-
mology, namely, that only a thought world sustained by 
intelligent causality is possible. The problem of human 
knowledge involves (1) a knowable, rational universe; (2) a 
knowing human mind; (3) the identity of the categories of' 
human thought with the principles of cosmic being; (4) such 
an adjustment of the outer to the inner that the mind, 
reacting according to its own nature against external stim-
ulus, shall produce in itself thoughts which shall truly 
reproduce the objective fact, and (5) an identity of rational 
nature in human beings.3 
1. Ibid., p. 87. 
2. Ibid., p. 119. 
3. ~ibid., p. 132. 
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These arguments are "so involved in the very structure 
of knowledge that we take them for granted without thought 
of their significance."1 Yet fundamentally, as we have seen 
in the exposition of epistemology, only volitional causality 
is the possible answer to the existence of this knowledge 
process. 
{b) The argument from metaphysics: We have already 
seen that for Bowne .the world is an expression of a thought 
world behind it or immanent in it. The ultimate causality 
is "e supreme intelligence which founds and co-ordinates both 
the thing world and the world of finite spirits."2 The 
problems of metaphysics ere solved with the postulation of 
an idealistic theism. "The dualism of our human knowing is 
founded and transcended in a monism of the infinite, the 
source of both the finite spirit and the cosmic order.n3 
(c) The ontological argument: It is important to 
mention the ontological argument for the existence of God 
which is prominent in the history of philosophy and theology 
but which Bowne formally rejected. In Theism, Bowne indicates 
the nature of the argument and then the classical refutation. 
Basically, the ontological argument is that argument 
which assumes that existence must be among the attributes 
of a perfect being. God is a perfect being and therefore 
1. Ibid., p. 132. 
2. Ibid. 1 p. 145. 3. Ibid., p. 145. 
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must exist. Of this argument, prominent in theology since 
Augustine and made central in Anselm, Bowne declares, 
There is not a shadow of cogency in this 
reasoning. It only points out that the 
idea of the perfect must include the idea 
of existence; but there is nothing to show 
that the self-consistent idea represents 
an objective reality.l 
Thus he dismisses the argument and does not include it in 
his outline of important arguments for theism. However, 
he does admit that he uses it in a "different form" although 
emphatically rejecting its speculative significance. 2 His 
appropriation of the argument is seen in his essay on 
"Incarnation and Atonement:" 
There is a peculiar dialectic in human thought 
whereby we are compelled to think of God as 
perfect or not at all. An imperfect God is 
none. As soon as s higher conception emerges 
we must adopt it into our thought of God, or 
see our faith in him fade out until it van-
ishes altogether. A fairly good God we can-
not abide. We can be satisfied with nothing 
less than the Supreme and Perfect.3 
Bowne does not offer this as "proof" of God's existence 
but rather says that perfection must be a part of our 
thought of God. The notion of perfection does not compel 
us to infer its reality, but does assume that an imperfect 
God would be unthinkable. 
1. Ibid., p. 47• 
2. cr;-ibid., Chapter 4· 
3. Ibid:;-p. 104. 
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B. Some Implications for Christian Theology.--Bowne's 
theistic philosophyuwas not intended to be thor~bgo1ng 
systematic theology. He wrote within the context of phil-
osophical problems and used the language of philosophy. 
However, there is little doubt about the apologetical value 
in his philosophy. As we shall see, this interest in the 
field of Christian thought was not coincidental. After this 
cursory survey of his philosophical works, some implicstions 
for Christian thwology may be drawn. 
1. Doctrine of God 
Bowne's conclusions regarding the nature of the World-
ground lend themselves to the view of historic Christian 
theology. That view is characterized by a definition of 
God as creator and sustainer of the world. Christian thought 
has rejected impersonal causality in favor of a self-active, 
volitional causality and has recoiled from notions of infinite 
regress. At its best, Christian thought has also rejected 
any notion of anthropomorphism. That Bowne arrived at these 
conclusions regarding the World-ground through metaphysical 
and epistemological speculation rather than biblical or 
inductive arguments is instructive for Christian apologetics. 
2. Doctrine of immanence and transcendence 
Bowne's definition of immanence as "dependence of the 
world upon God" and his strictures against pantheism lead to 
a re-thinking of some Christian attitudes toward the problem 
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of immanence-transcendence. Clilrlstian thought has generally 
insisted upon the "otherqess" of God. The finite-infinite 
relationship is not dissolved in the immanentalism of Bowne 
but rather is predicated upon that immanence. Not content 
with a simple realism, Bowne sought to preserve the unity 
of God as well as his otherness. 
3. Empirical religion 
Bowne's emphasis upon the priority of experience as the 
fundamental fact of our knowledge process is consistent with 
and instructive for Christian thought. He does not allow 
his emphasis upon the rational to d~generste into a shallow 
"rationalism." It is clear in his epistemology that the 
rational lies at the very heart of the epiatemic process and 
he calls to our attention the fact that it is indeed a 
difficult thing to be irrational. His emphasis upon the 
fact that cognition precedes analysis, and that we can only 
wait for experience and not create it, and his insistence 
that practical concerns take precedence over speculative in 
some matters have implications for Christian thought. Historic 
Christian thought has been insistent that God initiates 
knowledge and revelation. 
4. Uses of mystery 
Bowne proceeds through his system with a sense of rever-
ence for the mystery behind all speculation and construction. 
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This is a consistent theme in his metaphysics and episte-
mology. Behind our best judgments of the nature of being, 
the world, man, and our ways of knowing, there is mystery 
and we are required to proceed by faith rather than light. 
In an interesting analogy, Bowne compared human attempts to 
reach ultimate definitions to the asymptote in calculus. 
An asymptote is a "right line which an infinite branch of a 
curve continually approaches but does not reach." Our best 
affirmations about the nature of the world,and God, however 
necessary they may be, are like the asymptote that approaches 
but never touches the curve. 1 This reverent handling of the 
material is consistent with and instructive for Christian 
thought. 
1. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 120. 
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II. The Meaning or Revelation 
A. Philosophical Presuppositions 
1. The priority or experience 
One or the most persistent themes in the philosophical 
writings or Bowne is the idea that is expressed in the early 
pages or his Metaphysics: "We must wait ror reality to 
reveal itselr, end our utmost hope is to understand it."'l 
Later he repeats the theme: "We may not seek to const~1e 
the inrinite mind, but must content ourselves with recog-
nizing it."2 
This emphasis upon the priority of experience is 
important in a derinition of revelation. For Bowne, 
recognition is prior to construction. Interpretation 
predicates experience. 
Bowne came to cell his position "transcendental empir-
icism" to distinguish it from "sense empiricism." For him 
ell thought about reality had to be rooted in experience 
and apart rrom experience there would be no assurance that 
conceptions represented any actual rsct. corThe ·.catagortes 
are not something which precede the mind and 
round its possibility. They are rather modes 
or mental operation. The~ are the forme which 
the mind gives to its experience, but the mind 
is not to be understood through them. Rather 
they are to be understood th3ough the mind's 
living experience of iteelf. 
1. Bowne, 
2. Ibid., 
3. iiOW'iie, 
Metalhysics, 
p. 1 9. 
Personalism, 
p. 5. 
pp. 104-105. 
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The meaning of this epistemological solution in spec-
ulative thought is important. Note that explanation largely 
consists of classification. The essential "mystery of 
things" is untouched. The "facts" of experience are simply 
given and have only to be perceived by the mind. 
2. Volitional ground of phenomenality 
Bowne has asserted in his epistemology that the whole 
system of objective experience is phenomenal. The phenomenal 
world is a great mental function depending upon self-conscious-
ness and the synthetic activity of intelligence.l As process 
the world has continuity only for its cause. For the ob-
server the continuity consists in the "continuity of laws 
according to which the process moves and the unity of pur-
pose which underlies it."2 
The phenomenal world is not mere presentation but a 
revelation of the activity of the "Supreme Will.n3 The 
world is God's !£! as well as God's ~· As such its 
causality is volitional; it has what Bowne called "the 
forward look"4 as opposed to a mechanical causality which 
has reference only to past conditions. 
From our point of view, the reason for the 
uniformity of things, or the progress of 
1. Ibid., p. 150. 
2. !DIQ., p. 153. 
3. !'bid., p. 159. 
4• Ibid., p. 180. 
things, or the coming or going of things, 
must be1round at last in the will and plan of God. 
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For Christian thought the implications of this brief 
outline are clear. Revelation is God's self-revelation 
based on his own volition and initiation. The reception 
of revelation by the finite mind is a matter of "waiting" 
for reality to reveal itself. 
B. Revelation as Anti-thaumaturgical 
1. Immanence as condition of revelation 
Elsewhere it has been noted that Bowne defines immanence 
as "the dependence of all finite things on God."2 He is 
careful to warn that this is not immanence in the form of 
deterministic pantheism or disjunctive supernaturalism. 
Primarily immanence for Bowne is to be understood simply 
as God's direct support of the phenomenal activity of nature.3 
Nature is but the form and order of the 
working; and God is the ever-present ruler 
and administrator of what we call nature; 
or< r:athe.r God is the 11 ving Will from which 
nature is constantly upheld.4 
The key to revelation, therefore, is to be aware of God's 
self-revelation in all experience. This led Bowne to assert 
1. Bowne, Personalism, P• 211. 
2. Bowne, Theism, p. 246. 
3. Cf. B.P. Bowne, The Immanence of God, (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1969), p. 3. 4. B.P. Bowne, "Thoufhts For the Present Distress in Matters 
Biblical," Zions Herald, 78(1900), 333. 
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that "Christianity does not affirm an infallible Bible, but 
a self-revealing God" as the heart of its revelatory work. 1 
In his famous expression, Bowne spoke of the "supernatural 
natura!," expressing his faith that causality of the natural 
is always supernatural--that is, the volitional activity of 
God, maintaining the phenomenal world through divine purpose 
and wisdom. 
Bowne used a favorite scriptural passage to illustrate 
this truth of revelation through immanence. He spoke of 
the immanence taught by St. Paul when he 
declares that in God we live end move end 
have our being, end that it is God who 
worketh in us both to will end to work of 
his good pleasure.2 
2. Miracle as implication of immanence 
The thoroughgoiilg_: immanentel position enabled Bowne 
to resolve much of the anxiety created in the discussions 
in higher criticism over the meaning of miracles. "The 
most familiar fact," said Bowne, "is as supernatural in 
its causation as any miracle would be."3 It was on this 
basis that Bowne claimed at his heresy trial that he was 
a "crass supernaturelist.n4 
1. Bowne, The Immanence of God, ~P· 43-44· 
2. B.P. Bowne, 11 Jesus or Christ? , Methodist Review, 
92(1910), 192. Cf. also Theism, p. 246, and The Immanence 
of God, p. 120. 
3. Bowne, The Immanence of God, p. 58. 
4• G. Elliott, ed., "The Orthodoxy of Bowne," Methodist 
Review, 105(1922), 405. 
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As all,phenomena are supernatural from the point of 
view of causation, miracles, as commonly understood, would 
simply differ from other events only in phenomenal relations. 
In 1900 Bowne wrote: 
Personally I have never had much trouble over 
miracles. I believe that God is bound only by 
his wisdom and goodness and will do whatever 
they demand. If uniformity, then uniformity; 
if new departure, then1new departure; if miracle, then miracle. 
He notes that much difficulty in this area arises be-
cause of our misunderstanding regarding the nature and pur-
pose of revelation. Religious thought "has sought to walk 
by sight rather than by thought and feith."2 The result is 
that the conception of revelation has come to be "thaumaturgic" 
--a disjunctive expression of wonder. Proof of faith becomes 
allegiance to detail rather than faith in God. God's 
self-revelation is not pyrotechnic but fundamentally con-
sistent with the existence of life and nature itself. "We 
must remember always," said Bowne in 1903, "that God is not 
engaged in random thaumaturgy, but in reproducing in men his 
own moral image end likeness, whereby we become God's spirit-
ual children."3 
1. B.P. Bowne, "Thoughts For the Present Distress in Matters 
Biblical," Zions Herald, 78(1900), 333. 
2. Bowne, The Immanence of God, p. 120. 
3. B.P. Bowne, "supernatural in Religion," Zions Herald, 
81(1903), 43· 
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c. Reason and Faith 
1. Belief, faith and reason 
Ralph Tyler Flewelling recalls a lecture by Bowne in 
which he was commenting on Kant's skepticism regarding an 
intellectual demonstration of the existence of God. Bowne 
declared that apprehension of God could be reached only by 
faith. Then Bowne added: 11By way of mere speculation we 
cannot attain to demonstration in any field. There is no w~ 
of stopping where Kant stops."1 
11Faith11 --by which Bowne meant "trusta:ld dependence"--is 
a common theme in his works. In the preface to Theism, he 
writes: 
There is an element of faith and volition latent 
in all our theorizing. Where we cannot prove, 
we believe. Where we cannot demonstrate, we 
choose sides. This element of faith cannot be 
escaped in any field of though~ and without it 
the mind is helpless and dumb. 
This does not mean that Bowne's system was merely fideistic 
or irrational. Quite the opposite is the case. Reason and 
its use is at the center of his system. Knudson, writing 
in 1934, could say, "Bowne's theology was emphatically a 
rational theology. 113 But this must be understood in context. 
Bowne's theology was rational on the basis of terms outlined 
1. R.T. Flewelling, Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, 
(Hew York: Methodist Book Concern, 1915), p. 96. 
2. Bowne, Theism, p. iv. 
3. A.C. Knudson, "Bowne as a Theologian," Zions Herald, 
~120:9~4), 'll0)7. 
by him in 1888. The rational is that 
which accords with the fundamental laws of 
thought ••• which is viewed as fitting 
into an intelligible system ••• which hai 
evidence of purpose, outcome, final cause. 
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In other words, he sought rationality in. the deepest sense of 
that term. He had no idea of fitting revelation into a 
strait-jacket of abstract logic oi speculative fancy. Reason 
was a tool for the discovery of truth and he "belinved very 
sincerely that it was careless thinking and not logical think-
ing that would hurt the cause of religion."2 
Eventually thought arrives at the "deepest questions," 
and beyond them is "impenetrable mystery." Bowne spoke of 
"limit-notions" in thought. Limit-notions are notions which 
"the facts force upon us, and which are perfectly clear from 
the side of the facts, but which from the farther side are 
lost in difficulty and mystery."3 At this point the "element 
of faith" is brought to bear on the facts and decision is 
reached. 
Faith as trust and dependence must center in particulars. 
Bowne was very critical of any form of spiritualism or 
mysticism that did not relate itself to content. In a letter 
to Hartman in 1908, he said, 11Ihha:ve not the slightest 
1. B.P. Bowne, "Theology and Reason," Zions Herald, 
66{1888), 401. 
2. J.T. Carlyon, "Bowne in the Classroom," Personalist, 
28{1947). 271. 
3. Bowne, Theism, P• 38. 
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patience with the great bulk of what the professional mystics 
1 have said." Religion was a matter of commitment to a faith 
and not simply a vague openness at the end of speculation. 
Reason is not abdicated but completed. In a striking phrase, 
Bowne concluded: 
It still remains our faith that the absolute 
reason at the center of things sees all things 
in rational connection; but our rea~on is 
neither absolute nor at the center. 
Christianity does not solve the intellectual problems of 
life and the world. "It rather outflanks them by a revela-
tion of God which makes it possible to thustand love him, 
notwithstanding the mystery of his ways."3 
2. Fallacy of illicit process as method 
The limits of reason and logic are often spoken of in 
Bowne's writings. Ona of his favorite expressions was the 
famous "life is deeper than logic." Surprising, therefore, 
is the statement in Theism that "logically considered," his 
"entire system :)f fundamental belief rests upon a fallacy."4 
The fallacy in question is called "illicit process." 
Illicit process involves reaching a conclusion that does 
not follow from the premises. Bowne describes it as an 
1. L. Hartman, ed., "Letters To a Student," Zions Herald, 
125(1947), 849. 
2. B.P. Bowne, ~at is Rationalism?", Independent, 
40(1888), 100. 
3. B.P. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, (Boston: H0 ughton 
Mifflin Co., l909), P• 24, 
4· Bowne, Theism, p. 316. 
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argument in which "our conclusions are too large for the 
premises."1 It is the opposite of the fallacy of petitio 
principii, or "begging the question." In the latter fallacy 
the premise depends upon the conclusion. 2 The fallacy of 
illicit process is.used when we "illustrate" proofs by ex-
perience rather than deducing proof from experience. 
We illustrate by picked facts, and this passes 
for proof. Of course it is not proof, but only 
an illustration of pre-existing conceptions. For 
one who has not the conceptions and the inter~sts 
expressed in them, the argument is worthless.J 
Bowne intista that logic is right in pointing out the 
"non-demonstrative character" of arguments from illicit 
process. But he asserts that "undemonstrated ideals are still 
the· real foundation of our mental life."4 Without implicit 
faith in them no progress can be made in any field of thought. 
Unless these ideals are "positively disproved," we are right 
in accepting our conclusions despite the violation of formal 
logic. 
Theism is the "sum and source" of non-demonstrable ideals 
that rule our lives. "By the aide of this great faith and 
its great results the formal objections of formal logic sink 
1. Ibid., pp. 316-317. 
2. Cf.l R. Whatley~ Elements of L~ic, LLondon: John W. Parker 
184~ (9th ed.)_;; also Oxford glish Dictionary: "Illicit 
process that form of syllogistic fallacy In which a term 
not distributed in the premises is distributed in the 
conclusion." 
3. Bowne; Theism; P• 317. 
4· ~·· p. 317. 
into an almost despicable impertinence."! 
Bowne's frankness in labeling his method as logically 
fallacious points up an important aspect of his entire system. 
He refers in several instances to the "limits of reason" or 
the "misuse of reason." Tbe human intellect must always be 
restrained by criticism. and experience. This is true in all 
intellectual and moral endeavors, But when reason begins 
to be misused as in speculation without disciplined thought 
or in the use of reason to support principles which destroy 
reason, 2 then it becomes rationalism and 
begins to distort ita own principle and begins 
to slide off into that petty mental arrogance 
which has made rationalism a synonym for §ll 
that is hasty and shallow in speculation,J 
3. Pragmatism sa criterion 
A number of commentators have noted the pragmatic 
emphases in Bowne's writings, both philosophical end theo-
logical, Among these ere;'coe,4 Strickland,5 and McConnell,6 
A complete study of Bowne's "pragmatism" was made by Edward 
1. Ibid,, P• 317. 
2. !Did •• p. 120. 
3. B:1: Bowne, ~at is Rationalism?", Independent, 40(1886), 
100. 4· G.A. Coe, "The Empirical Factor in Bowne's Thinking," 
Methodist Review, 105(1922), 380-383; also in Studies in 
Philosophy and Theology, E.C, Wilm, ed., PP• 17-21. 
5. F.L. Strickland, "Pragmatism and the Personal Philosophy," 
Methodist Review, 92(1910), 598-604. 
6. F.J, McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne. Ct. Chapter 9: "Bowne 
and Pragmatism." 
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T. Ramsdell in a doctoral dissertation entitled "Pragmatic 
Elements in the Epistemology of Borden Parker Bowne."l 
Ramsdell concludes that Bowne had two methodologies 
which he did not succeed in harmonizing. 
For /_BowniJ the· field of thought was fundamentally 
divided between that portion which rested upon 
objective grounds and that portion which rested on 
subjective grounds. And this reflected an essential 
dualism in Bowne's view of the mind, for it set 
interests and feelings over against the theoretical 
reason, life over again*t logic •••• Bowne attempted 
to harmonize the two sides of the mind-life by making 
the theoretical reason instrumental with respect to 
the practical •••• But if interests and feelings are 
determinants of the beliefs even in their general 
form, then theoretical reason cannot be autonomous 
with respect to them, although it is left supreme 
in the realms of logic, and mathematics, science 
am metaphysics .2 
In the case of a conflict between the two methodologies of 
knowledge as in the case of a metaphysical view and a reli-
gious be lief, 
~ •• the practical must be given the supremacy, 
for opposing facts or theories must not be allowed 
to destroy faitb; they must be held as simply not 
yet understood.) . 
This ~pragmatic" strain in Bowne 1 s epistemology is 
traced by Ramsdell as :far back as 1879, the year that Bowne 
first published Studies in Theism. Ramsdell finds there 
1. E.T. Ramsdell, Pragmatic Elements in the Epistemology of 
Borden P. Bowne, Boston University Ph.D. aissertation, 1932. 
/Ramsdell published excerpts :from his dissertation in the 
~ersonelist, 15(1934), 305-315; 16(1935), 23-35, 132-141~ 
2~ Ibid., P• 158~ 3. !biCI •• f' • .,,- ..... 
-.
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nearly every element which we have distinguished 
and defined and clearly expressed: (1) the 
emphasis upon the determinative character of the 
interests and feelings of the mind (65,66,69): 
(2) the validation .of our cognitive postulates 
in terms of the satisfaction of our subjective 
cognitive interests (69-72); (3) the criterion 
of workability and results (69); and (') the 
conception of truth as fruitful (115). 
The most important evidence of early pragmatism is to be 
found in an article published in 1884, "The Logic of Religious 
Belief."2 In this article Bowne makes emphatic his assertion 
that the mind is "practical rather than speculative."3 
The mind does not ask whether it has a right to 
live, but it lives; and in living it develops a 
frame-work of principles which represent the 
. conditions of its fullest life. It has no time 
to speculate; it. assumes. It has not ·time to 
theorize; it takes for granted. The pressure 
of practical existence is upon it; and it must 
adjust rtself practically before it can attend 
to speculative problems.~ 
In the matter of religious faith, it is subjective factors 
which will be determinative. -whatever the mind demands for 
the satisfaction of its subjective interests and tendencies 
may be assumed as real, in default of positive disproof."5 
1. Ibid., pp. J19-150. 
2. i3.'P. BOwne The Logic of Religious Belief, 11 Methodist 
Review, 66tlB84), 642-665; This article is apparently 
an extension of a brief satirical article which appeared 
earlier that year in the Brooklyn Independent; "Science 
Must Go," 36(1884), 98. This article discussed the 
practical appropriation of experience, suggesting that 
the arguments generally directed against religion if 
used against speculative science would destroy that 
discipline. 
3. ~·· p. 647. 
4· !£!..!!·' p. 648. 
5. ~·· p. 652. 
On this pragmatism, Bowne is free to embrace his 
doctrinal theology without fear of inner contradiction. 
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His theological writings end, especially in later years, his 
other books take on a decided religious pragmatism combined 
with a skepticism regarding speculative endeavors. In the 
posthumously published collection of sermons entitled The 
Essence of Religion, Bowne concludes: 
God finds his way to the faithful and loving 
heart not by speculation, but by self-revelation 
in the inspirations of the Spirit and the tender 
ministries of the Comforter.l 
The epologeticel uses of Bowne's thought come clear in 
a discussion of the meaning of revelation. (1) The priority 
of experience and the voluntaristic causality of his meta-
physics make for easy transition to traditional cnristian 
categories of revelation and creation. (2) The erophssis 
upon immanence being a statement of the dependence of the 
finite upon the infinite preserves the traditional Christian 
insistence upon essential transcendence and immanent activity. 
(3) His emphasis upon the practical nature of belief and 
the limits of reason with regard to subjective questions 
allows a Christian world-view without being either irrational 
or "rationalistic." The basic Christian doctrine of rave-
letion insists upon the priority of God in his self-disclosure 
1. B.P.~Bowne, The Essence of Religion, (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1910), P• 66. 
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and the radical otherness of finite creatures, This dis-
tinction is quite possible within the apologetical frame-
work here outlined by Bowne. 
• 
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III. The Bible 
A. Bowne and Higher Criticism.--The career of Borden 
Parker Bowne spanned one of the most turbulent periods in 
American church history. The first effects of the radical 
criticism of the German scholars were beginning to be felt 
in American universities and the inevitable clashes between 
professors and students on the one hand and professors and 
ecclesiastical authority on the other were coming. It is 
significant that one of Bowne's earliest published articles 
was an attack on over-confident higher criticism, and that, 
at the close of his career, he was to be tried for his 
adherence to the principles ot higher criticism. The years 
of his effective work were years in which he had constantly 
to be a critic both of thoughtless and destructive criticism 
and of equally futile Biblical literalism. 
1. Attack on David Friedrich Strauss - 1874 
'While a student at Halle, Bowne reviewed David Friedrich 
Strauss' book The Old Faith and the New. 1 The review appeared 
the year of Strauss' death. The book represented the cul-
mination of the negative criticism of the New Testament 
which had been the main feature of the German scholar's work. 
New Testament thought had moved from the old orthodox 
1. B.P. Bowne, "The Old Faith and the New, by D.F. Strauss, 
a review," Methodist Review, $6(18741, 286-296. 
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acceptance of miracle stories, to rationalistic interpretation, 
to radical skepticism. 1 The so-called TUbingen school, of 
which Strauss was an exponent, finally accepted a mythological 
interpretation which had the effect of destroying the his-
torical bases of revealed faith, making Jesus "a myth which 
as symbol set forth a noble and beautiful ideal, but without 
any considerable historical basis in an actual personal 
career. "2 
Such a concilmion naturally lad to the demand for a new 
formulation of faith, and Strauss replied with his book. 
The tragedy was apparent to one of a metaphyscial temper like 
Bowne, because, once out of Biblical research--where his 
contributions were really immense--Strauss was not nearly 
so formidable. Briefly, his thesis was total pessimism, 
seeing the universe as nothing but a vast, impersonal, grind-
ing machine whose wheels crushed men and ideals without 
remorse.3 
Bowne attacked mercilessly. When Strauss paid respect 
to the beauty and dignity of the "old faith," Bowne quoted 
in commenting on these Pf:~Ssages the ominous words from the 
gospels describing the treachery of Judas, "Hail, Master! 
1. Cf., Albert Schweitzer, The %uest of the Historical Jesus, 
(New York: Macmillan Co. Z19 §71916). 
2. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, p. 42. 
3. Bowne, Theism, p. 312. 
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And he kissed htm.•l The severity of the attack gives a 
clue to the pitch at which the theological-biblical discus-
sions were raging in that period as well as an indic.ation 
of the sharp tongue that was to characterize Bowne through-
out his career. 
It was on metaphysieal grounds that he dealt with Strauss. 
The idea that one could launch such a weak system from so 
' 
sacred a source as the Bible was a grim one for the young 
student. Strauss' careless metaphysics and destructive 
theology seemed to be using holy things for unholy purposes. 
The destruction of Biblical faith was followed by the sub-
stitution of such emptiness that its hollowness was self-
evident to Bowne, and he could not understand anyone taking 
Strauss seriously. 
The proposition to erect truth into an object 
of reverence and worship seems like proposing 
to adore the fact that the earth turns on its 
axis once in twenty-four hours, or that water 
will not rise in a pump above thirty-three 
feet. Neither of these propositions seems 
adapted to be read or su~g in the churches or 
chanted around an altar. 
McConnell notes that Bowne did not discern the worth of 
men of the Tubingen school and of Strauss himself until after 
he left Europe.3 Later he came to have a solid respect for 
the critics. At the end of his life, Bowne commented that 
1. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, p. 42. 
2. B.P. Bowne, WWhat Is Truthf•, Independent, 36(1884), 1185. 
3. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, p. 44. 
the mythical theory of Strauss and the writings 
of the Tubingen school gave Christian scholars 
something to think about for a time. It can 
hardly be pretended by anyone acquainted with 
the literature that current negative writings 
have anything like the solid and original 
scholarship of those men. 
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Bowne always considered the Bible as central to a 
healthy religious perspective. Therefore destructive or 
negative criticism tended to negate what he felt to be the 
essential purpose of its authority. Writing about those who 
set up mystical or non-biblical faiths, Bowne notes that 
the religion of the spirit is a very important 
fact, but when it sets up in opposition to the 
religion of a book, the light that is 1n it is 
apt to turn to darkness, Individual dark lanterns 
never contribute much to the light of the world,2 
The essential purpose of the Bible as a revelatory agent in 
faith is clearly expressed by Bowne in 1888 in a comparison 
between it and speculative work. 
In the development of speculative thought, the 
world of fact has always been the great corrector 
of theoretical aberrations; and with that world 
all theories have to reckon. In the development 
of religious thought, the Bible has occupied 
much the same position.3 
2. Defense of Hinckley G. Mitchell 
Bowne's most immediate involvement in Biblical contro-
versy begBn in 1895 when his colleague on the faculty of the 
1. Bowne, "Jesus or Christ?", Methodist Review, 92(1910), 
191. (Post.) 
2, Bowne, The Immanence of God, p. 110. 
3. Bowne, "What Is Rationalism?", Independent, 40(1888), 100. 
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Boston University School of Theology, Professor Hinckley G. 
Mitchell, was subjected to severe fire for his "critical" 
theories regarding the documentary hypothesis of the 
Pentateuch. Mitchell was a scholar of unquestioned ability. 
He had studied in Germany and had breathed the fresh air of 
Old Testament research there. McConnell described Mitchell 
as •a singularly open and honest mind, with a simplicity of 
spirit amounting to naivete."l After he had taught at the 
school for twelve years, a mild controversy broke out in 1895 
when his appointment normally would be up for review by the 
bishops of the Methodist Episcopal Church. At that time, 
seminary teachers were subject to approval by at least two 
bishops, but the bishops would not give sanction without a 
majority vote. With a number of the bishops not having had 
seminary training, such a situation proved to be quite 
pregnant of danger. A mild student revolt against Mitchell 
was quelled and the issue was quiet until 1900 when it broke 
out again in full force. In this period Bowne actively 
sup?orted his friend Mitchell. In 1905, when Mitchell was 
finally sacrificed to the equivocation of both trustees and 
bishops, Bowne was in the Orient and unable to participate.2 
1. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, p. 180. 
2. For excellent accounts of the controversy see H.G. Mitchell, 
For the Benefit of My Creditors, (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1922). 
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In this case (1900), Bowne took the position which he 
followed in theological discussion throughout his career--
what he regarded as essential orthodoxy. He did not allow 
a critic to label him as a heretic without fighting back in 
defense of his own "orthodoxy." This became very clear in 
his trial in 1904 when his whole defense was based on his 
orthodoxy. His counsel at the trial, James M. Buckley, 
commented on Bowne's theological views: 
Had the testimony shown that Dr. Bowne believes 
and teaches Christ to be less than God: that 
His sufferings ware only those of a martyr; 
that all men finally will be saved; or that 
beyond this life men who have deliberately 
rejected the Gospel find another probation, 
the Select Number, composed as it was, would 
have convicted him on the spot, ani his counsel 
LBucklezYwould have forsaken him. 
McConnell notes that it was Bowne's "bold support" that was 
decisive in preventing Mitchell's dismissal in 1900.2 
The passion of Bowne's defense is nowhere better illus-
trated than in an article prepared for the Brooklyn Independent) 
Underlying our faith in the Scriptures is a 
still de•per faith--namely, faith in God, faith 
in the ti'uth, faith that the truth can never be 
permanently harmful, faith that all good causes 
should rejoice in the truth and must finally be 
furthered by the truth. Without this funda-
mental faith in God, our Christian faith will 
1. J.M. Buckley, "The Acquittal of Professor Bowne,"New York 
Christian Advocate, 79(1904), 573. 
2. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, p. 181. 
3. B.P. Bowne, "What is of Faith Respecting the Scriptures?", 
Independent, 52(1900), 919-921. 
alwa7s have s secret reserve or hidden fear 
about it, a fear that if all the facts be known 
faith might be embarrassed, or made impossible. 
Hence result suspicions, respecting science, 
doubts concerning the freest inquiry, attempts 
to blink the results of investigation, author-
i\a~ive assurances where evidence and argument 
fail, and all other fruits of darkness in which 
Christian apologetics too much abound. But 
with this faith we need have no fear from any-
thing that is real, and no fears for anything 
that is good. Recognizing that at best we know 
only in part, and that we walk by faith and not 
by sight, but believing nevertheless that this 
is God's world, we may be of good courage and 
open-e7ed at the same time, ready to give up 
anything which in the fire of criticism proves 
to be wood, hay, or stubble 0 and hospitable to 
any new truth which ma7 appear, from whatever 
quarter. And any Christian who occupies a 
lower platform than this shows thereby a secret 
unfaith at the heart of his faith and a fear 
of bringing it to the light lest it should be 
found baseless. It is instructive but not 
edifying when a great Christian body deals with 
its heretics without once raising the question 
of truth, but onll of agreement with the con-
fession of faith. · 
The thinly veiled reference to the deliberations of the 
bishops is telling. 
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After the exhausting year in which he himself had to 
face trial for heresy (1904), Bowne embarked on a world 
tour, of which more will be said later. In his absence, 
the Mitchell esse came up for discussion once again. This 
time the bishops were adamant and the school was anxious 
to have the whole problem dispensed with, so Mitchell was 
asked to resign. In J~e, Bowne wrote to Professor Knudson: 
1. ~·· p. 919. 
Mitchell is perfectly orthodox, and I do not 
think that at present, whatever may have been 
the case ten years ago, any complaint is to be 
made of his methods of teaching. It would be 
too ridiculous to have dropped him for holding 
views which are held by a large number of the 
bishops themselves, and which in the scholarly 
world are about as well established as geology 
and the Copernican astronomy. 
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It is interesting to note how much apologetic work in 
Biblical interpretation Bowne did at the turn of the century. 2 
His participation in the defense of Mitchell undoubtedly 
hastened his own trial in 1904. But the issues were clearly 
drawn and battle was waged on two fronts by Bowne. On the 
one hand he struggled to bring light to those who worry 
"over the geology of Genesis"--the Biblical literalists who 
lack imagination and scholarship. He referred to them 
collectively as "dementalized textarians."3 On the other 
hand, he did not forget the dangers or extravagant criticism 
which was equally rampant at the time. 
It also appears how inverted is any study of 
the Bible which does not begin with its central 
ideas and essential facts. It is this inversion 
of the true order which leads to a missing of 
the good news of God in disputes about dates, 
1. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, p. 182. 
2. Cf., B.P. Bowne "Studies of the Christian Life," Zions 
Herald, 77(1899~, 78-79 1 108-109, 142-143, 172-173, 206-207; 
"Thoughts for the Present Distress in Matters Biblical," 
Zions Herald, 78(1900) 1 298-300 1 331-333; ~at is of Faith 
Respecting the Scriptures," IndeEendent, 52(1900), 2684-
2686; "The Supernatural and the ible," Zions Herald, 
81(1903), 1302-1303; "The Inerrancy of the Scriptures," 
Zions Herald, 76(1898), 7. 
3. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 5. 
authorship, and swarms of insignificant details; 
so that we cannot see the great Christian facts 
from being taken up with the que.3tion whether 
the dead man really did come to life when his 
corpse touched the bones of the prophet Elisha, 
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or whether the lost axe really did swim. Concern-
ing both of these grave problems it is possible 
for closet lo§ic to remind us: "False in one, 
false in all. But of persons who have some 
sense of reality some will be inclined to reply 
with Hus,"Ssncta simplioatusl" While others will 
~espond more directly, "FUdgel"l 
That he was able to maintain a mediating position in this 
controversy, to speak authoritatively with incisive logic 
and Christian conviction, and still to maintain a sense of 
humor and perspective is one of the outstanding feats of 
his life. 
B. Bowne 1 s View of the Bible •. --A thorough reading of 
Bowne's books and articles leads to the conviction that he 
was deeply immersed in the literature of the Bible. He makes 
constant use of Biblical illustration and metaphor, even in 
his technical works. McConnell indicates that there is little 
doubt that Bowne shared the general current theories about 
the Bible current in his youth. In his discussions of 
evolution, however, he "lighted almost at the outset on the 
idea that if we once get hold of the truth as to the Cause 
back of evolution, the method of the evolution itself is 
2 harmless." This principle came to be carried over into all 
1. BQhe~owne, "The Inerrancyof the Scriptures," Zions 
Herald, 76(1898), 7• 
2. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, p. 182. 
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of Bowne's work. He was supremely concerned with causality 
and rather unconcerned with details. Therefore the inerrancy 
and infallibility arguments were simply beside the point 
for him. In the trial in 1904, Bowne expressed this faith: 
I do accept and use the language of the Scriptures. 
It has never occurred to me to find the least 
difficulty in them •. I do not butt against analogy. 
I am after meanings.l 
1. The language of faith 
A few months before his death in 1910, BoliDe addressed 
the seminary students' night at the Boston Methodist Social 
Union. Speaking informally, Bowne has given us the best 
picture of his mature Christian faith to be found. Free 
from the acidity of much of hi& writing, spoken in the 
context of the fellowship of his school and his colleagues, 
Bowne spoke frankly of the meanings of faith for young 
ministers. Reminding them that conditions outside the 
seminary were going to be different, he said, "We do not 
need 'higher criticism' every day, but we need the living 
faith in God all the time." To those who yearned for critical 
argument and to "put some champion of error to flight," Bowne 
had these pastoral words: 
~at your peopli( want is to know God, and to 
believe in His infinite love and condescension, 
1. G. Elliott, ed., "The Orthodoxy of Bowne," Methodist 
Review, 10$(1922), 411. 
to believe that the Infinite cares, and that 
He is infinitely near, and there is an Almighty 
Friend in whose hands we continually are. And 
I am very sure that if in our preaching we deal 
with these things, these other questions (of 
higher criticism) will fairly take care of 
themselves. 
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This attitude was so prominent in Bowne that he allowed 
a rather thoroughgoing pragmatism in the uses of the Bible. 
Its value is to be determined by what it proves itself to 
be in the life of the individual, not what it is proved to 
be in an abstract theory either literal or critical. Ria 
faith was that tested in this way the Bible clearly is 
revealed in its supreme significance. In a happy analogy, 
he remarked, "Whatever spots we find on it, it still remains 
the sun."2 This whole emphasis on "pragmatic" appropriation 
has been dealt with exhaustively in Ramsdell's dissertation.3 
Illustrative of Bowne's use of the Bible in this respect 
is his scorn for those who force doctrinal views or views 
of conduct supposedly deduced from personal interpretation of 
the Bible upon others. He once spoke to a group of con-
servative preachers in Boston, saying, "If you can't believe 
in God the Father, and his Son our Lord, and the Blessed 
Spirit, without also believing that the whale actually 
1. B.P. Bowne, "Address to Methodist Social Union: Students' 
Night," Zions Herald, 88(1910), 267-270. 
2. ----------, Studies in Christianity, p. 38. 
3. E.T. Ramsdell, Pragmatic Elements in the Epistemology of 
Borden P. Bowne, Boston University Ph.D. dissertation, 1932. 
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swallowed Jonah, by all means hold fast to the literalness 
of the narrative." McConnell, witnessing the scene, recalled 
that the audience broke out in shouts of applause. When 
the applause died, Bowne smiled and said, "But don't ask me 
to do so."l 
Bowne insisted that honest faith was the attitude for 
approaching the scriptures. He wes critical of the liter-
alists because of what he called their "unfaith" and the 
naturalists and atheists because of their sentimentality in 
method. 2 Only one who approaches the scripture with a sense 
of its religious significance is able to find its truth. 
No one is fit to give an opinion of the value of 
the Scriptures who overlooks this religious use 
of them, and the fact that by this use the great 
majority of God's saints have been nourished end 
are still nourished. It is to explain this fact 
that devout scholars have long spoken of the 
testimonium s~iritus sancti as the great warrant 
of Scripture. 
Such an attitude of reverence was the sign of participation 
in the Christian fellowship. 
This only is of faith respecting the Scriptures; 
that they contain a revelation of God which is our 
great source of hope, of courage, and of ins-ira-
tion. Whoever holds this and works for the king-
dom of God is of the household of faith.4 
1. F.J. McConnell, "Borden Parker Bowne," Methodist Review 
105(1922), 348; also McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne; p. 185. 
2. cr. B.P. Bowne, "concerning the 'Christian Consciousness'," 
Independent, 37(1885), 36. 
3. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 53. 
4• B,P. Bowne, '~at is of Faith Respecting the Scriptures?", 
Independent, 52(1900), 921. 
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2, The Bible and revelation 
In his famous sermon "The Christian Revelation," the 
baccalaureate address delivered before the graduating classes 
of Boston University in 1896, Bowne summarized his definition 
of the Christian revelation. He began with his text: 
"The entrance of Thy words giveth light." 
Psalms 119:130. •Lord, to whom shall we 
go? Thou hast the words of eternal life." 
John 6:68. 
His first few words stated the historical faith: 
I read these two passages as suggesting the 
excellence of the Christian revelation and its 
completion and perfection in the appearance 
and work of Jesus Christ our Lord. At sundry 
times and in divers manners God spake unto the 
Fathers by the prophets; in the fullness of 
time He revealed Himself by a Son.l 
In the two quotations from scripture, Bowne bad stated his 
faith in the role of the Bible in revelation. He states that 
"the Bible is the historical ai)d literary record" of the 
revealing movement. 2 "The entrance of Thy words giveth light." 
On the other hand, the Bible also is the place where we 
learn what the revelation is. "Thou hast words of eternal 
life. "3 
The Bible may be a hindrance to the truth or revelation 
if it is misunderstood. Bowne notes that "a good deal of 
1. B.P. Bowne, "The Christian Revelation," Zions Herald, 
74(1896), 374· 
2. Ibid •. " ,., • 
3. Ibid.: ;~ •. , . ., • 
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traditional theology has been little more than an exegesis 
1 
of misunderstood metaphors." 
The important matter for Bowne was to convince men 
that the Bible was indispensable to faith and Christian 
belief, but it was not revelation itself. The content of 
revelation was a self-revealing God of grace and holiness. 
God was in the movement out of which the Bible 
came, and in it in such a way that out of it we 
have won a supremely valuable knowledge of God. 
Whatever else was or was not there, God was there, 
guiding the movem0nt for his own self-revelation. 
This is2the true and only Christian faith in this matter. 
Through long centuries of the movement of God in history, 
the scriptures became the record of that self-revealing. 
Whatever of myth or legend or error there may 
be in the Scriptures, it does not remove the 
fact that they nevertheless contain the supreme 
religious treasure of the race. If we would 
know what God is and what he me@ns for men we 
must first of all turn to them.J 
It was Bowne's faith that the facts of Christian revels-
tion will be abiding and that Christian scholarship has 
ultimately no destructive effect. 
All the changes of conception among Christian 
scholars concerning the mode and method of 
revelation leave these facts standing. After 
1. Ibid., P• 375. 
2. B:P7 Bowne, ~at is of Faith Respecting the Scriptures?", 
Independent, 52(1900), 921. 
3. Ibid., P• 921. 
1~ 
Copernicus had overturned the theoretical 
conception of ancient astronomy men still lived 
on the earth and walked in the light of the sun; 
and after all the changes wrought by biblical 
scholarship in our conception of the mode of 
revelation we still live only by the1spiritual truth which it has brought to light. 
1. Ibid., p. 921 • 
........... 
PART TWO: DOGMATICS 
IV. GOD 
A. The Nature of God.--Bowne divided the attributes of 
God into two classes, metaphysical and ethical. The former 
attributes are those which refer to the divine nature; the 
latter, to the divine will. In outlining these attributes, 
Bowne consciously sought to show that the implications of 
religion and speculation were identical. In Theism, when he 
talks of "world-ground," he moves into the terminology of 
religion and suggests that the terms "God" and "world-ground" 
should be used interchangeably. 1 One notes that Bowne did 
not feel it necessary to discuss some of the traditionally 
conceived theological attributes. He suggests that beyond 
the distinction of metaphysical and ethical attributes 
"the various classifications of the divine attributes in 
which dogmatic theology abounds have no significance for 
either speculative or religious thought."2 
1. Cf. Bowne, Theism, P• 173. 
2. ~·· p. 172. 
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1. The metaphysical attributes: divine nature 
a. U:nity. 
This attribute is a necessary postulate of interaction. 
As has been demonstrated in epistemology and metaphysics, 
there can be no interaction without a conscious unified will 
comprehending it. The doctrine of unity is a denial of 
unorganized composition.· It is not necessarily simplicity, 
because simplicity leads to nothing and explains nothing 
in itself. The idea of God must contain some provision for 
the manifoldness and complexity of the world. The problem 
of unity can be solved only by positing the free intellect. 
The free and conscious self is the only real 
unity of which we have any knowledge,and 
reflection shows that it is the only thing 
which can be a true unity. All other unities 
are formal, and have only a mental existence.l 
The metaphysical necessity for unity leads to the 
theological affirmation that God is the only God. This is 
the assertion of the "speculative necessity" of monotheism 
rather than henotheism. The thought of many Gods leads to 
the same confusion seen in the thought of space and time 
as pre-existent necessities to which God himself must submit. 
God would not then be independent and self-existent, but a 
finite and conditioned being in an interacting universe. 
The unity of the world-ground means, the~ not 
only that it is uncompounded, indivisible, and 
without distinction of parts, but also that there 
1. ~·· pp. 174-175· 
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is but one such fundamental existence.l 
b. Unchangeability. 
Some speculative theology, according to Bowne, has so 
"emphasized the unchangeabillty LOr Goi7 as to lose the 
living personal God altogether.•2 Here, as he has indic8ted 
elsewhere, we are victims of our tendency to assume the 
"sense metaphysics or spontaneous thought." But cosmic 
movement cannot be explained by sameness of existence or 
substantiality of the world-ground. 
The ghingelassness of being consists not in 
such an ontological rigidity of fixed monotony 
of being, but rather in the constancy and 
continuity of the law which rules its several 
states and changes. The unchangeability of 
God means only the constancy and continuity of 
the divine nature which exists through all the 
divine acts as their law and source.3 
As with unity, the problem can never be solved on the mechanical 
plane, but only on the plane of free personality and living 
experience. "The changelessness we need is not the rigidity 
of a logical category, but the self-identity and self-
equality of intelligence."4 
Bowne notes that religious thought, "as distinct from 
theological thought," has meant something dif~erent from 
this formula. It has sought to sft:irm the "independence and 
1. Ibid., p. 177. 
2. Ib'Ia:.' '. •. -~· . . . 
3. Ibid., p. 178. 
4· Ibid., p. 179. 
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eternity of God in opposition to the dependence and brevity 
of man." It has also sought to be an ethical predicate, 
illustrating the constancy of the divine judgment. But in 
this latter realm the discussion passes from metaphysical 
and theological categories into an area of personal faith. 
c. Omnipresence. 
This attribute concerns God's relation to space. Bowne 
has already shown the untenability of a substantial space. 
Omnipresence would be impossible in space considered as 
volume or an aggregate of parts. 
Space appears to us as a limitation, although 
space is really but the form under which our 
dynamic limitations appear. Omnipresence means 
a denial of these limitations. Immediate action 
means presence; immediate action which extends to 
all things means omnipresnece. God, • 1 • as immanent in all things, is omnipresent. 
The theologiclll meaning is simply that we are forced to 
deny that space is a limitation or a barrier for God. His 
activity and our access are made real by this doctrine. 
Speaking of prayer, Bowne notes that "if the finite wishes 
to act upon God, say by prayer, neither the prayer nor the 
person need go wandering about to reach end find God; for 
we live and have our being in him; and he is an -:pre'sertt 
2 power in us." The doctrine of omnipresence is made nec-
essary, furthermore, by the claim from our discussion of 
1. Ibid., p. 180. 
2. Ibid., pp. 180-181. 
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metaphysics that space is not ontological reality and has 
only a mental existence. 
d. Eternity. 
As omnipresence concerns God 1 s relations to space, 
eternality concerns his relations to time. A common con-
ception of eternity is "endless duration." Bowne notes that 
religious thinkers, in general, have been unwilling to 
identify this conception with divine eternality. They have 
sought, rather, "to place it in opposition to all time, as 
denoting an existence above and beyond all temporal limits 
and conditions."1 The attempt is designed to project the 
divine relation to time as to space as a superior or 
transcendental one. 
Another common thought is that time is a "boundless 
form" which God fills out with duration the same way he fills 
out space with his extension. Both these views are meta-
physically untenable because they make time an independent 
reality and violate the necessary unity of the world-ground. 
way: 
Bowne describes the nature of eternality in the following 
There are certain features in our relation to 
time which cannot be affirmed of the world-
ground. Thus we are subject to slow develop-
ment; we come gradually to self-possession; we 
grow old and pass away. This we express by 
1. ~·· p. 182. 
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saying that we are subject to temporal limits 
and conditions. In none of these respects can 
the unconditioned world-ground be subject to 
time, but must rather be non-temporal. A being 
which is in full possession of itself, so that it 
does not come to itself successively, but forever 
is what it wills to be, is not in time so far as 
itself is concerned. Such a being would have e 
changeless knowledge end a changeless life. It 
would be without memory and expectation, yet in the 
absolute enjoyment of itself. For such a being 
the present alone would exist; its now would be 
eternal, and its name, I Am. For us the uncondi~ 
tioned world-ground, or God, is such a being; and 
he is not to be viewed as conditioned by time 
with regard to his own self-consciousness and 
self-possession. But only in the self-centered and 
self-equivalent personality Cbn we transcend the 
conditions and the sphere of time. God, in himself, 
then, is not only the eternal or ever-enduring; he 
is also the non-temporal, or that which transcends 
temporal limits and conditions.l 
e. Omnipotence. 
As in his analysis of the previous attributes, Bowne 
follows his general metaphysical position in defining 
omnipotence. The assumption is that the world-ground is 
not e substance but en agent. 
There are two tendencies in the common view of omnip-
otence. One view sees God as able to do the doable, but 
limited by a few necessities which cannot be transcended. 
The other views God as lifted above all limitations end able 
to do all things, the impossible as well as the possible. 
Neither view is satisfying to religious or speculative 
thought. 
1. ~·· p. 184. 
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Bowne asks us to turn to experience for understanding. 
Our concrete experience shows that freedom, to have any 
significance, must be based on uniformity or fixity; on 
the other hand, fixity to have any value must be allied 
with freedom. "Pure necessity cancels reason. Pure 
arbitrariness c~ncels reason. It is only in the union of 
fixity and freedom.that the rational life is possible."l 
Omnipotence, then, is neither arbitrariness nor 
uniformity as such, but the attribute of God in which he is 
incessantly constituting himself the rational 
and absolute spirit. God is absolute will or 
absolute agent, forever determining himself 
according to rational and eternal principles.2 
f. Omniscience. 
Bowne begins his discussion of this attribute by asking 
if untrained thought is untenable in stretching omniscience 
to include foreknowledge of the unknowable in the same way 
that omnipotence is often stretched to include the impossible. 
"As omnipotence must be limited to the doable, so omniscience 
must be limited to the knowable."3 
The problem of foreknowledge of free choices is "the 
chief difficulty in omniscience" for popular thought. Some 
theologians have asserted foreknowledge and denied freedom. 
Others have asserted freedom and denied foreknowledge. 
1. Ibid., p. 197. 
2. Ibid., p. 198. 
3. Ibid., p. 18~. 
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Soma have affirmed both. On the assumption of a real time, 
these are problems and it is difficult to find a way out 
of them. One answer is to postulate ways of knowing in 
God that are "inscrutable" to us. 
The problem is solved for Bowne on the basis of the 
doctrine of time discussed earlier. 
On our own view of the ideality and relativity of 
time the problem vanishes in its traditional form, 
and nothing remains but the general mystery which 
shrouds for us the epistemol~gy of the infinite 
and existence of the finite. 
2. The ethical attributes: divine will 
a. Moral goodness. 
Bowne notes that the human mind is not content with 
metaphysical descriptions of the nature of God. Men demand 
a "religious" conception. More often than not the metaphysical 
conception, however a priori in logical progression, has 
followed the religious conception. The metaphysical 
attributes are "ethically barren." They furnish the possi-
bility of an ethical nature, but they do not imply it as 
a necessity."2 
There are two ways of demonstrating the ethical char-
acter of God. The first is to appeal to experience to prove 
that the world-ground proceeds according to ethical prin-
ciples. The other way is to argue from the affirmation of 
1. Ibid., p. 190. 
2. Ibid., p. 249. 
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faith in the perfect ethical character of God. Bowne uses 
a combination of the two. 
The empirical argument for moral goodness, according to 
Bowne, is derived from three sources: our own moral nsture, 
the structure of society, and the course of history. The 
first two point to a moral author and the last reveals a 
power not ourselves making for righteousness in history. 
For Bowne the method of arguing from moral effect to 
moral cause is as solidly established as the matter of 
deducing intelligence from intelligent cause. 
As there is no known way of deducing intelligence 
from non-intelligence, so there is no known way 
of deducing the moral from the non-moral; except 
of course, by the easy, but unsatisfactory way 
of begging the question.l · 
Neither spontaneous thought nor speculation can give any 
better account of the origin of the moral nature in man 
than to argue from the moral character of God. 
Another argument for the moral nature of God comes from 
the structure of society. Bowne notes that "the nature of 
things is manifestly on the side of righteousness."2 There 
are signs that ethical virtues are, in fact, great utilities. 
"The tendency of virtue is to life, while the final wages of 
sin must be death.n3 And society is organized on moral 
principles with moral ends. The implication must be, 
1. Ibid., pp. 2$1-252. 
2. Ibid., p. 255. 
3 ~ ....... _, 
• ~·· n, 
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therefore, that a good God has intended us to live together 
in society as righteous persons. This is the same con-
elusion as that drawn from the argument from history. 
But Bowne warns that these empirical arguments are 
greatly limited. &while they may serve to illustrate and 
confirm our faith, they are plainly not its source. They 
all rest upon picked facts, and ignore some of the most 
prominent aspects of experience.•1 
Bowne proceeds to note the evidence of goodness in the 
world and admits that we have no evident perfect goodness. 
Having aeen limited goodness and finite wisdom, we general-
ize to perfect goodness and perfect wisdom in which we 
believe. We do this only by force of our faith in the ideal.2 
Admittedly, this argument may be used to prove the ultimacy 
of the oppo'a!Jil; of goodness. But, having gained the con-
ception by faith, we return to the world for illustration • 
• • • ~ mind prefers rather to maintain its 
faith in the ideal, and to set aside the con-
flicting facts as something not yet understood, 
but which to perfect insight will fall into 
harmony. This. assumption is made both in the 
c~tive and. the moral realm; and so far as 
logic goes, it is as well founded in one as in 
the other. In both cases our procedure is not due 
to any logical compulsion; it is rather ar. ··act 
of instinctive self-defense on the pert of the 
mind, wpereby it seeks to save its life from 
1. Ibid., P• 256. 
2. Cf. lbid. 1 p. 257 • 
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destruction. This implicit teleology of life 
leads with equal necessity to the affirmation 
of a Supreme Reason and a Supreme Righteousness.l 
b. Holiness. 
Bowne was impatient with the tendency of "speculative" 
theology to set up elaborate schemes of separate attributes 
of God. In Theism he notes that "a good deal of ingenuity 
has been shown in adjusting their relations.•2 At his trial, 
Bowne humorously made reference to this tendency when he 
recalled a "theology which taught that in God there was one 
essence, two processions, three persons, four relations, five 
notions, and a circumincession.•3 The ethical nature of 
God is sufficiently determined for all thought, ethical and 
speculative, as being holy love. "Love without holiness 
would be simply well-wishing without any ethical content; 
and holiness without love would be a lifeless negation•~; 
Contemporary theology will note the absence here or 
any full-scale discussion of such attributes as justice and 
wrath. "Holiness" is deemed by Bowne as comprehensive 
enough to be adequate and descriptive enough to avoid non-
moral or forensic connotations. Bowne was fond of the text 
"Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?"5 His 
1. Ibid., p. 258. 
2. Ibid., P• 266. 
3. G. Elliott, ed., "The Orthodoxy of Bowne," Methodist 
Review, 10$(1922), 407. L-eircumincession" is the reciprocal 
existence in each other of the three persons of the Trinity~ 
4· Bowne, Theism, P• 286. 
5. Genesis 18:2$. 
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confidence in God's justice wss implied both in his thought 
that holiness included "devotion to goodness" (and therefore 
active sharing in the human predicament) and in his concern 
for God's earnestness in commanding obedience to his will. 
·One is reminded here of Emil Brunner 1 s remark in his ~ 
ll:}lristllche Lehre -.on Gott to the e.ffect that "God takes 
himself as God seriously."1 
B. Immanence and Tranacendence.--The relation of the 
doctrine o.f immanence to revelation has already been dis-
cussed in an earlier chapter. It is necessary, however, to 
state more explicitly the meaning of this doctrine and its 
converse--traDscendence--in Bowne's definition of the 
nature o.f God. 
The doctrine o.f immanence was a characteristic .feature 
of liberal thought in the late nineteenth century. In fact 
it was "perhaps the most important" tenet of so-called 
liberal Protestantism, according to Dillenberger and Welch.2 
It had immense significance in releasing thought from the 
impasse o.f the alternatives of literalistic biblicism on 
the one hand and blind scientism on the other. Albert c. 
1. E. Brunner, Die Christliche Lehre von Gott, (Zurich: 
Z~ingli-Verlag, 1946), p.lb?. *Gott nimmt sein Gott-Sein 
1 ernst'--und das ist das Einzige, was ganz ernst 1st und 
sus dem alle recbte Ernst Kommt. 1Gott lasst seiner nicht 
spotten. 1 "(Gal. 6:7.) 
2. John Dillenberger and Claude Welc.h, Protestant Christianity 
Inter reted Throu h Its Develo ment, (New York: Charles 
cribner s Sons, 1 17. 
11.5' 
Knudson spoke for many of his generation when he said of 
Bowne's doctrine of immanence that it 
saved me from what Olin A. Curtis called "the 
unspeakable curse" of a crude realism. It put 
God back into the structure of the universe from 
which the Copirnican astronomy had apparently 
banished Him. 
Francis J. McConnell spoke of Bowne's conception of the 
immanent God as 11 the fundnmental thought of Bowne in 
theology."2 
Essentially, immanence may be defined as "the presence 
and working of God within the world rather than upon it."3 
Bowne's definition is as follows: 
This doctrine we call the divine immanence; 
by which we mean that God is the omnipresent 
ground of all finite existence and activity. 
The world, alike of things and of spirits, is 
nothing existing and acting on its own account, 
while God is sway in some extrssideresl region, 
but it continually depends upon and is ever 
upheld by th19 ever-living, ever-present, ever-
working God.!+ 
The doctrine of transcendence may be described as that view 
of God's relation to the world in which there is a radical 
otherness implied between God's activity and the natural 
world. We have already seen how Bowne's metaphysics posits 
1. A. C. Knudson, "Bowne- as a ·Theologian, 11 Zions Herald, 
112(1934), 10.57. 
2. F.J. McConnell, "Memorial Address: Borden P. Bowne," 
Zions Herald, 88(1910), 492. 
3. Dillenberger and Welch, Protestant Christianity Interpreted 
Through Its Development, p. 217. 
4. Bowne, The Immanence of God, P• 3. 
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an immanentel world. Nature, for Bowne, is but the form and 
order of God's working. God is the ever-present admin-
istrator of nature. "God is the living Will from which 
nature forever proceeds and by which nature is constantly 
upheld."l Elsewhere Bowne states the condition clearly: 
Now nature is no rival of God, but the form of 
His manifestation. The laws of nature are His 
modes of working. The fact~ of nature ere the 
incarnation of His thought. 
The implications of this world-view for theological 
thought are apparent. The older distinction between natural 
and supernatural came in for revision. This crested some 
serious misunderstanding in a generation of biblical liter-
alism. For Bowne, an event was natural in that it related 
to a system of law; but it was aupernatural in that it also 
rooted in the divine will and ceusel1ty.3 The events of the 
world are to be viewed as natural in form and supernatural 
in cause. The result is a breaking down of the idea of a 
radical disjunction between natural and supernatural. "The 
commonest event, say the fall of a leaf, is as supernatural 
in its causation as any miracle would be; for in both alike 
God would be equally implicated."4 Bowne confidently asserted 
1. Bowne, "Thoughts for the Present Distress in Matters 
Biblical," Zions Herald, 78(1900), 33i. 
2. Bowne, "Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation," 
Living Age, 266(1910), 453. 
3. Bowne, "nistinguo," Independent, 50(1898), 696. 
4• Bowne, Immanence of God, p. 18. 
that 
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for sometime, at least, the keynote of religious 
progress must be found, not in vague end illiterate 
utterances about the supernatural, but rather in 
the divineness 1of the natural end the naturalness of the divine. 
The liberating influence of this emphasis in liberal 
thought cannot be overestimated. Not that Bowne was alone 
in urging immanental conceptions of God, but he certainly 
shared in the movement to recapture the early Christian 
notion of 11 the universal presence of the Divine Word in the 
2 
world process." Commenting upon the tendency of Christians 
in previous generations to depend upon miracle for explanation 
rather then description of God's activity in the world, 
R. Seaberg hew written: 
Miracle was once upon a time the foundation of 
all Apologetics; then it became a crutch for 
Apologetics~ and today we might say that it hes 
become the cross" of Apologetics.j 
Immanence made possible the preservation of traditional 
theological formulations as well as the correcting criticism 
of naturalism. To the troubled Christian mind, miracle as 
a form of revelation is at once accepted and broadened while 
causation is made the source of the natural world. As Bowne 
explained, 
1. Ibid., p. 150. 
2. DII!enberger end Welch, Protestant Christianity Interpreted 
Throu~h Its Development, p. 217. 
). ~uote by E. Brunner, Revelation and Reason: The Christian 
Doctrine of Feith end Knowled e, trans. Olive Wyon 
Pi ede pis: Westm ns er ress, 1946), p. 305. 
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The cosmic order is not the rival of God, but is 
simply the continuous manifestation and product 
of the divine activity. There is no longer any 
reason for being afraid of naturalism, for natural-
ism is now merely a tracing of the order in which 
the divine causality proceeds. 1 
While the doctrine was gaining popular support, Bowne 
warned of excesses in its appropriation. Critics of this 
liberal tradition have noted correctly that often the doc-
trine shifted into a form in which the distinction between 
finite and infinite was difficult to maintain. For theology 
(and, in Bowne's case, for philosophy) the result of such 
speculation was disaster. Bowne wrote in 1898 that 
not a few well-meaning theologians and religious 
editors ere talking somewhat at random about the 
divine immanence as if it settled about all the 
questions of speculative theology. If this keeps 
on we shall find this doctrine as2great a source of error as the one it displaces. 
In the same article, he noted three points that must be kept 
in mind 1n estimating the doctrine of divine immanence if 
we are not to fall into "speculative insanity." The first 
suggestion is that "the doctrine applies only to causality" 
and not form, laws, and so forth. Secondly, the doctrine 
"in no way affects the contents and value of things" but 
simply affirms dependence of being on God. Finally, the doc-
trine "throws no light on the problem of finite existence."3 
1~ Bowne 
2~ B.P. 
3. ~·· 
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Bowne was always alert to the danger in his system or 
slipping over into a pantheism wbicb vitiated any ·finite-
infinite possibility. He wrote tbat the mutual otherness 
of the-finite and inrinite is "nacessary if we are to escape 
the destruction of all thought and life."1 He noted that 
"in crude thought this immanence takes the form of a species 
of deterministic. pantheism which is altogetloer impossible."2 
On the other hand, a moral universe would be impossible with-
out a clear distinction between the finite and the world-ground. 
How the finite can be, how it can have otherness 
to the Inrinite and a relative ~ndependence, there 
is no telling. But the finite, nevertheless, is; 
and, by its existence, it makes possible a moral 
order and an intelligible rational system. The 
doctrine of the divine immanence must be inter-
preted in accordance with this fact; otherwise 
we shall have to regard the brothel as a divine 
inatitutioxi, and hold to the gospel of the divine 
oyster •••• Yet, rightly understood, the doctrine 
is important, both speculatively and religiously. 
It cancels the hard-and-rast mechanism of deistic 
thought; it makes intelligible the divine 
omnipresence, and helps us to realize how the 
Infinitely Far may also be the Infinitely Near.3 
Transcendence, in Bowne's system,becomes simply the 
arfirmat1on that all finite existence depends for its being 
upon the activity of God. God is not the sum of the many 
finite manifestations nor the stuff out of which the many are 
made. God transcends them in the sense that his activity 
1. Bowne, Personalism, p. 284; Metaphysics, p. 102 •. 
2. B.P. Bowne, 0 Jesus or Christ?*, Methodist Review, 92(1910), 
192. 
3. B.P.-Bowne~ "Divine Immanence," Independent, 50(1898), 842. 
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is the predicate of their existence and meaning. On the 
other hand, the finite is not spatially outside God. But 
God "is the ever-present power in and throu,.h which the 
many exist. nl In this sense God is immanen·t, 
Recalling his methodology, the practical appropriation 
of faith postulates and the uses of illicit process, Bowne 
describes "the kind of God we need." 
What is really needed is, not a God who blocks 
existence by absorbing ell things into himself, 
but the living and immanent God in whom we live 
end move and have our being, and whose tender 
mercies are over ell our works; a God also in 
whom revelation and mystery mingle, who comes 
near enough for love, and ri~es high en.ough for 
awe and voiceless adoration. 
C, The Moral Understanding of God.--Writing from Germany 
in 1874, Bowne was filled with despair for German thought 
which seemed to have collapsed in exhaustion after a century 
of heated theological debate. He saw, in Germany, theolo~y 
divided between "faith" and "ethics" so that confessional 
conformity was more to be desired than moral or ethical 
purity. Writing from Halle, the young student said, 
It can hardly be questioned that the ethical side 
of Christianity has never found adequate recognition 
in our Protestant theology. Faith has been made 
a kind of talisman whereby the possessor could 
reconcile an offended God and ward off deserved 
punishment. Morals! What has a Christian to do 
1. Bowne, Theism, P• 245. 
2. Ibid,, p. 218. 
with morals? It is a fatal act of unbelief to 
trouble oneself with the remonstrances of 
conscience. Hance, the odious results we so 
often meet of piety which goes hand in hand 
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with trickery and dishonesty and ~ religion 
which is divorced from conscience. Pre-eminently 
do we suffer from this divorce here in Germany. 
This vigorous insistence upon a moral theology was to char-
acterize Bowne's thought throughout his entire career. We 
have already seen how God's righteousness is deduced from the 
moral nature of man. It is now necessary to indicate in more 
detail the relati-on of a moral God to moral man. 
1. The "filial" definition of man and God 
a. Obedience the test of faith. 
Bowne often spoke of the "filial spirit" in man. This 
phrase means a recognition of man's sonship to God. 
We are not children of the kingdom because we are 
filled with awe before the midnight heavens, or 
in some great cathedral, or at some magnificent 
religious servtca •••• These things are possible 
without one spark of loyalty to God or love to 
man. We are children of the kingdom, if at a~l, 
because we are bent on doing the will of God. 
This "filial" obedience is called by Bowne "the deepest 
thing in religion."3 In his famous sermon, "Obedience the 
Test of Discipleship," Bowne begins with the words, 
Obedience is the test of religion. This is what 
the Lord requires of us, and this is all the Lord 
1. B.P. Bowne, "The Materialistic Gust," Independent, 
26{1874), 3. 
2. B.P.-Bewne, "But Are They Converted?", Zions Herald, 
81(1903), 302. 
3. lhP• ·Bowne, The Essence of Religion, p. 62. 
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requires of us, the filial spirit issu~ng in lives 
of obedie.nce to his coiii!DaDdlllents .1 
The distinguishing mark of a Christian is "that his will is 
set to do the will of God."2 The doing of God's will is the 
one and only sure mark of grace and discipleship. 
This thoroug~q,l:irlg!.,; emphasis upon "filial obedience" 
must be understood in relation to the times. Bowne lived 
in a period of great respect for the emotional revival as 
a mark of God's preser~ce. Theology had only recently moved 
beyor1d the naive notions of an earlier generatior1 in which 
"each fluctuation of felling was ir~terpreted as a mark of 
divine favor or disfavor, without ar1y s~spicior1 of the laws 
of emotional periodicity and of their physical and temper-
amental conditions."3 
Bowne would be the last to deny that religion had real 
and deep emotional factors. One of the most touching of his 
letters tells of his own emotion at viewing a statue of 
Christ in Denmark. 
At Copenhagen we went to the Thorwaldsen Museum 
and to the Church of Our Lady where the famous 
group of Christ and his apoatles is found. No 
other Christ compares with this. Christ seems so 
majestic yet tender, so regal yet so winning, 
removed by such infinite-heights, yet ao con-
descending as to be infinitely near. Thorwaldsen 
seems to have aimed to unite both the invitation 
1. ~·· p. 211. 
2. Ibid.> p. 218~ 
3. Ibid., P• 221. 
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and the benediction. When I first glanced at it 
I said "That is the way Christ must have looked 
when he said, 'Come unto me,' and underneath is 
written 'Come unto me.' 
Again I thought that the attitude was one of 
blessing and underneath I found the words "Lo, 
I am with you always." The pierced hands and the 
side show that the moment is that of the Ascension 
and of his final benediction on the disciples. But 
the other text shows that the other moment was in 
his thought also. I looked at the marble for a 
long time without noticing the text, and when I 
was filled and almost overwhelmed in its presence 
I read below 1Lo, I am with you always.' It seemed 
to me almost as if He spoke himself to me. I could 
not keep back the tears and could scarcely refrain 
from sobbing aloud. I wanted to kneel down and 
pray, it would have been a joy and relief. But 
there were others in the church, so I entered the 
closet of my own heart and having shut the door 
I prayed to Him who aeeth in secret.l 
Clearly emotion has a rightful place; but, acc~ng to 
Bowne, the only essential ingredient of religion is right-
eousness. He defines "righteousness" as obedience. The 
prophet 1 s injunction in Micah 6.: 8--"What does the Lord require 
of you but to do justice, love mercy and walk humbly with 
your God?"--is called by Bowne "the Magna Charta of spiritual 
religion.•2 Paraphrasing it, Bowne writes 
Religion in its essence is righteousness and good-
will toward men and reverent humility and obedience 
toward God. And this, as we have seen, is no 
lonely utterance of (the) prophet; it is the under-
lying idea of both prophetic and apostolic teach-
ing, as well as of the teaching of our Lord.3 
1. B.P. Bowne, "Letter from Copenhagen," Bostonia, 10(1937), J.4. 
2. lii,.P .. --Bowne, The Essence of Religion, p. 75. 
3· !!2.!!!·' ,, 7~. 
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Bowne recognizes the many-sided nature of religion. 
But he is insistent·that the only adequate test of religion's 
adequacy is .the test of righteousness. 
I know very well that reH.g:llcn is not exhausted in 
righteousness ••• but I do say it is the sum of 
God's demands on us, and it is the central thing 
in our relation to God.l 
Bowne paraphrases the "love chapter" of I Corinthians, 
using "obedience" in place of "love." 
Obedience is the only test recognized by the Master. 
Though we should speak with the tongues of men end 
of angels, and had not obedience, we should be but 
sounding brass and cla~ging eymbals. And though 
we spoke in the social meeting, and were eloquent 
in public prayer, and bore testimony to wonderful 
outpourings and upliftings and spiritual mani-
festations far beyond those of common Christians, 
and bad not obedience, it would profit us nothing. 
And though we had a wonderful conversion and be-
came quite unconscious through the exceeding 
abundance of the outpouring, and had not obedience, 
we should be nothing. The Master mentions none of 
these things as conditions or tests of disciple-
ship; but He was very particular about obedience. 
When He called Simeon and Andrew and James and John, 
they left all and fQllowed Him, and thus beca~e 
his disciples; and the same rule holds still. 
b. Moral proof of God's presence. 
A popular theological argument of Bowne's generation 
consisted in deducing evidence for the nature of God from 
social moral progress.. Succeedibg generations were not to be 
1. B.P. Bowne, "But Are They Converted?", Zions Herald, 
81(1903), 302. 
2. ~~P. Bowae, "Obedience the Test of Discipleship," Zions 
Herald, 81(1903), 10. 
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so confident of this, but in the late nineteenth century 
there appeared to be ample evidence to support the doctrine. 
Writing in 1900, Bowne expresses his faith that 
the great proof of God's presence in history and 
the sole significance of that presence lie in 
the moral realm. '!'he slow moralization of life 
an~ society, the enlightenment of the conscience 
and its growing empire, the deepening sense of 
responsibility tor the good order of the world 
and the well being of men, the gradual putting 
away of old wrongs and foul diseases and blinding 
superstitions,--these are the great proofs of 
God in history.l 
Bowne objected to tests for the presence of God which were 
"physical prodigies." 
The believer in God 1n history has sought for him 
largely in strange and striking events, in historical 
crises, in marvelous coincidences, rather than in 
the orderly movement and progress of human life and 
society ••.•• They are not looking for God in the 
moral realm, but in the field of physical prodigies, 
and have eyes for scarcely anything else. But the 
great proOf of God 1.s pl'es(lnce in history and the 
sole significance of that presence lie in the mental 
and moral rea1m.2 
2. The "obligated" God 
An important element of Bowne's moral theism is the idea 
of an "obligated" God. By this ia meant that Bowne believed 
that God assumed some responsibility for his creation in a 
moral as well as a physical sense. 
Dr. L.D. McCabe once asked Bowne, "Do you think God would 
have made this 'universe· with all its tragedies if He had 
1. B.P. Bowne, "Thoughts For the Present Distress in Matters 
Biblical, 11 Zions Herald, 78(1900)·, 333. 
2. BoP·.· Bewae, '!'he l~~~manenoe of God, p. 45. 
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known how it would come out?" Bowne replied, "Do you think 
God would have made this universe with all its tragedies if 
He had not known how it was coming out'l"1 This is an expres-
sion of Bowne's notion that God has morally obligated himself 
in his creation. 
Some object that it is wrong to ascribe limitations of 
any kind to God. God's absoluteness must necessarily rule 
out any limitations. Bowne notes that in order to preserve 
this "logical" absoluteness, God has been styled as "the 
abyss," 11 the silence," the "super-essential," and many other 
"verbal vacuities. 11 2 Also theology has echoed the political 
absolutisms of previous generations and "regarded God as an 
irresponsible ruler."3 But questions of imposing "limitations" 
upon God by definition are eeen to be somewhat beside the 
point when God himself--in the Incarnation--reveals his 
power and love in humiliation. Seen from the ethical point 
of view, God 11 is the most deeply obligated being in the 
universe."4 
God is obligated by his own moral character. Just as 
the strong ought to bear the burdens of the weak, so "the 
strongest ought to be the greatest burden-bearer. In the 
moral world he that is greatest of all should be the servant 
l. F .J •. McCd~nell1 "Memorial Addreu: Borden P ~ Bowne," Zions Herald, ~8(1910), 494. 
2. Bowne, Theism, p. 195. 
3. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 144. 
4· ~·· p. 144. 
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of all. There ia no exception from this rule, not even for 
God himself."1 When one considers the poasibilities for 
good and evil in the human race, then the responsibility of 
the creator is clear. In creation, 
God • • • put himself under infinite obligation 
to care for his human family; and reflections on 
his position as Creator and Ruler instead of · 
removing,. only make this obligation more manifest.2 
D. The Trinity 
1. Argument from God's nature 
In a generation that was engrossed in Biblical studies 
and their implications, non-biblical doctrines were likely 
to be given slight attention. Because of the fact that 
trinitarian formulations were early church contributions 
and not primarily biblical, there was a tendency in liberal 
circles to discredit trinitarian speculation. Theologians 
like Harnack and Ritschl placed a great emphasis upon 
Cbristology-but it was the exaltation of the second person 
to the point of complete lack of interest 1n a trinitarian 
economy in the god-head. 
Bowne, however, affirmed a vigorous trinitarian faith. 
At his trial he became particularly incensed at the sccusation 
1. Bowne, Studies 1n Christianity, p. 98. 
2. !2!S·. p. 95. 
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that he did not have a trinitarian raith. "I am a Trini-
tarian or the Trinitsrians,"l he said. He did not reel that 
biblical study in any way undermined that raith. 2 He 
admitted that it was a "mysterious" doctrine; yet, as we 
have seen, mystery is not necessarily ruled out or his thought-
world. The Trinity, as an explanation or the nature or God, 
is "the line or least resistance, both rrom the biblical and 
rrom the philosophical standpoint."3 
a. Ethical absoluteness as predicate. 
Bowne argues from the ethical absoluteness or God to 
the speculative necessity or a trinitarian conception or the 
nature or the world-ground. As has been noticed berore, 
Bowne is adamant at the point or insisting that abstractions 
are nothing ror thought. Therefore being must be manifested 
in activity. Love, justice, benevolence--these are not 
abstract attributes but are to be understood as implying 
activity. To maintain the moral absoluteness of God requires 
recognition of the fact that a moral lire must be a commu-
nitarisn life. 
If we conceive God sa single and alone, we must 
say that, as such, he is only potentially a moral 
being. To pass from potential to actual moral 
existence the Infinite must have an object, and 
1. G. Elliott, ed., "The Orthodoxy of Bowne," Methodist 
Review, 105(1922), 402. 
2. Bowne and others, "Noteworthy Opinions Upon the Deity of 
Jesus Christ," Zions Herald, 88(1910), 1037. 
3. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 92. 
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to pass to adequate moral exiitence the Infinite 
must have en adequate object. 
Bowne poses three solutions to this dilemma. One solution 
is to affirm that God's absoluteness is metaphysical and not 
moral. On this view, "his morality is but an incident of his 
cosmic activity, and not something pertaining to his own 
essential exiatence.n2 
The second possible solution is an implication of the 
first; namely, that God needs the finite in order to realize 
his ethical potentialities and attain a moral existence. In 
both these views the moral ia made subordinate to the met-
&physical; and, in the latter, God is made dependent for the 
full expression of himself upon something outside of himself, 
a violation of the fundamental requirement of unity in the 
world-ground. Bowne also notes that these views lean toward 
pantheism in that "God apart from the world is as impossible 
as the world •part from God"--a view which Bowne has criti-
cized already.3 
The third possible solution seeks to avoid these specu-
lative difficulties by providing for community of personal 
life within the divine unity itself. 
In this way the conditions of ethical life are 
found within the divine nature; and the ethical 
1. Bowne, Theism, P• 287. 
2. Ibid., p. 187. 
3. cr:-ibid., p. 288. 
absoluteness of God is assured. But how this 
community in unity is possible is1one of the deepest mysteries of speculation. 
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Bowne turns to the idea of "necessary creation" for 
resolution. This doctrine depends upon the divine nature 
instead of the divine will. It would account for the plurality 
within the unity. In order to have a meaningful community 
in the ~gbdhead, the objects of God's creation must be apart 
from a finite system and be co-eternal with God himself. 
If it be said that this is polytheism, the answer 
would be that polytheism implies a plurality of 
mutually independent beings. If it be said that 
these dependent personalities are created, the an~ 
swer would be that their existence does not depend 
on the divine will, but on the divine nature. They 
therefore coexist with God; nor could God exist 
without them. If, then, in pantheism we say that 
the world is God, what can we say of these but that 
they are God, at once numerically distinct and 
organically one? If creation seems to be an ax-
pression implying will, we may exchange it for the 
profoundly subtle terms of early theological 
procession. These terms throw no light upon the 
matter, and only serve to mark off the eternal 
implications of the divine nature from the free 
determinations of the divine will.2 
Bowne was dissatisfied with the problems raised by this 
apparent separation of the divine will and the divine nature. 
So he proposed making the thought more consistent by dis-
tinguishing a "double willing" in God, "that by which God 
is God, and that by which the system of the world exists."3 
1. Ibid., p. 288. 
2. !bid., p. 289. 
3. Ibid., p. 290. 
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The former is the absolute will, conditioned by 
the divine nature and coeternal with God. It is 
logically necessary if God is to be God •••• We 
pointed out that the absolute will must ever be 
present to give validity and reality to the other-
wise powerless necessities of the divine being, 
so that the divine existence as anything realized 
forever roots in the divine will. The will does not 
make or alter the logic or the divine nature, but 
it realizes it. If now that logic implies that 
God in order to be the ethically absolute God must 
have his adequate Other and Companion, than the 
will by which God is God implies the eternal 
generation of that Other. This will would be quite 
disti~ct from the will by which the world exists. 
The latter w~uld be no necessity for God's self-
realization. 
At the conclusion of this exposition, Bowne notes that 
he has been led from a discussion of the ethical absoluteness 
of God into speculations which suggest the Christian doctrine 
of the Trinity. There is an easy transition from the spec-
ulative to the dogmatic descriptions of this idea. 
b. Incarnation as predicate. 
Bowne has w.ritten that "the doctrine of' the Incarnation 
••• depends for its possibility on the doctrine of the 
Trinity."2 The conception or a community of persona in the 
unity of the world-ground or ',ll'odhead "is no worse off in 
this respect than the conception of a single and lonely 
personality without the eternal fellowship which moral life 
demands.•3 The end result or assuming the latter view 
l. Ibid., p. 290. 
2. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 93. 
3. Ibid., p. 92. 
-
132 
would be either agnosticism or pantheism. 
The Trinity is the postulate of the full morel life of 
God. There must be en essential community within the organic 
unity of the godhead. This is necessary in order for the 
divine to have communication within itself for morel absolute-
ness. It is also necessary in order for the divine to 
have communication with the finite for moral fulfillment, 
The Trinity is a postulate of the former, as the Incarnation 
is the implication of the latter. 
Admittedly this is all in the realm of mystery; but "no 
view is • • • not attended with great difficulty when we try 
to think it through."1 "The net result of theological thought 
is that ••• we come nearest to the truth when we think of 
the Father, the Son, and the Spirit."2 
2, Empirical argument: the work of the Holy Spirit 
Bowne's constant emphasis upon the distinction between 
forensic and empirical theology is very clear in his dis-
cussion of the Holy Spirit. In his most extended discussion 
of the third person of the Trinity, he writes that "we need 
to distinguish the language of theology from the language of 
experience,"3 Trinitarian speculation lends itself to com-
plicated and metaphorical exegesis. This, in turn, leads to 
1, Ibid., p. 92. 
2. Ibid. 
3o !Did,, Po 202o 
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the oommon difficulty of persons trying to experience theology 
instead of religion. 
The problem is complicated further by the fact that there 
is a confused history of doctrine. It is only inferentially 
a biblical doctrine. Knudson has given a very complete out-
line of the development of this doctrine and the attendant 
1 problems. He writes that 
the New Testament ••• does not think of the Spirit 
as a distinct personal entity alongside of the 
Father and the Son, nor does it think of the Spirit 
as a supernatural power in any way independent of God 
and of Christ. The Spirit in the New Testament is 
merely God operative in human life for the2accomplish-
ment of his purpose as revealed in Christ. 
Knudson continues with a definition: 
The doctrine of the Holy Spirit means that God is 
present as a sanctifying and redeeming power in 
human life. It is this immediate and vivid ex-
perience of the divine power that gives us the 
primary meaning of the Holy Spirit.3 
Bowne's empirical definition suggests that our religious 
consciousness is "enlightened and quickened by Revelation end 
the Holy Spirit."4 Elsewhere he speaks of the "sanctifying, 
inspiring, life-giving Spirit."5 The "Holy Spirit must 
6 
assist us in our efforts" at repentance. The Spirit 
1. A.C. Knudson, The Doctrine of Redemttion (New York: 
Abingdo•·Cokesbury, 1933), pp. 389- 03. 
2. Ibid., p. 397. ). !biQ. 
4• Bowne, "Concerning the 'Christian Consciousness,•" 
Independent, 37(1885), 36. 
5· Bowne, The Immanence of God, P• 104. 
6. Bowne, Studies In Christianity, p. 229. 
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is "the immediate agent in the purification, sanctification, 
and upbuilding of the soul.•l 
In Bowne's day there was much interest in the old 
Methodist doctrine of "the witness of the Spirit." The 
doctrine, having its origin in John Wesley's teaching, was 
aimed essentially at breaking through s~erd:otal and restric-
tive theological formulations to obtain assurance of the 
presence of conversion. The original motivation in Wesley's 
day was to release religion from the shackles of both Anglican 
doctrines of the necessity of the sacramental assurance and 
2 Calvinistic ideas of the perseverance of the saints. The 
source of the doctrine waa a metaphor in Romans 8:16 in 
which Paul writes that "the Spirit of God" bears witness with 
our spirits that we are the children of God. As a figure of 
speech, it was probably derived from Roman court practice in 
which the testimony of an unimpeachable witness was counted 
as certainty on behalf of a defendant.3 
Wesley was confused about the ultimate implications of 
the doctrine, but finally relied on its scriptural authority 
ss a test of its usefulness. Ultimately it came, in late 
1. ~ •• p. 2$1. 
2. For Bowne's extended criticism of the origins and history 
of this doctrine, see Studies in Christianity, pp. 245-2$0. 
3. Cf. Knudson, Doctrine of Redemption, p. 41Jf;; J. Westbury-
Jones, •st. Paul, Roman Jurist," in Roman aaa Christian 
Imperialism, (London: Macmillhl;, 1939), pp. 105-181. 
.. 
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nineteenth century Methodist thought, to be a problem. 
For Wesley the witness of the Spirit was psycho-
logically distinguishable from any inference or 
natural conviction of our own as to our acceptance 
with God. That it was accompanied by a supernatural 
or miraculous manifestation of some kind, he 
apparently did not affirm. Others, however, have 
so construed it, and the result has been murh vain 
searching after an unattainable experience. 
Bowne mentions the havoc the late form of the doctrine 
was making in the churches. He notes a number of instances 
where good Christians were inw~rdly torn by confusion over 
their failure to experience the "witness of the Spirit" in 
2 
the wooden categories of the forensic psychology. 
Bowne was quite sure that the Holy Spirit had more to do 
than simply grant assurance of a forensic sort. The idea of 
"sanctifying" carries with it the notion that one is made holy 
through the active presence of the Holy Spirit. This can 
only be done through the Holy Spirit. "The weak will must be 
strengthened, the dull conscience must be enlightened, the 
wayward affections must be fixed; and in all this we need the 
co-work:l.ng of God. 113 This is the work of the Holy Spirit, 
1. Knudson, Doctrin~_Q,L_Re,demp1i91h pp. 1;.13-4-14. 
2. Cf. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, pp. 197-198. LNote: In 
a letter to Lewis (later Bishop) Hartman, dated Narch 11, 
1908, Bowne suggests to the then student that a disser-
tation which would be "fresh and important" would be a 
study of the doctrine of the witness of the Spirit as it 
is found in John Wesley and "to what extent he was 
influenced in this doctrine by the philosophy and psy-
chology of his time." Unpublished letter, Boston University 
School of Theolo~y Library, through the courtesy of 
Richard Hartman • ./ 
3. Bowne, Studies In Christianity, p. 229. 
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and the only sure test of the Spirit's presence is the test 
of the fruits of the Spirit. 
Without our knowing precisely when or how, the 
Pelagian controversy has become obsolete. The 
Pelagians no longer even "vainly talk." But 
while we maintain with all strenuousness that 
God must work in us, we find the marks of his 
presence not in signs and wonders of any sort, 
but in the renewed life and the fruits of the 
Spirit.l 
Therefore assurance of the activity of the Spirit follows 
volition. The committed life does not begin with the "witness 
of the Spirit." 
The general fact of Christian experience is this: 
The sincere and continued attempt to be disciples 
ot Christ results in. the conviction that we are 
in the right way, that we are on the Lord's side 
and he is on our side; and this conviction grows 
from more to more as the life broadens and deepens. 
The new life takes firmer hold and strikes deeper 
root; and as the soul grows in grace and the know-
ledge of truth, this life becomes more and more 
rooted in the conviction of its divine origin. 
Under the influence of Christian teaching, the 
believer will adjust his experience to the form ot 
Christian thought and doctrine; and as we view the 
Spirit as the immediate agent in the purification, 
sanctification, and upbuilding of the soul, we 
naturally come to regard our graces, or strength, or 
joy, our peace, our rest in God, as wrought in us 
by the Spirit, as the marks of His presence, as the 
witness he perpetually bears in us to our being 
children of God. And this is all the witness of the 
Spirit means in general. What peculiar manifes-
tations it may please God to make in certain crises 
ot life or moments ot spiritual exaltation, or what 
revelations he may make to particular persons, we 
may not decide; but such things are not demanded of 
any one as conditions or marks of sonship.2 
1. Ibid., pp. 234-235. 
2. Ibid., pp. 250-251. 
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One's awareness of the activity of God in his life is a 
matter of growing assurance that in leading the life of 
obedience to the will of God, he finds God's presence 
manifested in the fruits of the Spirit. Always, in Bowne's 
writings, the most fundamental ingredient of religion is 
simply this: •to surrender ourselves to God to do his will, 
and then at once set about our Father's business.nl 
3. Bowne's Trinity in relation to historical Christian thought 
It has been shown how Bowne develops his Trinitarian 
formula from both metaphysical and empirical approaches. 
However, there is no clearly defined exposition of the Trinity 
in Bowne. His explication must be found in his sermons, end, 
in passing, in his metaphysical arguments in Theism. A clue 
to his method here is found in the previously quoted statement; 
"Under the influence of Christian teaching, the bAliever will 
adjust his experience to the form of Christian thought and 
doctrine."2 
A lack of interest in the problem of the Trinity is 
found in theology since Schleiermacher. In his The Christian 
Faith, Schleiermacher devoted only a scant number of pages 
to this doctrine. Ritschl was not "interested in the 
'speculative' problems indicated by the traditional doctrine 
1. Ibid., p. 226. 
2. Ibid., p. 250. 
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of the Trinity, ttl The liberal tradition out of which Bowne 
came placed far greater emphasis on Christology than on 
discussion of the third person. 
Yet Bowne did find the doctrine important if not central,. 
His doctrine of immanence made possible an active person!-
fication of God's presence. His semantic consistency has 
contributed to the clarification of careless interpretation 
of metaphorical theology. His system of "personalistic 
theism" has made possible a thoroughly orthodox yet spec-
ulatively sound interpretation of the Trinity. Knudson 
writes that Bowne's position 
is leading us away from the tri-theistic tendency 
in earlier trinitarian thought~ and inclines us 
to think of the three "persons of the Trinity as 
essential modes of being within the one personal 
God rather than as distinct Persons within some 
sort of impersonal unity,2 
Indeed, Bowne spoke with assurance when, at his trial, he 
remarked, "I am a Trinitarian of Trinitarians." 
1. "Albrecht Ritschl," Ency. Brit,, (1910-11), XXIII, 367. 
2. A. C. Knudson, "Bowne as a Theologian," Zions Herald, 
112(1934), 1057. 
V. Man 
A. The Nature of Man. 
1. Man as a finite creature 
a. Empirical evidence. 
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We have seen in the discussion of the Metaphysics and 
Theory of Thought and KQowledge how Bowne developed the 
definition of man from a study of the epistemic process. To 
summarize briefly, Bowne suggests that the surest fact of 
experience is our awareness of self. Thoughts, feelings, 
volitions--these things have the characteristic of being owned. 
This is undeniable except to "closet speculation." A further 
introspective implication is the faith that we possess a 
measure of self-control or the power of self-direction. The 
person postulates his selfhbod in the act of experiencing. 
Bowne does not begin an analysis of the nature of man 
with a traditional ant~opology. In his view a discussion 
of antecedents, as in a history of the race, is not a proper 
approach to a definition. Only observation of the present 
condition of man in relation to his destiny is relevant for 
definition. Similarly, s description of superficial char-
acteristics is simply a misconception of sense-thinking. 
The self is affirmed in the epistemic process. Man, 
through awareness in the thought process, not only discovers 
a certain measure of self-control and self-direction, but 
also discovers that he is dependent as well. He finds that 
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we "cannot regard ourselves as self-sufficient and independ-
ent in any absolute sense."1 By this is meant, of course, 
that the phenomenal world is not simply an illusion of one 
self, but is &·.commonly experienced external world. Thought 
has objective reference. It goes straight to things. Epis-
temology illustrates the fact that man is at once independent 
and dependent. Man is independent in respect to his self-
control and dependent with respect to his finiteness, e.g. 
he is not self-sufficient. 
How these two aspects of experience can be combined 
in the same being we cannot tell, any more than we 
can tell how freedom and uniformity can be united 
in the same being. But we find them thus united 
nevertheless. It is only as we take the ideas 
abstractly that we find them contradictory; what 
they may be2in reality can be learned only from experience. 
We have also seen how metaphysics requires a self-
sufficient world-ground to postulate dependent existence. 
The metaphysical principle of the world-ground or God is 
"the self-sufficient source of the finite."3 To cell it the 
self-sufficient source does not mean that it excludes the 
co-existence of the finite, but rather predicates the ex-
istenoe of the finite. 
The finite, because of its necessary dependence 
and subordination, must always have an imperfect 
and incomplete personality. Complete self-
knowledge and self-control are possible only to 
1. Bowne, 
2. Ibid., 
3. BOWne, 
Personalism, 
p. 281. 
Metaphysics, p. 
p. 281. 
93. 
the absolute and infinite being; and of this 
finite personality can ne!er be known more than 
a faint and feeble image. 
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Man therefore is a finite creature, depending for his existence 
upon the source of being, the world-ground or God. All that 
may be said of this dependence is that it is an "unpicturable 
relation." 
b. Evidence from psychology. 
Bowne's psychology also provides an analysis of the 
nature of man. Here, as in the metaphysical description, 
we discover a dualism. In the metaphysical argument, the 
dualism was independence/dependence with reference to the 
question of self-direction and self-control. In the psy-
chological argument, Bowne notes that the proper definition 
of man must account for the mind/body or soul/body dualism. 
We view man as we find him, as a dual being, body 
and soul. By the mind we mean the soul in its 
intellectual activities. The true man is the 
soul, but the soul is connect~d with an organism 
which conditions mental life. 
The body's constitution is "a system of appetites, 
passions, and instincts."3 These lie back of all volition 
and are "expressions of our nature itself." They are not 
reasoned principles or inventions, but simply the result 
1. Ibid., p. 118. 
2. B:P7 Bowne, Introduction to Psycholofical Theory, (New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1886), p. 3 • 
3. Ibid., p. 125. 
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of our constitution. Bowne calls this "the automatic form 
of life.111 
Alongside this "automatic form of life" is a rational 
and moral activity of the soul. 
Here man becomes free and conscious of his aims. 
Here he assumes control of himself, and sets 
himself to perfect and complete that development 
which begins automatically, but is carried on only 
by freedom. Here the constitutional becomes moral; 
and the natural rises to the plane of the spiritual. 
To effect just this change • • • i2 the normal 
function of freedom in human life. 
Understood psychologically, then, man is viewed as 
created with both automatic and volitional sides to his 
nature. He stands determined from the side of his body but 
free from the side of his will. It is what Bowne calls "the 
normal function of freedom" which distinguishes man from 
other animals. 
Realistically, Bowne warns that "freedom may serve to 
lift up the natural or to drag it down."3 At this point 
he introduces a "third factor" in our definition of man. 
That factor is 
the evil, the selfish will, which misuses its 
freedom and seeks to exploit the world and 
society for its own private interest and amuse-
ment. This is the prolific source of the wrongs, 
the oppressions, the4outrages, the baseness, the infamies of his~ory. 
1. IQ!g., p. 125. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibia., p. 126. 
4. Ibid. 
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Man, he warns, "lives less by rational appreciation and 
moral devotion, than by something analogous to the herding 
instinct of the cattle."l Man's dependence is always pain-
fully evident to him. He believes that he is a child of 
God, and yet he finds himself in "closest alliance with the 
animal world" which make him 
subject to the same general laws of existence, 
birth, labor, hunger, pain, all soon ended by 
what, from the standpoint of our high spiritual 
claims, can only appear as a humiliating and 
sinister anticlimax, the universal fact of death.2 
2. Man as image of God 
Having described man as a finite creature, Bowne calls 
to our attention the "magnificent audacity" of the Christian 
revelation. Superficially, man is but another animal, subject 
to the same general laws as the whole animal kingdom. He is 
faced with "the ever-present irony of death • • • which so 
surely blights all earthly prospects and blasts all earthly 
hopes."3 But true as this is, it is only outward appearance, 
not inward spiritual fact. 
We are not simply the highest in the animal world, 
we are also and more essentially children of the 
Highest, made in his image likewise, and to go on 
forevermore with him; made, as the old catechism 
had it, to glorify God and to enjoy him forever, 
growing evermore into his likeness and into ever 
deepening sympathy and fellowship with the eternal 
1. Ibid., p. 127. 
2. BOWne, Essence of Religion, p. $1. 
). B.P. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1892), p. 192. 
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as we go on through the unending years, unril we 
are "tilled with all the fullness of God." 
Belief in God, according to Bowne, carries with it the 
converse assurance of belief in man. 
It would seem that Bowne ia perilously close to an 
anthropocentrism here. He points out that our failure to 
think worthily of man and his destiny often leads to defi-
cient thoughts about God. It is because of our desire to 
think worthily of God that we do have a high estimate of the 
worth of man, God's child. 
Man shares with God the freedom of self-direction and 
self-control within the limitations of his nature. Not only 
is he a part of the animal world, but he is created with the 
ability to will obedience to God's purposes. Without this 
dual nature--animal and mental--God's plan would be impossible 
and the meaning of the creation itself would be frustrated. 
The training and development of souls as the 
children of God is God's essential purpose in the 
creation of men. Our human life is to be dealt with 
from this point of view; and the religious teacher 
must fashion his instruction and direct his effort 
in accordance with this fundamental truth. His aim 
must be to help men to a consciousness of the divine 
purpose, and to bring them into obedience to it.2 
B. Freedom: Real and Limited.--One of the features of 
the thought-world of Bowne's generation was the conception 
1. Bowne, Personalism, pp. 300-301. 
2. -----, Studies in Christianity, pp. 252-253. 
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ot a necessitarian universe. This was seen in metaphysics 
with such systems as that of Herbert Spencer, based as it 
was on the inexorable unfolding of evolution without volitional 
bases. It was also manifested in theology in the Calvinistic 
emphasis upon man•s impotence. However, Bowne did not make 
freedom central in his system for forensic reasons, but 
because of his conviction that it was necessary for thought 
itself. He writes: 
If, then, we were looking for the most important 
field of freedom we should certainly find it in 
the moral realm; but if we were seeking the purest 
illustration of freedom we should find it in the 
operations of our thought.l 
In an important article entitled "The Speculative Significance 
ot Freedom," Bowne indicates that freedom is as necessary for 
the rational life as it is for the moral life. 
By freedom, Bowne means simply the "power of self-
direction" of persons. This is not lawlessness or "abstract 11 
freedom, but self-direction within the limitation of one 1 s 
own nature and the nature of things. In his 1895 article, 
Bowne writes: 
By freedom I mean the power of self-control and 
self-direction in an intelligent being. More 
specifically it is the power to form plans, pur-
poses, ideals and to work for their realization. 
Or it is the power to choose between competing 
or conflicting possibilities and to realize the 
1. Bowne, Metaphysics, P• 408. 
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one chosen. Whenever this power is present we call 
the agent free.l 
Now this "power of self-control" is self-evident. It 
is not simply an abstraction for the purposes of debate, but 
is a fact of experience. In his definition of personality, 
Bowne used the same method of appeal to experience.2 The 
concrete experience demonstrates both a measure of self-
control and, at the same time, obvious limitations. Freedom, 
therefore, can never be assumed to be 11pure lawlessness." 
This is a closet contention. It is not born of 
any observation of life and experience, or of any 
profound reflection, but only of a verbal exegesis. 
Freedom everywhere presupposes a basis of fixity 
or uniformity to give it any meaning. An absolute 
freedom unconditioned .by any law whatever, is simply 
our old friend pure being, and cancels itself. Even 
for the absolute being we must affirm a fixed nature 
as the condition of freedom; and without this, thought 
perishes.) 
Human freedom is founded upon an order of law in nature 
which is simply there, which we can use, and upon which our 
control of nature is dependent. In fact, this order of law 
is the basis of our freedom and is "the condition of any 
proper self-control and social unfolding."4 Actual experience, 
removed from abstractions, reveals to us the fact that "we 
find an element of uniformity and fixity in our life, and 
1. B.P. Bowne, "The Speculative Significance of Freedom," 
Methodist Review, 77(1895), 681. 
2. Ct. Bowne, Theism, p. 162. 
). Bowne, Metap~slcs, P• 411. 
4. B.P. Bowne, 1 orals and Life," Methodist Review, 91(1909), 
709. 
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this gives us the only positive idea of necessity that we 
possess."1 In other words, just as freedom is not "pure 
lawlessness," nei,ther is necessity the inexorable force of 
determination. "Freedom and necessity are contradictory only 
as formal ideas, and are not mutually exclusive as deter-
minations of being.•2 
The element of uniformity and fixity that we find in 
experience gives us the proper notion of necessity. Instead 
of abrogating our freedom, this element founds it. 
Freedom and uniformity must be united in rationality 
and neither can dispense with the other. In our 
rational life we find the basis of uniformity given 
in the laws of thought and the fixed connection of 
ideas. We do not make the laws and we cannot abrogate 
them. ••• l!ru!J in addition to the laws of thought 
founded on~he nature of rationality, there is needed 
an act of ratification and Qf self-control in 
accordance with those laws.j 
Thus metaphysical necessity is replaced by "the conception of 
uniformity, administered by freedom for the attainment of 
rational ends.•4 
The limits of our freedom are very narrow at best. 
Even the order of our thoughts is largely beyond 
our control. The existence and order of our feelings 
is still more independent. The laws of our own 
nature and external nature are quite independent. 
The field for choice is small, and our choice con-
sists almost entirely in deciding to do or not to 
do. The result is, that the great outlines of life 
1. Bowne, Theism, p. 197. 
2. Ibid., p. 197. 
3. B:P7 Bowne, "The Speculative Significance of Freedom," 
Methodist Review, 77(1895), 687. 
4· Ibid., p. 697. 
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and history are drawn by a power which we cannot 
control. We can originate no new and unforeseen 
possibilities. The law of our nature cannot be 
escaped. Rebellion is possible, but defeat is 
sure. The universe is going our way and will help 
us along if we choose; but he who will not be led 
shall certainly be dragged. Thus on every side 
our freedom is hemmed in by massive necessities 
which we cannot escape. It is, then sheer cant 
or thoughtlessness, to claim that to limit foreknowl-
edg~. is to endanger the universe. To increase the 
opprobrium, the claim that God foreknows the possible 
only as the possible, is made to mean that God ~as 
no foreknowledge of any kind. This is knavery. 
This assertion of freedom within the limits of the 
uniformity of law is an important contribution of Bowne's 
theological definition of man. 
c. Sin.--The bearing of this doctrine of freedom as being 
necessary both for moral and speculative life becomes clear 
in a discussion of the meaning of sin. Historically, the 
Christian faith has defined sin in "sub-volitional" terms. 
This is particularly true in Protestant thought. 
When Luther and Calvin consider man as sinner, they 
thus have in mind a state, a position, and every 
act of sin is but a reflection·of this state. Sin 
is not to be equated with specific acts of sin. It 
can be described as the tendency of man to build 
the world around himself, to corrupt even his best 
achievements by being conscious that they are his 
achievements. It is the pride and self concern-which 
manifests itself even in man's noblest deeds. It 
is the activity of men which is done apart from faith 
and which therefore is not done ohly for God and 
neighbor but also for self. This is why Luther spoke 
of sin as separation from God, or unbelief, and why 
Augustine declared the glorious virtues of the good 
1. B.P. Bowne, "The Divine Foreknowledge," Zions Herald, 
56(1879), 73. 
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sin is his unwillingness to accept himself as 
sinner, as one who needs to1be rescued by some reality other than himself. 
Bowne's own conception of the nature of sin is outlined 
with attention to the avoidance of the "abstractions" and 
"forensic arguments" in which soteriological thought has 
abounded. This is clear in his statement of the human con-
dition: 
Our human life is not lived on the abstract plane 
of abstract moral agency. It is a life of ignorance 
and weakness; a life of crude beginnings and shadowy 
incipience; a life without insight into itself and 
without foresight of the end; a life in which power 
and faculty and knowledge and moral sensibility and 
self-control have to be developed; a life rooted in 
the animal out of which we only slowly and by much 
trial and error emerge; a life largely molded by 
heredity and environment, and solicited by temptations 
from without and within, from above and beneath and 
around. Now, the application of abstract rectoral 2 and forensic notions to such a life is ••• absurd. 
One might assume a doctrine of "original sin" in this statement, 
but Bowne would vigorously reject the common use of that term. 
Elsewhere he speaks of "the tremendous force of hereditary 
evil which works ceaselessly and mightily against ua."3 In 
still another context, Bowne speaks of the universality of sin. 
If God were a Pharisee and careful of his reputation 
with other Pharisees he would have nothing to do with 
LMeEl. But as God was revealing himself as a God of 
1. Dillenberger and Welch, Protestant Christianity Interpreted 
Through Its Develo~ment, p. 29. 
2. Bowne, Studies inhristianity, p. 143. 
3. B.P. Bowne, 11ShsllWe Kill Our Advanced Scientists?", 
Zions Herald, 55{1878), 57. 
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grace, it seems to be quite in the order of things 
that he should condescend to sinners. Indeed, there 
was no other class to deal with, as there is no 
other class still •••• That ~od receiveth sinners 
is the essence of the Gospel. 
A characteristic emphasis in Bowne at this point is the 
distinction he makes between formal and material judgments in 
the nature of sin. He uses the analogy of epistemology. We 
stand before the vast mystery of the universe with an awareness 
of the minuteness of our knowledge. ~But, this would be quite 
compatible with faith in our knowledge within its own limits, 
and with faith in its exceeding value. 112 By the same token, 
when confronted with the highest insight into the nature of 
God and the demands for obedience in trust made upon us, we 
are stricken with an. awareness of our unworthiness and imper-
fection. 
We might even speak of ourselves as miserable sinners 
and declare that we are unworthy so much as to lift 
up our eyes unto heaven. And .. '.this would be entirely 
compatible with a str~ng assertion of our integrity 
from the formal side. 
There seems to be a separation of definition here into 
formal and material categories of sin. Formal sin is that 
willful act of choosing contrary to God's will. Material sin 
is choosing contrary to the actual will of God whether the 
1. Bowne, 
2. Bowne, 
3· ~·· 
Studies in Christianity, p. 73. 
Principles of Ethics, p. 180. 
"'; X 
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will is known or not. 1 It is thus possible for man to be 
materially sinful but formally righteous. 
There is a volitional emphasis implicit in the definition 
as it is shaping up. Bowne makes a distinction between 
choosing and willing as s factor in a definition of sin. He 
notes that in theology 
a distinction has been made between freedom of choice 
and freedom of willing; and determinism has been 
placed in the choice, while our will has been left 
free. Our choice· is fatally bound by our nature, 
or by what we are; but we are free in execution. 
Hence the doctrine of moral inability and natural 
ability. In practical life, however, this doctrine 
seems to invert the difficulty. Freedom of choice 
does not seem to be so difficult as conception; 
the trouble lies entirely in realizing our choice 
in life. And for this the soul must be able to 
intensify its effort until it bears down all resist-
ance. In our executive inability lies the weakness 
of life, ~ather than in e leek of power to choose 
the good. . 
In another context he stated this position more emphatically 
when he wrote, "If anything is free it is not the w111."3 
Again, Bowne commented that "We should steadfastly deny any 
Pelagian self-sufficiency of the human will, and that for 
both philosophical and religious reasons."4 
Man's problem lies, therefore, not in the essential 
sinfulness of his nature but in the "executive inability"--
the inability to will the right. 
1. Ct. L.H. DeWolf, Theology of the Living Church, (New York: 
Harper and Bros., 1953), p. 183. 
2. Bowne, Introduction to Ps~chological Theory, p. 232. 
3. ~. Metaphysics, P• 41 • 
4· ~. The Immanence of God, p. 121. 
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The gist of the sinful life consists in the 
willingness to do wrong end the unwillingness to 
do right. Some ••• have thought to find some-
thing deeper than this, and they have proclaimed 
that sin is a nature, and that its nature is 
guilt. With such notions, nothing but a web of 
abstract fictions can be woven. 
Despite protestations to the contrary, Bowne is close to 
a Pelagian concept of the nature of sin. As quoted by Augustine 
in his On Nature and Grace, Pelagius drew a distinction be-
tween "possible" and "actual" sin. 
I say it that it is possible for a man to be without 
sin. What do you say? That it is impossible for a 
man to be without sin? But I do not say that there 
is not a man without sin. Our contention is about 
what is possib2e• and not possible; not about what 
is end is not. 
In this respect then, Bowne might be celled Pelagian. He 
places the seat of sin in the will rather than in the nature. 
"The will to do right is possible to everyone and in all 
circumstances.") He.makes possible the perfection of the 
will, even thout,h, realistically, he admits the improbability 
of s perfected will. Sin is most adequately described in 
moral terms rather than generic terms. In contemplation of 
the commands and character of God, we ere convicted of our 
weakness and sin, but nevertheless are commanded to righteousness. 
1. B.P. Bownet The Christian Life: A Study, (New York: Eaton 
& Mains, ltl99), P• 61 · 
2. Augustine, On Nature and Grace, ed. J. Whitney Oates, in 
Basic Writin~s of Saint Augustine, (New York: Random House, 
1948), f!, 5 5. 
3. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, P• 70. 
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In a personal letter to Rev. James Mudge, a prominent 
Methodist clergyman, writer, and later curator of the New 
England Methodist Historical Society, Bowne commented spe-
cifically on the question of the nature of sin. 
Concerning the first question you raise there can 
be no doubt that all sin lies in a self-perverted 
will. The ground for thinking otherwise lies in 
the fact that our moral judgements have generally 
an aesthetic element in them, or rather, a compar-
ison of the state of the agent with a moral ideal. 
This idea is independent of volition and also of 
ability; and that which falls below it is dis-
pleasing not indeed as involving guilt but as being 
abnormal. It is easy to fancy because of this fact 
that sin may consist in a constitutional state 
rather than in self-perverted volition. It is 
important to separate the two elements of guilt end 
simple abnormality. The former displeases us as 
deserving condemnation. The latter displeases as 
being a state of disease.l 
It appears from this letter that there can be little question 
concerning the volitional nature of Bowne's definition of sin. 
Elsewhere in the same letter, he suggests that "guilt and 
crime are only in the originating and occasioning volition." 
Knudson sums up the bearing of Bowne's doctrine of freedom 
on his definition of the nature of sin: 
Bowne's doctrine of freedom has in important bearing 
on the doctrine of sin. It excludes a subvolitional 
and also an abstract and impersonal conception of 
sin. The doctrine of original sin in its traditional 
form and also the idee of sin as inherent in our 
finitude have no place in a freedomist theology. The 
real basis of belief in the seriousness and universality 
1. B.P. Bowne, Letter to James Mudge, January 23, 1884; 
unpublished letter in files of New England Methodist 
Historical Society; Boston, Massachusetts. 
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of sin, according to the freedomist standpoint, is 
not to be found in a literally inherited guilt or 
sin, but in the enormous difficulty of completely 
moralizing the non-moral impuls!s and desires with 
which we are by nature endowed. 
This peculiar formulation of sin does not exclude God's 
grace. It is worthy of note that Pelagius and Augustine 
argued most vigorously at the point of grace in the controversy 
over will. Pelagius 1 view was that grace was manifested in 
the capacity for willing while Augustine held that grace was 
operative in the failure of will. Bowne insisted that he had 
a doctrine of grace. Knudson, referring to this particular 
problem in theology, noted that freedomism in a definition of 
sin "is entirely compatible with a profound doctrine of divine 
grace."2 Bowne seems to equate knowledge of God's will and 
our capacity to fulfill that will as the destiny of man. Man 
is righteous to the extent that he does fulfill his moral 
obligations; he is sinner to the extent that he fails to 
fulfill them. 
But we are sinners. Yes, but not outcasts. But 
we are rebels. No, we are prodigal sons._ And 
God's grace is such that his essential will for 
us remains unchanged, that we should become aware 
of his loving purpose for us, and should accept 
it in filial submission, and work together with 
him in the building up his kingdom among men.3 
1. A.c •. Knvdiio:D, ~Bowne lis •''l'b.eolGgie~a,"'ZiGns Herald, 
112(1934), 10$7. 
2 • .A..c .• Knudson, "Bowne and Barth," Zions Herald, 113(1935), 296. 
3. Bowne, ''The Christian Lit'e: A Study, p. 44. 
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D. The Problem of Immortaliti.--Nineteenth century 
liberal protestant thought tended to pay less attention to 
traditional formulations of the problem of personal eschatology 
than previous generations. Dillenberger and Welch write: 
The life after death became a relatively less central 
emphasis, attention being focused on the fulfillment 
of life here and now, and the future life was in-
creasingly interpreted as "immortality of ihe spirit" 
rather than as "resurrection of the body." 
Bowne treats the problem of immortality in this setting. 
He advances _two principal "arguments" which affirm the 
possibility of immortality. 
First, the interaction of body and soul indicates that 
there is a possibility of existence apart from the body. "The 
destruction of the body contains no assignable ground tor the 
destruction of the soul."2 The burden of proof in this matter 
lies altogether upon the believer in annihilation. 
For the soul is real, and must be assumed to exist 
until its destruction has been shown. Of course, 
such a showing is impossible, and hence the pre-
sumption must remain in favor of continual existence} 
Secondly, all finite beings exist because the nature or 
plan of the Infinite calls tor their existence. Bowne lays 
down this principle: 
Those things that have perennial significance for 
the universe will abide; those which have only 
1. Dillenberger and Welch, Protestant Christianity Interpreted 
Through Its Develoiment, p. 222. 
2. B.P. Bowne, "The·s gnlficance of the Body for Mental Action," 
Methodist Review, 68(1886), 271. 
3. Ibid., p. 271. 
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temporary significance will pass away. • • • The 
only thing to which we can attribute absolute worth 
is moral goodness or the moral personality; but 
this is a consideration drawn from LQur conceptions 
of7 the moral nature, and not from metaphysical 
speculation. 
The basis for belief in immortality of the soul, there-
fore, rests in the needs of the human spirit. 
If the moral nature demands continued existence, 
or if any word of revelation affirms it, there is 
no fact or argument against it. On the other hand, 
apart from the moral nature and revelation, pure 
speculation must occupy a somewhat agnostic2 attitude upon this question of immortality. 
In a letter to Miss Alice Stone Blackwell of Cambridge, 
under the date of February 27, 1884, Bowne expressed 
succinctly the same position. Miss Blackwell had written to 
ask about books which she might profitably read on the problem 
of immortality. Bowne suggested that there was "nothing worth 
reading on the subject except the New Testament."3 In closing 
his letter, he expressed the formula for deciding problems 
of this nature. 
Our faith in science and its objective reality rests 
on our faith in our right to assume what our nature 
demands, This is not a logical principle and hence 
can't be argued, It is essentially an esthetic-
ethical principle. Our faith in immortality rests 
on the same foundation, apart from revelation; and 
argument generally weakens it, because of f4ilure 
to see that it does not depend on argument. 
1. Ibid., p. 272. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Bowne, "Bowne on Immortality," Zions Herald, 120( 1942), 1063. 
4. lli:.£· 
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For a definitive statement of Bowne's own faith in 
immortality, the inclusion of a portion of a funeral sermon 
delivered by him seems wise at this point. The following 
remarks were made at the funeral of Henry B. Blackwell, 
father of the student mentioned above, end a friend of Bowne. 
This sermon was published in Zions Herald one week after the 
death of Bowne himself on April l, 1910. 
We see death only from the outside. The body which 
has been the means of expression and communication, 
ceases its work end we say our friend is dead. But 
this only means that we have no further intercourse 
with him. There is no answering pressure of the 
hand and the loving voice is still. Yet our friend 
lives, nevertheless; for all live unto God. some-
where in God's kingdom he is engaged in activities 
and has the experiences which belong to that unseen 
realm. And all the while he and we are in the hands 
or our Father. 
Love met us and prepared the way when we came into 
this life; similarly love meets us when we pass into 
the next life and prepares the way for us there. Death, 
then, is only an incident in the existence of an 
immortal spirit. It is a passage from a lower to a 
higher phase or our continuous life. In the great 
resurrection chapter which I read from St. Paul, the 
animal body is replaced by a spiritual body; the 
corruptible puts on incorruption; and the mortal 
puts on immortality. As Paul puts it in another 
chapter, the earthly house of our tabernacle is 
dissolved, but we are clothed upon with another 
habitation, a house not made with hands, eternal in 
the heavens. And all the successive phases of this 
life of ours are comprised in the divine thought, and 
are gathered up in one great plan of love and wisdom. 
The gloom and terror, with which the imagination has 
shrouded this subject are heathen, and not Christian, 
or they are borrowed from the outward appearance which 
masks the hidden spiritual fact. St. Paul, who was 
looking forward to a violent death, speaks or it with 
incidental esse as the time of his departure, or as 
he put it, the time of his sailing. The term he used 
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was a nautical one, and means an unmooring, as if 
Paul thought of raising the anchor or casting off 
the lines and sailing for another haven and another 
shore. And the writer of the Fourth Gospel reports 
the Master as speaking of many mansions in the Father's 
house, and of places prepared for many. Rightly, then, 
do we say that this event is no more an ending than 
it is a beginning. The earthly life has ceased and 
the immortal life has begun. On this fact one's 
thought should dwell today. To u:s the heartache, 
the tears, the loneliness, and the emblems of sorrow; 
to him the fullness of life immortal.l 
Bowne's reluctance to outline in detail any personal 
eschatology beyond the metaphysical and pragmatic possibilities 
is a consistent tendency in his writings. He did comment, 
however, upon the contemporary discussions dealing with the 
doctrines of annihilation, retribution, and probation. The 
thorough-going ethical interest of Bowne led him to consider 
these doctrines which reflect a judgment upon disobedience 
to God's will. But Bowne was uncomfortable with the tend-
ency of the doctrines to become mechanical. 
The doctrine of annihilation was the theory popular in 
nineteenth century theology that everlasting punishment of 
the wicked consisted in utter destruction or annihilation. 
The ablest expositor of the theory was an English divine 
named Edward White. His Life ta Christ was widely read. 2 
Bowne was asked by a young student minister,. C. Julian Tuthill, 
1. B.P. Bowne, "The Mortal Shall Put on Immortality," Zions 
Herald, 88(1910), 449. · 
2. E. White, Life _dn Christ, (London:Ellio~ Stock Ll87271878). 
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to comment on the problem. After suggesting that the 
•technical" theological aspects were unfamiliar to him, he 
proceeded to give a philosophical analysis of the problem: 
As to the philosophical aspects of the case we can 
only lay down a formal principle from which we can 
draw no concrete inference. The principle is that 
no finite thing, material or spiritual, has any 
absolute right to e~ist in itself. On the contrary, 
every finite thing begins, continues, and ends 
acoording to its place and significance in the plan 
of the whole. But from this we cannot infer that 
any existing thing will cease to exist or continue 
to exist. The fact which justifies the present 
existence of moat things is as hidden as the fact 
which may justify their future existence. 
As to the fact itself I have no longer any opinion 
and feel no need of one. I don't think that the 
Scriptures give us any information. The fancy that 
they do seams to me largely due to a failure to 
consider how language is used. 
Wi ttl my prannt >l:iglit cL .. think l.;:ciould best adjust 
things all round on a scheme of annihilation. At 
least I feel so sometimes, and then again I grope. 
Practically I fall back on the principle of our 
Saviour's reply to the question, Are there few that 
be saved? Strive to enter in at the strait gate. 
God will do right. In the meantime it is everyone's 
duty to strive to enter in at the strait gate. What 
the divine love and righteousness may demand in 
settling up the affairs of the world I can't say, 
but I'm sure of two things: (1) that the Judge of 
All the Earth will io right, and (2) that I must 
strive to enter in. 
Apparently the letter to Tuthill about annihilation did 
not fully satisfy the young cleric. Five days later, Bowne 
wrote another letter, this time dealing with the problem of 
1. B.P. Bowne, "Two Bowne Letters," Zions Herald, 109(1931), 
1457-1458, (Letter to Rev. c. Julian Tuthill, Nov. 17, 1894). 
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retribution and punishment. 
Bowne affirmed a doctrine of retribution.l However it 
was inchoate and mainly in the form of a corrective statement 
rather than a consistent position. It was inconceivable to 
him that sin would be simply overlooked by God. A theory 
which allowed for ultimate justice seemed to be necessary. 
Bowne noted that there was no widespread agreement as to the 
proper conception or form of the doctrine. In the second 
letter to Tuthill, he wrote: 
I do not think that definite quantitative statements 
about the measure and duration of punishment are 
desirable or effective as appeals even to human 
fears ••• The pulpit in the past indulged in a 
deal of easy damnation---now it is engaged in the 
opposite task of easy salvation. I conceive 
that neither is our function, but rather to proclaim 
the duty and the beauty of holiness and the shame 
and danger of sin. 
As to the devil. This term is so beset with gro-
tesque associations and connotations that it is 
dangerous to use it without definition. Otherwise 
hoPDs and hoofs, and pitchforks and forked tail, 
etc., etc., will be sure to come in and you will 
be held responsible for them. In itself, apart 
from these grotesque accretions, the affirmation 
of a devil means simply that the;>mystery of evil 
is not confined to the earth, but that elsewhere 
also the free will has gone astray. The devil is 
no more of a mystery or surprise than the devilish, 
and these are in incontestable evidence. And even 
if it should be allowed that he is able to tempt 
men to evil, it would be a fact of the kind which 
we are all familiar, that evil men are allowed to 
influence men for evil. I see no difficulty in the 
one case which does not exist in the other. 
1. B.P. Bowne, "Thoughts For the Present Distress in Matters 
Biblical," Zions Herald, 78(1910), 299. 
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In my own thinking, I have no use for the devil. 
In preaching I should make no use of him. But 
as to the cosmicsl question whether evil has ever 
appeared beyond the bounds of our race, I should 
be very slow1to affirm or deny on the basis of any speculation. 
Another problem of wide interest in his generation was 
second probajion. This problem was raised by the New England 
Theology as it developed into Universalism. The thought that 
there would be no mercy for sinners after death was distasteful 
to the liberal temper of some New England theology. The 
discussion had become so central in theology that Bowne was 
asked to declare himself on the problem at his heresy trial. 
He admitted that he would like to be a Universalist. Pressed 
for an explanation, Bowne replied: 
Only ih this sense; I should like to believe 
that it was God's purpose finally to bring all 
souls into obedience unto himself. I should like 
to have that faith if I could. I am not s 
Universalist. As to these remarks about Meta-
physics and the light, I have said simply that, 
left to Metaphysical reasoning, we should not 
get very fer concerning the future of the soul. 
That is all. Any positive conviction we have 
depends on ~ur moral nature or some word of 
revelation. 
At this point, Bowne's defense counsel, Dr. James Buckley, 
asked: "I ask him whether he believes that there will be any 
probation after death, for a person thoroughly instructed 
1. B.P. Bowne, "Two Bowne Letters," Zions Herald, 109(1931) 1 1457-1458, (Letter to Rev. C. Julian TUthill, Nov. 22, 1~94). 
2. G. Elliott, ed., "The Orthodoxy of Bowne," Methodist Review, 
105(1922), 412. 
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in the gospel of Christ in this world?" Bowne replied: 
"I do not know of sny such thing, and I should feel perfectly 
unjustified in telling anyone, 'You shall have another chance.•"l 
On questions of traditional theological formulations of 
eschatological nature, Bowne poses s combination of speculative 
skepticism and moral concern. Here is a clear example of his 
method and the tendency to adhere to what is practically 
important in the face of the absence of speculative proof. 
1. ~·• P• 412. 
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VI. Jesus Christ and Salvation 
A. The Person or Christ.--Bowne's theology was thor-
oughly Christocentric. Chancellor James R. Day of Syracuse 
University reminded readers ot Zions Herald of this dimension 
of Bowne's work soon after Bowne's death. Day quoted Bowne 
as saying to him during their last conversation, "The people 
do not know what comfort and what joy I have in my faith in 
1 Jesus Christ as my personal Saviour and my Lord and Master." 
Bowne'.''s faith in Jesus Christ had two dimensions. The first 
was a sublime faith that in Jesus Christ life found meaning, 
and that appropriation of God's love through Christ meant 
profound happiness in this lite. 
More and more it is becoming apparent that for 
knowledge and help and hope concerning the 
deepest things of God and life and destiny we 
must depend upon Jesus Christ or abandon our-
selves to apathy and despair.2 
The second dimension of his Christology was a moral dimension. 
For Bowne discipleship with Christ meant obedience to God's 
will which then became the social dimension of Christian 
eschatology.3 This connection between Christology and 
eschatology is a characteristic of Bowne's theology. As will 
be illustrated later, the kingdom of God was the reign of 
1. J.R. Day, "Bowne's Inner Life," Zions Herald, 88(1910), 455. 
2. B.P. Bowne 1 "The Supremacy of Christ," Methodist Review, 92(1910), tl82. 
3. Bowne, The Essence of Religion, pp. 209-234· 
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God's will revealed in the person and work of Jesus Christ. 
On one occasion, Bowne criticized those who would have a 
lesser loyalty or focus to faith. "God grant us a baptism 
of good sense and loyalty, not to Methodism or any other ism, 
but to Christ and his Kingdom.nl 
Bowne's Christological emphasis seems to have deepened 
after his world tour in 1905. His sermon, "The Supremacy 
of Christ," preached on that tour and published on his return, 
emphatically affirms the centrality of Christ in his theology. 
As a preface to the exposition to follow, here is the summary 
statement of his argument in this important sermon: 
Jesus Christ is the only original voice which 
commands our conviction and establishes our 
faith. Instead of becoming less and less 
necessary to humanity, he is more and more 
necessary. Our problems are larger, more pressing, 
more insistent today than ever before. Past times 
were in comparison times of childhood. And the 
solution of our problems is hopeless without the 
light thrown upon them by Jesus Christ •••• 'Lord, 
to whom shall we go? Thou has the word of eternal 
life. t2 
1. Jesus of history and Christ of faith 
It is symbolic that Bowne's first published review was 
a vigorous attack on David Friedrich Strauss and his last 
book, The Old Faith and the New.3 Strauss, one of the truly 
great pioneers in biblical studies, represented the culmination 
l. G~,A, Coe, "Borden Parker Bowne," Methodist Review, 92(1910), 
516-517. 
2. Bowne, The Essence of Religion, p. 21 
3. David Friedrich Strauss, The Old Faith and the New: A Confession, 
trans. M. Blind (New York: Holt Co., 1873). 
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of nineteenth century rationalism in the study of the life of 
Jesus. He had dispensed with Christ as an important element 
of religious faith. 
To the question, "Are we still Christians?" He 
answers, "No." But to his second question "Have 
we still a religion?" He is prepared to give an 
affirmative answer, if the assumption is granted 
that the feeling of dependence, of self-surrender, 
of inner freedom, which has sprung from the 
pantheistic world-view, can be called religion,l 
Bowne's review is quite bitter in tone.2 He asserts that 
(1) we do still have a religion, (2) religion is still Christian, 
and (3) the naive evolutionary assumptions of Strauss are 
metaphysically bankrupt. It is significant that in this attack 
Bowne is repudiating the apparent drift of thought in intel-
lectual and university circles, namely the exaltation of a 
religion of man and an absence of interest in the person and 
work of Christ. 
In one of his last reviews, Bowne again resorted to a 
thoroughgoing attack on the rationalistic approach to the 
person of Jesus. This time he was reviewing a book entitled 
What We Know About Jesus, by c. F. Dole, pastor of the Jamaica 
Plain, Massachusetts, Unitarian Church.3 Here we find the 
1. Albert Schweitzer, The uest of the Historical Jesus, 
(New York: Macmillan Co., 9 910 , p. • 
2. B.P. Bl)wne, "The Old Faith and the New; by D.F. Strauss, 
A Review," Methodist Review, .56(1874), 286-296. 
3. B.P. Bowne, 6 Jesus or Christ," Methodist Review, 92(1910), 
177-193, also "Dr. Bowne on 1 Jesus or Christ 1 , 6 Zions Herald, 
87(1909), 1382-1383. 
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clearest expression of Bowne's Christology, which is actually 
a mediating position• 
Bowne is insistent, as in other problems, that mis-. 
understanding is often due to sn oversimplification of 
alternative solutions. In the matter of Christology, for 
example, he urges a recognition of the fact of common origin 
of the historic Jesus and the faith in Christ which depended 
upon the former. 
The Jesus of history and the Christ of faith 
cannot be separated in time. Whenever we find 
anything in the history of the early church we 
find the Christ of faith •••• The distinction 
between the Jesus of hisotry and the Christ of 
faith is fictitious, for the Christ of faith is 
what we really find when we find anything.2 
For Bowne, the problem thus becomes one of practical appro-
priation. He then proceeds to emphas~ze the element of the 
Christ of faith for two reasons, both of which appear through-
out his works end ere discussed in chapter 2. His rationale 
is (1) that the "orthodox view" involves the least difficulty 
in understanding the problem; .and (2) that the "orthodox view" 
supplies the needs of the human soul. 
With regard to the first reason, Bowne says, 
It often happens that a view which, considered by 
itself, has many difficulties is, nevertheless, the 
line of least resistance, so that when the subject 
is comprehensively considered, the view is found 
to be one in which the mind most easily rests. And 
this seems to us to be the case with this discussion 
1. ~·· p. 185. 
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of Jesus or Christ. The orthodox view, while 
Undoubtedly having its M7steries and difficulties, 1 after all tui"ns out to be one of least resistance. 
But this rationalistic solution would not finally satisfy 
Bowne. There is always with him the second dimension, the 
appeal to the "interest-satisfaction" criterion of judgment, 
reflected in his statement that the idea of "Jesus the Christ, 
the Anointed and Sent of God," will never be outgrown because 
"it is too deeply rooted in histo!"y and the needs of the 
human soul. 112 
Bowne was particularly short with those who made the 
human Jesus the ideal life and sought to "imitate" Jesus 
by applying twentieth century viewpoints to his specific 
teachings and responses. The ultimate weakness in this 
approach to Bowne--characteristic, by the way, of much 
Christianity of this period--was the futility of its "imita• 
tive" approach, leading to skepticism. 
An ideal is a rather dangerous possession unless 
one knows how to use it. One man hears that he 
must imitate Jesus, and buys a pair of sandals, 
or a sweater, "without seam woven from the top 
throughout," and parts his hair in the middle, 
and eats unleavened bread. And another man of the 
same sort thinks that this will never do, and be-
cause it will not do decides that Jesus is no ideal 
for us. Jesus lived in Judaes; he was not married; 
he never went to college, and knew nothing ot modern 
democracy. How could he be an ideal for us?3 
1. Ibid., P• 177. 
2. Ibid.; p. 193. 
3. Ibid., p. 188. 
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Thus did Bowne express the futility of the emphasis on the 
Jesus of History to the exclusion of the Christ of Faith. 
The person of Jesus Christ was for him much ~ore than a mere 
historical human being. As will be indicated later in this 
chapter, he was the Word be_come flesh, eternally with the 
Father and the Holy Spirit and our present Lord end Saviour. 
It is one thing if he who hung on the cross was 
only a good young Jew of Nazareth, meeting an 
undeserved and shameful death--such things have 
happened before and since; but it is quite an-
other if he was the Son of God who might have 
summoned twelve legions of angels, but who for 
love's sake endured the cross end the contredic~ 
tion of sinners against himself. The power is 
gone if we are dealing with Jesus, the carpenter's 
son; for the power depends not on the words and 
deeds themselves, but on him who said and did 
them.l · 
2. The Incarnation 
For Bowne, the "central truth of Christianity" is the 
Incarnation. 2 It is here that his Christology finds its 
most orthodox expression.3 As details of this part of his 
theology, Bowne relies upon the traditional categories of 
pre-existence, eternal presence, the Virgin Birth, and a 
"kenos~s" solution to the two~nature problem. The result 
is "not as many have fancied, a barren curiosity of theo-
logical speculation, ••• but the power of God unto sal-
vation ••• n4 
1. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 101. 
2. Ibid., P• 9). 
3. Ct. McConnell's comment: "orthodox of the orthodox." 
4• Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 93. 
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As always, Bowne urges a careful distinction between 
the ~ of Incarnation and theories about the Incarnation. 
The former is indisputable; the latter hypothetical and not 
to be assumed dogmatically. The historicity of the Incarnation 
he did not doubt. The fact that it did happen requires men 
to rationalize about it and its consequences. In so doing, 
men must not give their loyalty to their own rationalizations, 
but to the central event. For him the Incarnation will always 
be "mysterious to speculation, but clear to love.•l 
a. Kenosis solution. 
McConnell has mentioned in several contexts his opinion 
that Bowne's Christology was "kenotic.• In his "Memorial 
Address" (1910), he noted that 
for Dr. Bowne the Christian revelation centered, 
of course, about the character and person of 
Christ. On this point he was the most orthodox 
of the orthodox. For him Christ ~as the Son of 
God become man for our salvation. 
In 1922, McConnell elaborated on this same theme: 
LBown!J himself was one of the most conservative 
scholars I have ever known as to the divinity of 
Christ, for example, believing that Christ came 
into this world after actual pre-existence as 
the Son of God. In technical terms he held to 
a stiff kenotic Christology,3 
In Borden Parker Bowne, McConnell again claims a kenotic 
1. Ibid., PP• 102-104. 
2. F:J7 McConnell1 "Memorial Address: Borden P, Bowne," Zions Herald, o8(1910) 492. 
3. F·,·J·, ffcConnel:l·, "Borden Parker Bowne," Methodist Review, 
105(1922), 344-
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view for Bowne: 
L5own!7 accepted for hiMself, though he never 
urged it on anyone else, the Christological 
doctrine which was once debated as Kenosis 
though his view was not conceived in any or the 
usual formulations. He was impressed by Coleridge's 
term "depotentiation," and declared, in private 
conversation, that the depotentiation of the Son 
of God, living under human terms, could go to any 
length that did not impair moral worth.l 
Ralph Tyler Flewelling also notes the presence or e 
"kenotic" solution in Bowne's theology~ 2 
The 11kenotic theory" is a nineteenth century position, 
although its antecedents may be traced back to the early 
church.3 Its modern form is generally conceded to have 
stemmed from the Lutheran scholar Gottfri~d Thomasius, 
1802~1875.4 Since the publication of his Christi Person 
und We~ in three volumes in 1853-61, most writers have 
either embraced a modified kenoais or been vigorous opponents 
of the theory. It has been a vital question in theology 
since the mid-fifties or the last century. Among the Lutherans 
expounding variations of the theory were C.T.A. Liebner 
(d. 1871), C.K. Hofm.ann (d. 1877), W.F. Gesa (d. 1891), 
probably the most radical or the kenoticists, Franz Delitzsch 
{d. 1890), and F. Frank (d. 1894). Among the Reformed 
1. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, p. 183. 
2. R.T. Flewelling, Personalism and the Problems or Philosophy, 
{New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1915), p. 179. 
3. Friedrich Loors, 11Kenos1s~," EDcyclo~edia of Religion and 
Ethics (1915), VII, 680-6~7. 
4• tOots, ibid., 687: also H.R. Mackintosh, The Doctrine or 
the Person-or Jesus Christ, {New York: Charles Scribners Son, 
1912), p. 266f. 
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theologians subscribing to a kenotic solution were J. P, 
Lange (d, 1884), J,H.A, Ebrard (d. 1888), and F. Godet 
(d. 1900). In England, such notable figures as Gore, 
Fairbairn, A.J. Mason, Rashdall, and Forsyth were deeply 
influenced by the kenotic discussion. The widespread 
interest in this doctrine gives evidence to the atmosphere 
in which Bowne undoubtedly thought about the problem. 
The theory itself receives its name from the Greek word 
) / 
~I<EVwrr~which is the controlling verb in the Pauline expres-
sion in Philippians 2:6f. t 
• .. .... , ·" 1 1 ' , , ' fV ~op•11 9~ou wy,.wv ouX O.f7r&.y~ov .,y., _,._To To 
,. , ... 1\ \) t o\ , , , t" \ 
4u'a.", cr£ 91~ 1 A,.,.. f4"ro~ t.e<UCIJIJ'I!- JlofJI/>'J~ oou.oll 
,\a._M..,v. 
The origin of the theory was merely an expression in 
passing in the Pauline corpus and no sure light is east 'Upon 
its interpretation by other Pauline writings, Generally 
speaking, in the nineteenth century the theologians who 
held this doctrine regarded 
, 
the Ke-vwn.s as a real surrender of the 1 forma 
Dei' for the 'forma servi' and thus assume that 
the Logos, in order to become man, actually 
renounced, iither wholly or in part, His divine 
attributes. 
The theory was an attempt to preserve the Trinitarian doctrine 
of the early Church and "to do justice to the true humanity 
of Jesus Christ and the unity of His person," 2 Undoubtedly 
the advance of the rationalistic school which stressed the 
1, Loofs, op. cit., p, 686, 
2. ~·· p. 686. 
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Jesus of History forced considerable modification of tra-
ditional formulations. The kenosis solution made possible 
the preservation of the "two-nature" doctrine and the unity 
of the person of Christ by the expedient of the "self-
emptying" formula. At the same time, in response to the 
anti-metaphysical thrust of Ritschl and his followers, it 
allowed for an ethical and moral resolution, rather than a 
ape cula ti ve one. 
By insisting that the Divine elements in Christ's 
character are not metaphysical, but ethical and 
spiritual, it reminds us that the deepest qualities 
in God and man are akin, and that humanity is 
grollided in and reproduces the eternal sonship of 
God. 
In more recent times there has been a rejection of the 
kenosis solution, based primarily on the inconsistent nature 
of the internal biblical evidence and also upon the logical 
problems which are raised in respect to the governance of 
the world during the human life of Jesus. Among the critics 
in the last century was Biedermann who characterized this 
doctrine as "a complete kenosis of the understanding."2 In 
this century, Donald Baillie has given the most consistent 
criticism, but with the advantage of a half century of New 
Testament investigation.3 
1. Mackintosh, ot. cit., P• 
2. Loots, ot. ci ., p. 686. 
3. D.M. Bai lie, God Was In 
Sons, 1948). 
271. 
Christ, (New York: Charles Scribner's 
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As was indicated above, Bowne's formulation is not 
systematically worked out. Only once in his writings does 
he mention the Pauline expression, "but emptied himself," 
in relation to the person of Christ,l But there are clear 
expressions of the kenosis element in his writings on the 
person of Christ. 
By the incarnation or our Lord we do not mean that 
an infinite being was compressed into the limits of 
human form, or that in some picturable way he put 
on our humanity like an external covering. We mean 
rather that he became sub4ect to the conditions, 
laws, and limitations of human lite, and thus be-
came in the truest sense of the word a man. In this 
sense he assumed our nature and lived our life •••• 
It suffices to affirm a subjection to the law of 
humanity such that we may best express the fact by 
saying, "The Word became flesh, and dwelt among us." 
This in the sense described is intelligible, at 
least in its meaning, and this is enough. When we 
say more than this, ~e soon lose ourselves in words 
and bad metaphysics. 
The net result of Christological thought is that 
Jesus was not merely the son of Mary, but was also 
the Son of God, who took upon him the laws and 
limitations of the human lot and th~s became man in 
order that he might lift us to God,J 
b. Pre-existence of Christ. 
As has been indicated, the kenotic solution sought to 
preserve both the ethical and the metaphysical dimensions. 
By making Jesus subject to human form (forma servi or doulos)the 
possibility of example is preserved. By the voluntary "self• 
emptying," the distinction between the two natures iapreserved. 
1. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, pp. 87-88. 
2. Ibid., p. 91. 
3. Ibid., p. 93. 
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Bowne clearly expresses his belief that the pre-existence 
ot Christ was important to his Christology. 
The word was made flesh and dwelt among us. The 
pre-existent Son of God humbled himself and be-
came obedient unto death, that he might reveal 
God and redeem man.l 
We find Bowne expressing dissatisfaction with the theory 
that the human Jesus is adequate for salvation. Here again 
one sees the usefulness of the kenotic solution for him. It 
enabled him to pre~erve both the ethical and pre-existent 
categories without logical confusion. He readily granted the 
need tor a human and sympathetic figure, but argued for much 
more. 
For our Saviour we do indeed need one who under-
stands us and who can sympathize with us, but we 
do not need any ordinary man like ourselves. We 
need something mightier by far than this. What 
could such a man do for us? If Jesus is simply 
the dead son of a dead carpenter, what can he do 
for us or we for him? What does he know about us? 
Even less, perhaps, than we know about him. We 
really want some one who knows us altogether as our 
eternal companion and helper, capable of infinite 
sympathy and infinite aid. This has always been the 
faith of the church with the scantiest exception, 
and we have no doubt2it always will remain the faith of the church. 
An unusual example of Bowne's belief in the pre-existence 
of Christ is to be discovered in his discussion of what it is 
to be a Christian. Bowne is relating the story of the Good 
Samaritan: 
1. B.P~ Bowne, "Jesus or Christ," Methodist Review, 92(1910), 
190. 
2. Ibid., P• 191. 
Surely the Good Samaritan was a member of the 
kingdom. Of course he knew nothi~g of Christ, 
but Christ knew something of him. 
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This seems to be an example or Bowne's argument for 
pre-existence due to the necessity of dealing with the problem 
of the salvation of the pre-Christian saints. He solves the 
problem 1n precisely the same way that Christian theologians 
have been solving it since the patristic period, namely by 
use of this doctrine.2 
e. The virgin birth. 
Bowne's method is characterized by a vast suspicion of 
either naive literalism or extreme rationalism. This is 
nowhere more evident than in his feelings regarding the virgin 
birth. For Bowne, belief in this article of faith was helpful, 
so he included it in his theology; 
With respect to Lthe virgin birtB7, I do not 
regard it as a doctrine of the standing or 
falling of the faith, and it should not be made 
any test of orthodoxy. I can get along with it 
or without it. I have no difficulty with it my-
self and I should say I believed it but I do not 
insist on it.3 
He was sublimely indifferent to details when he compared the 
attention to them with the nature of the event. For Bowne, 
the Incarnation 
1. Bowne, Essence of Religion, p. 109. 
2. B.P. Bowne, "Hartman Letter, October 16, 1908," Zions Herald, 
125(1947), 860; for Bowne's Pauline faith in pre-existence. 
). ~·• P• 860. 
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is essentially miraculous, and it is little less 
than pathetic that any one who accepts this thought 
of a self revealing God and the stupendous miracle 
of the incarnation of the divine Son should haggle 
over details of miracles, as if anything depended 
upon them.l 
). The Resurrection. 
Here again Bowne resorts to his dual criterion to 
establish belief in this article of faith. Roughly, his faith 
may be summed up in his own words: "All that is possible • • • 
for the Christian is to form an argument that will be con-
sistent with itself and fit into our general scheme of Chris~ 
tisn thought."2 Given a view of miracle which sees it as 
merely a working out of God'• purpose and will in sustaining 
the universe, then the so-called "miraculous" elements of the 
resurrection are not troublesome. In other words, Bowne begins 
with the ides of God and then asks the questions about the 
nature of the miracle. 
If we believe that our race is and always has 
been in the hands of God, who is leading us on 
toward himself, then our minds are not closed in 
advance against the presence of the living God in 
history and in the mind of man, and that too in 
such a way as we may discern his presence.j 
Science and modern views of man have not made faith in the 
resurrection impossible. "It is at least as possible today as 
it ever was. In this age, as in all ages, it has been a matter 
1. Bowne, Essence of Religion, p. 291. 
2. Ibid., P• 293. 
3. !Sid., p. 292. 
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of faith and not of demonstration.nl While Bowne would 
argus for the historicity of the resurrection, he appeals 
to the pragmatic test of faith aa the important element in 
this question. 
Christianity is its own best evidence. Any great 
consistent system which fits into life and which 
upholds and inspires life is its own proof. The 
Christian system, with its history and its present 
position at the head of all the influenc~that 
make for 2uman uplift, is Christianity's great 
evidence. 
On this basis, resurrection faith is not a matter of 
simple affirmation, but of conviction grounded in the fullest 
understanding of the nature of the revelation of God in Christ. 
Now from this point of view the resurrection and 
ascension are just what was needed to make clear 
what the great revealing movement that culminated 
in the life of Christ meant. The Word was made 
flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory 
aa of the Only Begotten of the Father. We are 
prepared to believe anything that fits into this 
magnificent conception. And what could be more 
fitting than that this divine Son, after having 
revealed the Father and been faithful unto death, 
should triumph over death and return to his Father 
again? How simply and worthily it is all told. 
He arose from the dead, showed himself to his 
disciples, talked with them of the future of his 
kingdom, commanded them to go into all the world 
and preach his gospel, promised to be with them 
always, and then, while bestowing blessing upon 
them, Tanished out of their sight. What else 
could have been done on the Christian theory? And 
if we suppose this to have happened, it is harmo-
nious with the general thought; and however much it 
may scandalize the Sadducean critic, it seems to 
1. Ibid., p. 294• 
2. ~·· pp. 294-295. 
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have bean the thing which the disciples needed 
and which the church has needid ever since to 
complete faith in their Lord. 
B. The Work of Christ.--As in most Christologies, the 
separation of the "person" and the "work" of Christ is an 
arbitrary device for exposition. Actually, the two are but 
moments of the same event. This attitude was shared by Bowne. 
For Bowne, Christ is the historic dimension of God's reve-
lation of his purpose, will, and love to man.2 This disser-
tation will deal with the "work" of Christ in Bowne's writings 
under three headings: the atonement, the revelation of God, 
and the governance of the church and the world. This division 
is expressed in the closing words of Bowne's sermon, "The 
Miracle of the Resurrection": 
It only remains that the church shall keep 
strenuously at work proclaiming the Gospel, the 
good news of God, the Son who came to show us 
the Father and to lead us to him, and who, when 
his revealing work was done, left the visible 
scene to be the eternal head of his church ajd 
the redeemer of all them that call upon him. 
1. The Atonement 
In view of the emphatic moral intent of Bowne's thought, 
it is not surprising that the doctrine of the atonement should 
play a prominent part in his writings. Indeed, Bowne speaks 
of it as "the essential doctrine of Christianity and the 
1. Ibid., PP• 295-296. 
2. lOrd., p. 298. 
3. BOWne, Studies in Christianity, p. 88. 
179 
1 
abiding source of its power." At the same time, he asserted 
that much confusion was created over this article of faith be-
cause it is often viewed as a matter of "forensic technicalities" 
2 
rather than "spiritual dynamics." Because the doctrine is 
"central" to Christian faith, it has been treated most seriously 
by Christian thinkers, and as a result many theories about it 
have arisen and claimed allegiance at one time or another. 
With his typical insistence upon a clear distinction between 
fact and theory, Bowne begins his study of the atonement by 
a clear look at both: 
In the religious life the fact is the effective 
thing and the abiding thing; the theory belongs 
to theology, and is by no means a constant quan-
tity. The grace of the Lord Jesus and the love 
of God which Jesus revealed are what moves men's 
hearts and compels devotion. The cross of the 
Lord Jesus was that in which alone Paul would 
glory, not the goyernmental, or any other theory 
of the atonement.J 
In 1888, Bowne was asked by the students of Boston University 
School of Theology to respond to the question, "How far may 
we go in attempts to rationalize our theology?" Speaking 
specifically on the atonement in this lecture, Bowne is quoted 
as saying, 
I for myself feel lost among the theories LOr 
atonemeni7 and come back with great satisfaction 
to the Scripture fact: "God so loved the world 
that He gave His only begotten Son." Hold the 
1. Ibid., p. 88. 
2. Ibid., P• 172. 
3• Ibid., P• 114. 
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theory if it satisfies, but do not identify the 
theory with the fact, Possibly the theory of 
the atonement, the essential reason of it, lies 
beyond our reach as yet, in the divine nature 
itself. What shall we do? Write a letter to the 
Bishop and leave the church?l 
a. Mediating position. 
For Bowne, there are two essential ingredients of the 
atonement; these must be considered in any discussion or 
evaluation of theories of the atonement, They are: 
(1) God will never depart from his moral laws 
in order to make men happy or to save men in 
their sins. LTherefore, Christ dies~ (2) The 
love and grace of God are set on high forever; 
and now every one that thirsteth may take of the 
water of life. This2is the specific meaning of the redeemer's work. 
He was as impatient with so-called "liberal" inter-
pretations of the atonement as he was with traditional or 
orthodox interpretations. The scorn with which he held the 
"traditionalists" on the one hand and the liberal "senti-
mentalists" on the other was genuine.3 The former distort 
the fact, while the latter often deny it altogether. Bowne 
recognized that traditional solutions to the problem of 
understanding the atonement all had a degree of truth. 
One who has been saved from sin and restored to 
righteousness and the divine favor may well think 
of himself sa redeemed and ransomed, or as freed 
1. B,P, Bowne, "Theology and Reason," Zions Herald, 66(1888), 
401. 
2. B.P. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, pp. 161-162. 
3 • .!!Ua·, cr. p. 154. 
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from debts he could never pay. And he might also 
well and truly think of his Saviour as having 
offered himself up as a sacrifice for him, as 
having died for him and redeemed him by his blood. 
But this is the language of discipleship. It is 
the language of the Christian heart and life, not 
the language of theological theory. To turn it 
into the mechanical letter of theori is to lose 
the spirit which alone giveth life. 
Meanwhile, Bowne notes, the critics of traditional doctrines 
are often equally beside the point • 
• • • fhe critics of the traditional theory have 
often dissolved away both the love and righteous-
ness of God into a hazy good-nature, with no 
power to awe or to attract. Both2extremes ere about equally far from the truth. 
Bowne emphatically insisted upon the atonement as the 
central affirmation of Christian faith. Even in interpretations 
he could'not allow for his own use, he could see meaning and 
truth, as when he speaks of the substitutionary theory of the 
atonement as "possessing a kind of gloomy, tragic grandeur."3 
And he went further to insist that the "sacrificial and sub-
stitutionary language of the scriptures • • • will always have 
its value for Christian speech.•4 
1. Ibid., 
2. !bid., 
3. lDid •• 
4- I"b'!Cf •• 
5. !EI'd. ' 
-· 
"Rock of Ages, Cleft for Me." "o Sacred Head Now 
Wounded." "O Haupt voll Blut und Wunden." There 
is no sign that the Church will ever outgrow this 
speech. But there is need that we understand this 
speech and do not caricature the vicarious suffer-
ing of Divine Love by turning it Snto the vicarious 
punishment of theological theory. 
pp. 121-122. 
p. 141. 
p. 135. 
p. 139. 
. . . 
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Any proper understanding of the real meaning of the 
atonement, according to Bowne, includes the emphasis upon 
the vicarious suffering of God's love rather than the vicarious 
punishment of God's Son. It was Bowne's contention that the 
theological interpreters of this doctrine incorrectly made 
the!!£! of the atonement the cause of God's love instead of 
the effect of God's love. 1 Bowne insisted that biblical 
evidence would have us understand the atonement as the ex-
pression of God's love. In most theological doctrines 
the true order is inverted. The love of God 
to man is made the effect of the atonement, 
whereas the Scriptures represent the atonement 
as the effect of the Father's love. God so 
loved the world that he gave his Son; God was 
in Christ reconciling the world to himself; and 
God in Christ, not God for Christ's sake, forgives 
us.2 
In the discussion to follow, it will be seen that Bowne 
consistently sought to point out two mistakes in understanding 
the atonement. The first mistake is the tendency to discuss 
the problem "in terms of abstractions and in very general 
oversight of the concrete facts of the case."3 The second 
mistake lies in the fact that discussion of the atonement 
often sees "the relations of non-moral things Lbeini7 
substituted for the relations of moral persons.4 
1. cr. ibid., pp. 
2. Ibid:;-p. 129. 
3o Ybld., Po 122o 
4· Ibid. . ·. . . 
128f, 140.f. 
183 
b. Ssl¥atioD by grace through faith. 
This important doctriDe of the Protestant tradition 
found a vigorous advocate in Bowne, despite some critics' 
Stj.l'prise. 
Bowne was occasionally charged with being a 
"rationalist" by his theological critics, but 
he was .emphatically not such in the sense in 
which they understood the term. He was as 
profound a believer in the divine grace as is 
Barth or any other Calvinist. "Grace, not 
faith," he said, "is the deepest factor in our 
salvation. It is the grace of God on which 
everything else depends, and which gives value 
to everything ... else. Salvation is not of our-
selves; it is the gift of God." On this point 
he is in complete accord with Wesley and with 
Methodists generally. The idea that Methodists 
ever taught a different doctrine from this is 
a curious illusion. They have always been 
opposed to a self-sufficient "humanism" or what 
is more precisely called Pelsgianism. In this 
respect they have always been in agreement with 
their Calvinistic brethren, and in this respect 
Bowne would today stand shoulder to shoulder 
with Barth. He would repudiate as vigorously as 
does Barth ~oth Pelagian and atheistic humanism 
of our day. 
With this in mind, it is clear that Bowne is interested 
in the relationship of the sinner to his God in the atonement, 
and not in any sort of transaction which makes grace less 
than grace. In other words, Bowne insists that salvation 
must finally be ethically understood,' "or we are landed in 
artificial hocus-pocus, if not in downright immorslity."2 
1. A.c. Knudson, "Bowne and Barth," Zions Herald, 113(1935), 
296. 
2. Bowne, The Christian Life: A Study, p. 56. 
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One is not saved by belief in a particular theory about 
faith or grace, or by works. With regard to the former, 
"men are not saved by their doctrine of Scripture, be it 
conservative or progressive, but by faith in God the Father, 
in the Lord Jesus, in the sanctifying Spirit, and in the 
forgiveness of Sins."1 Likewise, man is not saved by "works"; 
••• no one of any spiritual attainment can ever 
reach peace through any good works of his own, but 
only by trusting in the infinite grace above him. 
We are perfectly clear that our salvation is of 
grace, not of debt; it is not of works, lest any 
men should boast~ it is not of ourselves, it is 
the gift of God. 
Bowne's definition of "faith" is infused with moral 
content. He is emphatic about the priority of grace in 
salvation. "We ere not saved by faith, but by grace."3 
Faith, for him, is simply "yielding ourselves up in self-
surrender to the divine grace above us."4 But "grace" is not 
to be understood in any sense of mechanics or "sacerdotal 
proxyism." 
If we are to be lifted out of our low life into 
the life .and fellowship of the Spirit, it must 
be, not by any mechanical performance of external 
rites, but by fUth and trust in the grace which 
is above us, ~nd in the ideal which that grace 
reveals ••• !:> 
Self-surrender to the divine grace carries inevitable 
1. B,P. Bowne, "Thoughts For the Present Distress in Matters 
Biblical," Zions Herald, 78(1900), 331. 
2. B-.P-.··B"Owne. The Christian Life: A Study, p. 64. 
3. B·•P·•·Bowne, Essence of Religion, p. 88. 
4• Ibid. . . . • •• 
5. :EhP• B-owne, The Christian Revelation, pp. 87-88. 
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morel conseq~ences: 
It is .the very deepest end most active principle 
of obedience to God's will. Faith, if faith, must 
work, and it must work righteousness. Salvation, 
too, is essentially a salvation from unrighteous 
living, not from penalties only or chiefly, It 
is a gross misconception to think of salvation as 
anything but e salvation from sinning end a res-
toration to righteousness, and thus to God's favor. 1 
In feet, even the "traditional" doctrines at the bottom 
assert this inescapable morel connotation. Salvation by 
grace through faith can have meaning only when it results in 
the re-establishment of the right relationship between men 
end God. "The truth in the traditional doctrine on this 
subject is, that not even love can arbitrarily forgive or 
cancel consequences, This would make forgiveness itself 
immoral. 112 
c, Morel understanding of the event. 
Bowne further emphasizes the ides that often theories of 
salvation end theories of the atonement ere designed to pro-
vide "scapegoat" salvation. By iMmoral interpretations of 
deeply morel facts or by literal interpretations of immoral 
theories men overlook the element of righteousness and puri-
ficetion in every sincere act of repentance, This type of 
religion led Bowne to assert that 
s large pert of religious effort seems to be 
directed to saving men from hell rather then 
from sinning, end to getting men to heaven 
1. Bowne, Essence of Religion, p. 89. 
2. ~owns, The Christian Life: A Study, p. 59. 
instead of recovering them to holiness of heart 
and life--a frightful heresy in both faith and 
practice.l · 
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On the other hand, the "sentimentalist," as opposed to 
the misguided "traditionalist," might see the Cross and the 
work of Chris~ on the Cross as indeed "foolishness," But for 
Bowne, any sentimental or rationalistic rejection of Christ 
11 is forever vacated by the cross of Christ. God will be at 
infinite cost to save men, but he will save them morally or 
2 
not at all." 
Bowne is often characterized as holding an "exemplar" or 
"moral" theory of the atonement, these notions being under-
stood in terms of the "classical" theological definitions. 
The "moral" theory is often considered to be that of Abelard. 
The "substitutionary" theory is generally conceded to stem 
from the formula worked out by Anselm of Canterbuni3 While 
Bowne would acknowledge the limited truth in each, his par-
ticular brand of the "moral" theory differs from each of 
these "classical" views. At the risk of too great refinement 
of terms, one might say that Bowne insisted upon a "moralizing" 
of the "moral" theory. For he .felt that "traditional" 
1. Bowne, Studies in Christiahity, p. 158. 
2. Ibid., p. 162. 
3. BOWne criticized Anselm because he felt that Anselm 
confused three factors; the fact of the atonement, the 
theory of the atonement, and the theory and P.erson of the 
Redeemer. Also, he felt Anselm dealt with the matter 
quantitatively instead of morally. 
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doctrines of the atonement 
have insisted that the consequences of sin cannot 
be canceled without an atonement, but have signally 
failed to see that they are not canceled even with 
an atonement. Their occupation with fictitious 
forensic consequences has prevented1their seeing the world of concrete consequences. 
For Bowne the atonement must never be conceived as "a scheme 
for excusing us from righteous living, as if God could now, 
be content to have us live unrighteous and wicked lives."2 
At the same time, the results of the atonement are not to be 
conceived as mechanical, but deeply moral. The grace of 
forgiveness of sins is to be followed by obedience to the will 
of God as revealed in the Son.3 This is the "radical" moral 
theory of Bowne. He does not object to calling it the "moral" 
theory, but feels that the suggestion included in that des-
ignation is a bad one. 
The title itself is a bad one, as failing to 
suggest the eternal love and eternal working 
which underlie the life and salvation of men, 
and of which the earthly work of the ReAeemer 
is only a pert and as it were a sample.4 
Bowne wants to place the weight of his doctrine on the moral 
dimension, but wishes to make that emphasis more pronounced 
than even the so-called "moral" theory has in the past provided. 
1. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 154. 
2. Bown~. Essence of Religion, p. 87. 
3. Ct. ibid., Chapter v. 
4• B~-;-!tudies in Christianity, ~· 173; Cf., also B.P. Bowne, 
"comments on Dr. Steele 1s Paper, Zions Herald, 77(1899), 
1265. 
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At the same time, he wishes to make clear that the moral 
dimension does not in any way diminish the fact of grace 
and God's work in the atonement. For Bowne, a true response 
to God's grace would be a moral response. At the same time, 
the moral response is possible only to a moral God; this 
eliminates any mechanical theory and, indeed, heightens the 
necessity for a clearly moral interpretation of this most 
astounding affirmation of Christian faith. That "traditional" 
theories often do not give this type of meaning, is clear 
to Bowne. 
The satisfaction of the satisfactionist is one 
which does not satisfy. The substitution of 
the substitutionist is one which does not 
substitute. The justice of the rectoral theory 
is unlike any justice recognized by the un-
sophisticated moral reason. The satisfaction 
and the substitution and the justice have to be 
manipulated until they mean what they may be 
allowed to mean according to the exigencies of 
the theory, but what no one would even think 
they meant who relied solely on the ordinary 
usage of language. 
2. The Christian life 
It is now clear that Bowne's theology has a thorough-
going "this-worldly" emphasis. It is practical and apodictic 
rather than speculative and logical. "Practical certainties" 
are more important than logical consistency in matters of 
faith. 2 Theological phrases must be understood from the point 
1. B.P. Bowne, "Comments on Dr. Steele's Paper," Zions Herald, 
77( 1899)' 1265. 
2. B•P• ··Bowne. Theism, P• 32. 
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of view of life rather than metaphoric exegesis.l When life 
presents a problem for solution, only life can offer a 
solution. 
We meet all such difficultie·s by coming out of 
the closet and looking at the concrete facts. 
And then many a thing which may be difficult 
is found perfectly simple in practice. Plato 
expounded the· abstract impossibility of motion; 
and Diogenes refuted him by walking up and down 
before him. Concrete matters must be concretely 
tested; ~nd abstrac2 objections may often be 
removed by walking. 
a. Ethical emphasis. 
This "practical" emphasis runs through Bowne's treatment 
of the Christian life. 
In his most extended treatment of the subject, Bowne 
suggests that the "perfect" Christian life would involve 
three forms of religious experience.3 The first type is 
"ethical." 
Religion consists in righteousness; but it is 
more than abstract ethics, because the moral 
law, from being an impersonal principle, is 
elevated into the expression of a supreme and 
holy will •••• In quiet times, and with persons 
of wholesome training and habits, or with persons 
of unemotional type, and especially with children, 
this is1.the prevailing type of Christian expe-
rience.'+ 
This is the Christianity of the Synoptic Gospels, and of the 
1. Cf., Bowne, The Christian Life: A Study, p. 66. 
2. Bowne, The Christian Revelation, p. 57; also The Immanence 
of God, p. 1o9. 
3. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 27lf. 
4· !£!£·· p. 272. 
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epistles of James and Peter. 
The second type of Christianity is what Bowne calls 
"Pauline." This type is characterized by dissatisfaction 
with the performance of ethical du~ies. Persons of this 
type 
hold their lives up against the keen, still 
splendor of the divine perfection, and they 
are overwhelmed by the revelation. For such 
persons there is no peace in doing. The more 
they do the worse they feel •••• The ideal 
grows with obedience and thus condemns them 
more and more •••• They must be taken out of 
themselves ••• and saved by grace, not works. 
Then their distress is removed by the vision of 
that condescending grace from above which saves 
us through itself.l 
The third type of Christianity is called "mystical." It 
arises from the desire for direct personal communion with God. 
It is represented by the writings of St. John in the New 
Testament and "by the various bodies of mystics in church 
history, and by multitudes of individual saints." 
It belongs to the contemplative rather than 
the active side of religion; but it is im-
portant, even for practice, by furnishing 
the living water, w2thout which life loses 
its deepest spring. 
Bowne warns that overemphasis upon the ethical to the 
exclusion of the other elements leads to Pharisaism and 
spiritual pride. The Pauline form tends toward antinomianism 
if misunderstood and not interpreted vitally and ethically. 
1. Ibid., p. 273~ 
2. Ibid., p. 275. 
The mystical form may degenerate into contemplative and 
quietistic indifference toward the world. 
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His solution to the problem posed by the need for these 
three elements throws the weight upon the ethical. 
Now, while the ethical view needs to be deepened 
by the others, they, in turn need the ethical 
view to give them fibre and substance, and to 
furnish the active nature of man a worthy task. 
And this can be found only in recalling the mind 
from painful inspection of its own states, and 
from quietistic dreaming and contemplation, and 
setting it upon the positive task of realizing 
the kingdom of God in the world. The ethical 
view is fundamental and central; and however far 
we may go in religious fervor and aspiration, 
we must never lose sight of the ethical aim. All 
truly religious growth and insight must be based 
on this. And one of the promising features of the 
present religious outlook is the tendency to pay 
less attention to subjective states and more to 
the objective aim of building up the kingdom of 
God, which1is the kingdom of righteousness and good-will. 
It is apparent that while he admits the necessity of 
"varieties" of religious experience, Bowne is adamant at 
the point of the ultimate criterion, namely, "obedience as 
the test of faith" and righteousness. 
b. Conversion and redemption. 
This thoroughgoing ethical criterion is understandably 
evident in his discussion of the nature of conversion. As 
has been noted, Bowne was particularly concerned about the 
tendency "among his clansmen" the Methodists to distort the 
1. ~·· p. 277. 
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Wesleyen doctrine of the "witness o:f the Spirit" into non-
ethical thaumatu~gics. This form of religious experience 
placed great emphasis upon the necessity of "dating" with 
assurance the time of conversion. This could only be done 
if the person was able to recall an experience in which his 
life's direction was confirmed by the "witness." 
The dangers inherent in such a doctrine were only too 
apparent to Bowne. "The ideal form of the Christian life," 
he wrote, "is that which never experienced conversion, and 
which cannot date its beginning."l What he had in mind was 
that it is the Christian home, nurturing young lives into 
loving obedience to the will of God, that creates authentic 
Christian persons. 
However, one who is not fortunate enough to have had 
such Christian nurture may experience conversion simply in 
the "New Testament sense." Bowne suggests that those who 
can read their Greek or consult a Revised Version of the 
New Testament will understand that conversion means only 
"turning around." 
Men are going the wrong way; they must turn 
around. They are turned away from God; they 
must turn toward Him if they would enter into 
life. This is the New Testament idea of 
conversion--the resolute turning away from 
sin and toward God, i~ the fixed purpose to 
please and serve him. 
1. Bowne, The Christian Life: A Study, ~· 114. 
2. B.P. Bowne, 11But Are They Converted? , Zions Herald, 
81(1903), 301. 
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Conversion is never properly understood aesthetically. 
Bowne suggests that it is easy to "have pleasing and lofty 
religious emotions, and to fancy oneself religious on that 
account."1 But such fancies only hide from us what the 
essential thing is in our need of conversion, namely, the 
"set rebellion of the will."2 This rebellion is against God 
because it is our unwillingness to assume a life of active 
filial obedience to God. Beyond obedient loyalty to the 
spirit and commands of our Lord, 
there is no common pattern of religious ex-
perience; and it is not desirable that there 
should be. The search for such a thing implies 
gross ignorance 3n pedagogy, in psychology, 
and in religion. 
Redemption, or salvation, is of course understood in 
these same consistently ethical terms. Bowne insists that 
redemption is never an abstraction. The "deepest thought 
concerning God's purpose" in our lives is not redemption or 
salvation as commonly understood. It is not a forensic or 
metaphorical experience, but simply "the training and devel-
opment of souls as the children of God."4 Salvation or 
redemption, then, is simply an incidence or implication of 
this deeper purpose. It must not be treated in any other way. 
1. B.P. Bowne, "Supernatural in Religion," Zions Herald, 
81(1903), 42. 
2. Ibid., P• 42. 
3. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 282. 
4• Bowne, Essence of Religion, p. 241. 
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Redemption is not s finished fact, but a continual and vital 
process. 
In the book of Acts we are told that the Lord 
added to the church such as were becoming saved. 
In one sense every one is saved whose heart says 
Amen to the will of God. This is the dividing 
line between the children of this world and the 
children of the Kingdom; but in another and deeper 
sense no one is saved as a compl~ted work--we are 
becoming saved; that is, the will of God is being 
progressively wrought out in us and we are being 
transformed into his image ••• It is not enough 
that we cease from rebellion. We must come into 
positive co-working with God, that he may realize 
in us and through us his gracious purpose, and 
lift us to heights of knowledge, of power, and 
of love.l 
Conversion and redemption are thoroughly moral and ethical 
both in implication and experience. The turning away from 
rebellion into conformity with the will of God is properly 
conversion; the continuing concentration upon obedience to 
God's will is the mark of salvation or redemption. In a 
characteristic phrase, Bowne notes that "the forgiven sinner 
is not free to go and sin again; he is bidden to go and sin no 
more. 112 
Redemption also is not to be understood in completely 
personal terms. Just as man is not redeemed in abstraction, 
neither is he redeemed in non-social terms. "If the natural 
realizes itself only in the spiritual to which it is the 
introduction, the spiritual in turn gets a concrete significance 
1~ Ibid~, p. 244 
2. !bid., p. 88~. 
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only through the natural in which it roots."1 Social 
redemption is the result of individual turning to obedience. 
Redeemed men and women are called to the redemption of socie~. 
The personal dimension of obedience and fulfillment of God's 
will in personal life is only adequately fulfilled when society 
lives itself by filial obedience in the kingdom of God. 2 
c. Prayer. 
Prayer is an implication of the Christian life in that 
trust in God requires it. There are many events in life which 
are shrouded in mystery. The most insistent theme in good 
religion is the phrase, ''What is that to thee? Follow thou 
mel" The only adequate response to this sort of command is 
simply "to trust God even when we do not understand him, until 
it shall please him to reveal the inner meaning of his ways."3 
One of the important meanings of prayer is that it helps us 
trust God. 
Bowne suggests that prayer is the "very gist and essence 
of religion," and also that it is "life's deepest spring."4 
It is the point at which our sense of dependence upon God and 
our desire to relate ourselves to his purpose meet. For that 
reason our prayers ought to reflect both dependence and purpose, 
1. B.P. Bowne, "Morals and Life," Methodist Review, 91(1909), 
720. 
2. Cf., Part Three, Chapter 5, section A. 
3. B.P. Bowne, "second Probation," Zions Herald, 63(1886), 353. 
4• B.P. Bowne~ Essence of Religion, p. 159. 
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~ise Christians," he says, "must pray as if work were useless, 
and work as if prayer were useless, and in both oases leave 
the result with God."l 
He gives four general rules for effective prayers. 2 
First, we should not offer prayers which we ought to answer 
ourselves. Secondly, we should pray about everything. Third, 
we must not become disturbed over God's seeming delay in an-
swering prayer. Finally• alleged answers to prayer need to 
be carefully scrutinized before being allowed as such and 
very carefully interpreted when allowed. 
Petitionary prayer is conceived by Bowne purely in 
psychological terms. "It is practically and psychologically 
necessary for developing and expressing our sense of dependence 
upon God."3 The more developed religious nature will pass 
from particular petitions to more inclusive spiritual prayers. 
Petitions have no effect or significance on the divine side. 
When God answers prayer he does not answer the 
verbal petition, but the desire of the soul going 
forth in work and the use of all the means for 
the attainment of the thing needed. From the 
human side we need prayer as petition for its 
place in social relgion, for its value in re-
ligious pedagogics, and for its psychological 
necessity in the religious life of the individ-
ual; but, from the divine side, we do not need 
prayer as petition, but only the prayerful 
attitude of the spirit; that is, the desire of 
1. Ibid., p. 158. 
2. cr:-ibid., p. 153f. 
3. Ibid., p. 142. 
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the soul to relate itself and all its interests 
to God and his will. From the divine side the 
sufficient and all-inclusive prayer is "Thy 
will be done."l 
d. The Church. 
The doctrine of the Church is thoroughly discussed in 
chapter five of part three, "The kingdom of God as the Church." 
Some preliminary observations may be made here. 
Bowne's ecclesiology was very insignificant as a part 
of his theology. He defined the Church 
as the organization for public religious worship, 
for religious instruction, and the administration 
of religious ordinances.2 
As such it is merely one of "God's instruments" for the 
attaining of his will. The larger part of God's work is 
carried on by other institutions--the family, the state, the 
school--and therefore the moralizing of these institutions is 
more important than simply the upbuilding of the Church as an 
institution. "The Church ill the highest institution, 11 writes 
Bowne, "but by no means the most important."3 
The Church is defined in purely instrumental terms. 
Because Christianity is a spiritual and personal religion, 
no institution with mechanical and external rites can supply 
adequately the means of salvation. "It is purely instrumental 
for.the interests of the kingdom or the believers that com-
1. Ibid., P• 147. 
2. Ibid;, p. 39. 
3. Ibid,, P• 40. 
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pose it,•1 
The mission or the Church is primarily the proclamation 
or the rorgiveness of sins in Jesus Christ, and not through 
the sacraments of an institution,2 Also, the task is to 
k~ep strenuously at work proclaiming the Gospel, 
the good news of God, the Son who came to show 
us the Father and to lead us to him, and who, 
when his revealing work was done, left the 
visible scene to be the eternal head of his church 
and the Redeemer of all them that call upon him.3 
The Church exists, then, fundamentally to serve the needs 
and interests of the individual. There is no expression of 
the sacramental values in the Church, although.those may be 
included in Bowne's own mind. There is no discussion of the 
Church as the body of Christ; rather it is merely another 
among many of the divinely established institutions of human 
society. 
Probably because of this low estimate of the theological 
dimensions of the meaning of the Church, it was easy for 
Bowne to slip into a rather bitter denunciation of the Church 
as it expressed itself in life. For example, he ignored any 
possibility of a genuine theological basis for denominations 
and referred to them as merely the result of the "herding 
instinct,"4 
1. Ibid., P• 114. 
2. BOWne, Studies in Christianity, p. 213, 
3. Bowne, Essence of Religion, p. 298. 
4· Bowne, Principles of Ethics, p. 128, 
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Bowne's most bitter denunciations are reserved for the 
officialdom of his own denomination. McConnell notes that 
the HilckJI!Iy G. Mitchell affair left Bowne "with an undying 
contempt for ecclesiastical officialism."1 Speaking of 
ecclesiastical interference with the schools, he wrote: 
Ignorant men, unfitted for their position but 
having a vote, feel perfectly able to decide 
without the slightest knowledge or study of 
the case. They cannot discuss but they can 
decide; they cannot refute, but they can con-
demn; and they have so little interest in the 
truth that they ere willing to listen to all 
manner of false witness if it falls in with 
their notions, and a~e deaf to anything that 
makes the other way. 
McConnell recalls that Bowne once accused the Church officials. 
of "imbecility spiced with knsvery."3 
rna hitherto unpublished letter to Lewis Hartman, Bowne 
characterized Church leadership as follows: 
All institutions or organizations tend to become 
ossified or to fall into the hands of persons of 
mediocre intellect and inferior character. This 
is as much the case with the church as with any 
other institution and especially the case with 
orthodoxy. Orthodoxy gathers to itself not merely 
the persons who wish to hold fast all that is good, 
but a great riff raff of ignorant people and also 
of machine managers and persons who have vested 
interests of place and domination and so on. These 
people are always supremely orthodox, some with the 
1. F.J. McConnell, "Borden Parker Bowne," Methodist Review, 
105(1922), 344. 
2. G.A. Coe, "Borden Parker Bowne,"··Methodist Review, 
92(1910), 518. 
3· F.J. McConnell, "Borden Parker Bowne," Methodist Review, 
10,5(1922) J 346. 
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crass obstinacy of ignorance or a dull malignity 
of jealousy and some for reasons of interest; such 
persons as the money changers, the sellers of doves 
and the makers of shrines for the goddess. Unless 
we keep our eyes open and maintain the freedom of 
thought and think freely withal and resist these 
tendencies, the church becomes a kind of nest of 
ignorance and reaction and dullness. Quite an 
authority on this matter said of the old Temple, 
"It is written, My house shall be called a house 1 of prayer, but ye have made it a den of thieves." 
1. Unpublished letter to Lewis Hartman, January 8, 1908, 
Boston University School of Theology Library. 
PART THREE: ETHICS 
VII. Philosophical and Christian Ethics 
Bowne wrote no work on "Christian" ethics as such. But 
his ethical system is fundamentally Christian in intention if 
not in the method of analysis. It is necessary, therefore, to 
proceed from his philosophical ethics by inference to theolog-
ical formulations. His most important contribution is his 
The Principles of Ethics published first in 1892. 1 Discussion 
of ethical problems engaged him throughout his entire career, 
but he wrote no other thorough study than his Principles of 
Ethics. 
Bowne's method of procedure in ethics is similar to that 
in other areas. The task of ethics is simply the "moralization 
ot life."2 Familiar themes and tendencies in method appear 
as he suggests his program: 
The natural must be raised to the plane of the 
moral; but the moral must find its field in the 
natural •••• LBthics7 is also intended to show 
how complex the problems are. And how impossible 
it is to solve them without taking into account 
both the moral nature and the teachings of ex-
perience. The lawyer, the economist, the histo~ 
rian, and the moralist must work together, and 
1. B.P. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1892). 
2. ~., p. viii. 
1 the sentimentalist must be left out. 
A. Bowne's Philosophical Ethics. 
1. Synthesis of intuitionism and utilitarian.ism 
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Bishop McConnell has suggested that the two characteristic 
features of Bowne's contribution to philosophy are (1) an 
emphasis on the volitional element in belief, and (2) the 
"suggested reconciliation of intuitive and utilitarian posi-
tions in ethica."2 It is the latter feature which is most 
instructive for a discussion of ethical theory. The "recon-
ciliation" of which McConnell speaks has been compared by 
Brightman to the Hegelian syntheses: 
The greatness of Bowne as a thinker was largely 
due to his comprehensiveness. This in turn led 
to a many-sidedness that seemed almost paradoxical. 
The paradoxes were not really paradoxes, but were 
more like Hegelian syntheses, the reconciliation 
of opposites on a higher level. Thus we may say 
that he was pragmatic-rationalistic, contemporary-
historical, religious-secular, and the expounder 
of a creative personalistic synthesis.3 
Bowne notes in the introduction to Principles of Ethics 
that his work has "two leading thoughts": 
One is the necessity of uniting the intuitive 
and the experience school of ethics in order 
to reach any working system. The other is 
that the aim of conduct is not ab~tract virtue, 
but fulness and richness of life.4 
1. Ibid., p. viii. 
2. F.J. McConnell, "Borden Parker Bowne," Methodist Review, 
105(1922), 343· 
3. E.S. Brightman, "Bowne as a Philosopher," Zions Herald, 
112(1934), 1056. 4. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, p. iv. 
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The first objective is that suggested by McConnell as one of 
the two most important contributions of Bowne's philosophy. 
Essentially it means that 
ethics can never dispense with the good will as 
the centre of moral theory; and the good will 
can never dispense with practical wisdom and the 
teachings of experience, if it·is not to lose 
its way. When we abstract the good will from 
the natural objects set for its exercise in our 
constitution and the nature of things, the moral 
life is carried on in a vacuum, and loses all 
real substance and value. And when we abstract 
conduct from the personality in which it originates 
and which it expresses, we have a base, or sordid, 
externalism which is its own condemnation,l 
Bowne observes that ethical theory has moved back and forth 
between these two extremes, each excess of one leading to the 
assertion of the other. "Intuitive" ethics, with its emphasis 
upon virtue, has led to the "vacuum view of the moral life," 
"Utilitarian" ethics, with its emphasis upon good, has often 
led to a shrewdness without moral character, Bowne's program 
is a reconciliation of the two through a movement out of the 
"closet" into life. 
The intuitive basis for ethical life is discovered by 
induction in the actual form of human moral experience, Human 
experience is aware of unconditional imperatives, as the notion 
of right and duty. 
There are certain principles of conduct which 
ought to rule our action. Such are justice, 
good-will, truthfulness, etc. To discover these 
1, ~., pp. iv-v. 
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we need enter upon no speculation about the chief 
good. They stand in their own righti and their 
obligation is intuitively discerned. 
This is basically the position of ethicists of the intuitional 
school, especially of Kant. Duty is a categorical imperative. 
It simply declares a duty to be done. 
The "utilitarian" basis for ethical life is historically 
thought of as a "goods" ethics, an attempt to found a system 
on the moral ideal of the good rather than duty. There has 
been a great deal of "unedifying speculation" on just what 
the good is. Some have held it to be pleasure, some indiffer-
ence to pleasure, others rational life, others happiness. In 
modern times, with philosophers like Jeremy Bentham end John 
Stuart Mills, this general view has come to be known as 
Utilitarianism. 
These two greet schools or divisions of ethical philos-
ophy form the thesis end antithesis of Bowne's ethical 
synthesis. 
When the duty ethics ignores the goods ethics, 
it tends to formalism and etiquette in which 
the unconditional sacredness of its imperatives 
becomes absurd; end when the goods ethics ignores 
the duty ethics, it sinks to the level of practical 
shrewdness end loses its morel character altogether.2 
1. !21£., p. 21. 
2. Ibid., p. 25. In Dean Lauress J. Birney's (student at Boston 
University School of Theology, 1896-1899) copy of Principles 
of Ethics, he wrote in the margin next to the above quo-
tation these words referring to the relation of duty ethics 
to goods ethics: 11 ••• as inseparable as the two ends of 
a stick." The phrase is probably a lecture gloss by Bowne. 
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Bowne's insistence upon the need to begin our speculation 
with life rather than logical consistency, with the practical 
rather then the hypothetical, is an important element in his 
ethical theory. He sought concrete experience rather than 
abstractions. Indeed, the purpose of ethics is consistently 
expressed in terms of this ~ethod. 
Life must be moralized by being brought under 
the control of moral principles, and morals 
must be vitalized by being brought into 
connection with our eviryday human life in 
the world that now is. 
Our intuition asserts the reality of duty, but taken alone 
"is an unlawful abstraction." On the other hand, a utilitarian 
view, leading to the assertion of the importance of a goods 
ethics, taken alone is also sn unlawful abstraction. The 
former considers the good will apart from its conditions and 
its objects. The latter considers conduct apart from the 
living subject. For Bowne the two bases must be held in 
dialectic. The duty must aim at well-being while the well-
being must be realized in and through duty. 2 Stated simply, 
an ethical system must deal with both consequences and motives. 
Viewed from the former standpoint, Bowne's system is utilitarian. 
Viewed from the latter, it is intuitional. 
The reconciliation of these views is to be found in the 
activity of the free spirit. "When these goods are seen in 
1. B.P. Bowne, "Morals and Life," Methodist Review, 91(1909), 
708. 
2. B.P..···Bewne, Principles of Ethics, p. )6. 
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their value and obligation and the free spirit devotes itself 
to their realization, we have moral activity."1 The function 
of freedom 
is not to change the laws of our nature or to 
give them a new resultant, but rather, freely, 
lovingly, and thus morally, to realize the 
goods and ideals shadowed forth in our nature.2 
The ethical life then is based upon the nature and needs 
of the human spirit and the response of rational freedom to 
the life situation. 
2. Insredients of a workins szstem of ethics 
In Theism Bowne has outlined what he has called "a working 
system of ethics."3 It includes the insights of the intuitive-
utilitarian synthesis. The first ingredient is e set of 
"formal moral judgments respecting right and wrong." This is 
intuitive. It may be called the "formal content of conduct." 
The second ingredient is "e set of aims or ideals to be 
realized." This is a utilitarian or goods view. It may be 
called the "material content of conduct." The· third ingredient 
is "e set of commandments to be obeyed." This is the synthesis 
of the formal and material contents of conduct organized and 
presented as "duties." 
To labor Brightman's suggestion, let this be understood 
as a triadic dialectic. The thesis is intuitive morel 
1. Ibid., P• 39. 
2. Ibid •. 
3. BOWne~ Theism, P• 293. 
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judgments, the antithesis is utilitarian ideals, and the 
synthesis is the set of duties that are implied. A working 
system of ethics requires the triad of judgment, ideal, and 
duty. Judgment without ideals is "vacuum" morality. Ideals 
without moral judgment are calculating. Duty without content 
is irrational. 
On the plane of personal action, the distinction between 
formal and material is helpful in determining the rightness 
of individual behavior~ The standard of ethical behavior, 
for Bowne, is not simply a matter of right will. It must also 
be measured and balanced by rightness of act. One of the 
pernicious errors of ethics is the separation in fact of the 
formal and material aspects of behavior. 
This matter may be re-stated in terms of the 
familiar distinction between the formal and 
the material rightness of action. The former 
depends upon the attitude of the agent's will 
toward his ideal of right, the latter depends 
on the harmony of the act with the laws of 
reality and its resulting tendency to produce 
and promote well-being. Conduct which is 
formally right may be materially wrong; and 
conduct which is materially right may be 
formally wrong; but no conduct can be even 
formally right when the agent does not aim to 
be materially right. The ideal of conduct 
demands both formal and material rightness; 
and as long as either is lacking, the outcome 
is imperfect. The material rightness, however, 
is independent both of the agent's will and 
of his knowledge; and all that the agent adds 
to it is simply the formal rightness of the 
good will.l 
1. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, pp. 39-40. 
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Several great errors of ethical study are revealed when 
subjected to this analysis of the ingredients of a working 
system. In the first place, an ethical theory which places 
its justification simply on the "will to do right" is now 
seen as untenable. For, as Bowne indicates, 
we demand not only that the will be right, but 
that the affections and emotions all be harmon-
ious therewith ••• The will is not the whole 
even of the moral man. In such cases we get a 
hint that the standard of moral judgment is not 
so much a conception of right volitional relations, 
as it is an ideal of perfect manhood, which of 
course includes the right relations of will, and 
much more besides.l 
A second great error resulting from the separation of 
form and content is a "relapse into outright immorality." 
Doctrinaires with good intentions have wrought 
great mischief. Philanthropists have slaughtered 
and massacred for humanity's sake, while for the 
glory of God2the direst atrocities have been perpetrated. 
Still another possibility in the separation of formal and 
material is the lapse into sentimentality. Instinctive 
sympathy "so far from being a sufficient security for right 
action is very often the pronounced enemy of righteousness 
and justice."3 The natural impulse of the affection without 
moral insight may lead to the opposite of brutality and into 
sentimentality, as in the matter of punishment. Bowne was 
1. Ibid., PP• 41-42. 2. Ibid., p. 42. 
3. Ibid., P• 44· 
-
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highly critical of some forms of penal reform. McConnell 
recalls that Bowne "had no patience with the social redemption 
which has 'all bowels for the criminal and none for the honest 
man. 1 " 1 
To those who would claim that the infinitude of consequences 
makes impossible the judgment of conduct from this perspective, 
Bowne simply turns to experience and notes that "when ex-
perience has revealed little or nothing concerning consequences, 
our judgment of the right thing to do is wavering and uncer• 
tain. 112 We must simply make a study of such consequences as 
are open to inspection and insight and act accordingly. 
B. Implications for Christian Theology. 
1. Righteousness as obedience to the will of God 
Bowne's theological ethics is set within the framework of 
his system as outlined above. We have had revealed to us the 
requirement of obedience to the will of God as we see it in 
Jesus Christ. "To be a Christian is to live in loving sub-
mission and active obedience to the will of God, trusting in 
his mercy in Jesus Christ."3 This faith-claim upon our will 
becomes the ideal which is thrust into dialectic with our 
moral nature. The formal content, our expressed loyalty to 
God, must be complemented by the material content of active 
1. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, p. 174. 
2. Bowne, Princi~es of Ethics, p. 46. 
3. B.P. Bowne, 11 at Is It To Be A Christian?", Zions Herald, 
67(1889), 353. 
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obedience to God's will. 
For Bowne the "true and highest good of man" lies in the 
realization of his typical perfection. His perfection is to 
fulfill the end for which he was created. 
While a better is in sight, we can rest in no 
good; end the refusal to move onward is to be 
a traitor to the highest, and so, finally, to the 
good itself ••• The refusal to move on to the 
best is to decline the end fhe creator intended, 
and to transgress his will. 
Admittedly in religion s received code often takes the place 
of this ides. For conventionalized conscience this is nee-
essary, according to Bowne. Institutional morality is nec-
essary, but criticism often reveals the inner roots of dy-
namic ethical idealism and compels revision in institutional 
codes. 
Obedience to the will of God as the test of ethical 
religion was a consistent theme in Bowne. Relating this 
ethical test to conversion, he pointed out the utility of the 
insight: If we make obedience to the will of God the test of 
Christian discipleship, 
on the one hand, we shall escape those non-ethical 
conversions, which are the product of neuro-
pathology or social contagion; end, on the other, 
we shall no longer confuse honest inquirers by 
sending them to grope in the labyrinths of obscure 
emotional2psychology which has been mistaken for religion. 
1. Bowne, Princi5les of Ethics, pp. 120-121. 
2. B.P. Bowne, " bedience the Test of Discipleship," Zions 
Herald, 81(1903), 11. 
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When Bowne speaks of "obedience to the will of God" he 
means specifically obedience to the commandments of God. 
"Obedience is the test of religion. This is what the Lord 
requires of us, and this is all the Lord requires of us, the 
filial spirit issuing in lives of obedience to his commandments."l 
He speaks also of "the simplicity and inexorable rigor of our 
Master's requirement for discipleship."2 Beyond these general 
affirmations, there is little mention in Bowne's writings to 
any further explication. That he intends to affirm a strict 
moral foundation for faith is clear. However, his interpre-
tation of the commandments as to priority or absoluteness is 
nowhere discussed in print. To the mid-twentieth century 
Christian, Bowne's suggestion that "keeping the commandments 
of God is a clear idea"3 seems a bit simplified. 
a. The impossible ideal in ethics. 
Realistically, Bowne notes that the standard of complete 
obedience to the will of God is something that lies beyond 
attainment. This recognition leads to an apparent problem in 
religious life. If the ideal is unattainable, and that is 
the very nature of an ideal, then it would seem to be a moral 
axiom that no one ought to be blamed for failure to live up 
to that ideal. One is not bound to do what is patently 
1. Bowne, 
2. Ibid., 
3. Ibid., 
Essence of Religion, p. 211. 
p. 227. 
r -; 
•• 
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impossible. But, on the other hand, religious insight leads 
us to condemn ourselves for even this "unavoidable imperfection." 
To be sick by no fault of our own is still to be 
sick; end to be constitutionally imbecile does 
not remove the imbecility. In the same way we 
may inherit abnormal moral tendencies, but the 
fact of inhelitance does not diminish their 
abnormality. 
The very existence of the ideal defines everything that fells 
below it as imperfection. 
This has nothing to say, however, about the problem of 
merit or demerit. For Bowne, duty and obligation are measured 
only by "executive ability." Many ethical end theological 
disputes would be solved if speculators did not overlook 
this fact. "From the side of the ideal, ell are condemned. 
2 From the side of a bill ty, the quest! on is very different." 
b. Proposed solutions to the problem. 
As we have seen in the discussion of salvation and sin, 
Bowne rejects the traditional theological doctrine which 
attributes sinfulness to our nature. Although he has de-
scribed human nature as unable to measure up to en ideal, he 
refuses to incorporate this thought into a doctrine of "original 
sin." For Bowne ability end progress are the proper criteria 
for judgment, rather than any forensic definition of man. 
He was equally unsatisfied with the opposite tendency which 
1. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, p. 121. 
2. Ibid., p. 122. 
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denies all demerit and sinks et times into "an odious and 
1 loathsome criminal worship." 
A third possibility also draws his condemnation. This 
is the school of ethical thought "which ignores the metaphysics 
of responsibility" and treats ethical problems on the basis 
of physiology or sociology or "public safety." In this school 
of ethical theory 
the question of guilt or innocence is as irrelevant 
as the question concerning the guilt or innocence 
of w~sps or hornets. An ancient holder of this 
view set forth the opinion that it is e~pedient 
that one man should die for the people. 
This does not mean that Bowne rejected demerit as a conse-
quence of ethical failure. He writes that "a world in which 
no difference iS made between the good will and the evil 
will would be a moral horror."3 Bowne did not advocate moral 
laxity. In a reply to a letter from the distinguished New 
England clergyman, Dr. Daniel Steele, Bowne answered Steele's 
criticism of his doctrine of judgment with the remark, 
The implication that fatherhood implies moral 
laxity suggests that fatherhood hes been con-
founded4with grandfatherhood---a very different 
notion. 
The only test of righteousness, as we heve seen, is the 
fulfillment of the law of obedience to God's will. Conversion 
1. Ibid., p. 186. 
2. Ibid.. • • 
3. Ibid., p. 187. 
4. B.P. Bowne, "Comments on Dr. Steele's Paper," Zions Herald, 
77(1899), 1265. 
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and forgiveness depend upon this self-conscious turning 
away from the "set rebellion of the will" into the faithful 
obedience to the commands of God. Any theory which makes 
this loyalty impossible or unnecessary is less than adequate. 
His solution to the problem of the "impossible ideal" 
and the necessity of ethical righteousness is to fall back 
upon a practical resolution. He admits the logical or 
forensic impossibility of obedience to God's will, but 
insists that the ideal ought to determine human conduct. God's 
forgiveness for failure is not a mechanical justification for 
our nature. It is, rather, an invitation to go and sin no 
1 
more. The ideal, which is absolute in its demand, requires 
the human response. Forgiveness for falling short of the 
ideal does not thereby introduce moral laxity, but serves as 
a further indication of the necessity of a rigorous obedience. 
2. The significance of the Christian religion for ethics 
The discussion of "merit" and "demerit" as outlined 
2 
above is a point of contact with Christian categories. True 
to his method, Bowne urges us not to deny the reality of human 
virtue on the one hand, or the falling into a shallow spiritual 
pride and self-conceit on the other, As in all speech, 
this matter must be understood from the point of view of life 
and not language. 
The moral will must always assert itself, and 
1. Bowne, Essence of Religion, p. 88. 
2. See above, pp. 211-213. 
thus distinguish between the good man and the 
bad. And the religious nature, in its sense 
of dependence and reverence, will always 
delight in viewi~g our virtues and graces as 
the gift of God. 
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Bowne makes a distinction between the "ethical" side of 
life and the "relicious" side. The former is based on our 
freedom, while the latter is based on our dependence. Under-
standably, then, the moral nature in its experience of freedom 
and responsibility chafes at the religious strictures against 
human merit. The religious sense, in its feeling of reverence, 
recoils from ascribing merit to man. "Out of the failure to 
re.cognize the existence and equal legi t·imac~· of these opposite 
aspects of the spiritual life has arisen a great deal of 
unwisdom concerning the value of our good works."2 The 
resolution of this double need of our nature is not in the 
rejection of one point of view or the other, but in 
the doctrine of grace and faith. Our salvation 
is of grace, and not of debt. It is a gift of 
God, and not a reward of our meritorious works. 
But,this salvation is through our faith, which 
is an active principle, and which must issue in 
obedience, or it is not faith at all. We show 
and verify our faith by our works, and neither 3 can exist in any moral sense without the other. 
However, the important contribution of Christianity 
to ethics lies in the "extra-ethical conceptions" which 
condition ethical theory and application, and in "moral and 
1. Bowne, Studies in Christianity, p. 191. 
2. ~-· p. 189. 
3. ~-, p. 191. 
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spiritual inspiration." 
Our conceptions of God, life, and death have been 
greatly clarified by Christianity. Thereby a vast 
extension has been given to moral principles and 
the sense of obligation has been re-enforced. It 
also affirms an origin and destiny for man which 
give him inalienable sacredness. By its edict of 
comprehension, it makes all men children of a 
common Father and heirs of eternal life. It removes 
the antinomies or conscience by declaring that he 
that saveth his life shall lose it, while he that 
seeks first the kingdom of God shall have all true 
good added therewith. There is a morel kingdom 
stretching over all worlds and ages. The moral 
law is not merely a psychological fact in us, but 
also an expression of a Holy Will which can be 
neither defied nor mocked. Hence its triumph is 
secure. The universe, then, and God within and 
beyond the universe, are on the side of right-
eousness. Christianity also sets up a transcendent 
personal ideal which is at once the master light 
of all our moral seeing, and our chief spiritual 
inspiration. Thereby the thoughts of many hearts 
have indeed been revealed; for men never know so 
well what spirit they are of as when contemplating 
it. Finally, we are told of a God whose name and 
nature are love, in whom we live and move and 
have our being, and who ia carrying1all things on to an outcome of infinite goodness. 
In practical application, Bowne suggests that this view 
does not add much to moral theory but 11has incalculable 
significance for the moral life."2 Referring to the Good 
Samaritan, he writes: 
To pass by on the other side may seem a small 
matter when possibly it is only a question of 
adding a few days to a worthless and wretched 
existence, but it becomes a very serious thing 
to one who has received the words, Inasmuch as 
ye did it, or did it not, unto one of the least 
1. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, pp. 201-202. 
2. ~·· P· 202. 
of the§e my brethren, ye did it, or did it not, 
to me.~ 
This "inspirational" test is one of the important ways in 
which Christianity has conditioned ethics, But, for Bowne, 
however great the insights and inspirations from Christianity, 
the "concrete forms of duty must be found mainly in the life 
that now is."2 The ethical life finds its deepest springs 
in the world as it is and Christianity has a stake in learning 
this truth from "secularism." Writing in the Nashville 
Methodist ~uarterly Review, Bowne suggested that condemnation 
of the secular has been done at the risk of great misunder-
standing. 
No less pernicious is the religious view which 
would ignore or depreciate the great normal 
interests of the life that now is in the supposed 
interests of a life that is to come. So long as 
we have a Christianity that does this, so long 
we shall need s~cularism to save both the world 
and the church. 
3. The ethical ideal of the kingdom of God 
The rise of the so-called "social gospel" in the late 
nineteenth century was due to a number of factors, not the 
least of which was the force of liberal theology. While 
Bowne did not subscribe to all the articles of the movement 
as it developed later, he was instrumental in helping to 
1. Ibid., P• 203. 
2. Ibid., p. 20~. 
3. B.P. Bowne{ Secularism and Christianity," 
(Nashville}, 48(March 1899), 217. 
Methodist Review 
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shape the mentality of that generation. Concerning the causes 
of the growth of the social emphasis, Dillenberger and Welch 
write: 
The moral idealism of liberalism, and its 
insistence on practical fruits of religion, 
intensified the sense of Christian responsi-
bility for doing something about the evils of 
society. Liberalism's view of the sacredness 
of human personality and its optimism about human 
virtue were primary assumptions of the new social 
emphasis. Conceptions of the immanence of God 
end of evolutionary progress in history buttressed 
the faith1that the transformation of society was possible. 
As it developed in writers like Rauschenbusch, the concept of 
the kingdom of God was viewed not as "an other-worldly hope, 
but a goal for this world, the end toward which ell the divine 
activity is leading, the organization of humanity according 
to the will of God. 11 2 
Of interest in discussing the involvement of Bowne in 
this movement is en item which appeared in the New York 
Christian Advocate's report of en address made by Bowne on 
February 23, 1908.3 Bowne lectured in a series delivered at 
Union Theological Seminary in New York City entitled, "The 
Kingdom of God, the Social Message of Christianity." Bowne's 
address was entitled "Kingdom of God in Modern R•ligious 
1. Dillenberger end Welch, Protestant Christianity Interpreted 
Through Its Development, P• 244. 
2. Ibid., p. 249. 
3. Unsigned editorial, "Dr. Bowne at Union," New York Christian 
Advocate, 83(1908), 23. 
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Thought."l Other speakers in the same series included these 
outstanding figures of the generation: Rev. Harry Emerson 
Fosdick of Montclair, New Jersey; Professor J.H. Ropes of 
Harvard, internationally known New Testament scholar; Arthur 
c. McGiffert of Union Seminary, and Booker T. Washington of 
Tuskegee, Alabama. 
a. The kingdom as human society. 
The kingdom of God is defined by Bowne in his Union 
address as that order of life in which 
men were loving God with all their hearts and 
their neighbors as themselves. This is what 
it would mean in principle, In application 
to this life it would next mean that this 
principle of love was being specified into the 
highest and completest forms of human life upon 
the earth, until man and society and all social 
and political forms and agencies and activities 
had been made perfect and brought into ideal 
completeness. Perfect love within must find 
perfect expression in the human world without. 
The principle of the kingdom is love, but the 
field of this love's manifestation is life; and 
this life must be built into ideal form,2 
Later Bowne speaks of this as "the great spiritual society of 
the children of God."3 He extends the kingdom to take in 
goodness everywhere. There is no doubt in Bowne's mind that 
this kingdom will be brought into existence by the efforts of 
man. In a particularly poignant section of his Theism, he 
1. Bowne, Essence of Reliiion, pp. 97-124. This 
printed in Essence of elision as "The Church 
Kingdom of God." 
2. Ibid., p. 102. 
3· Ibid., p. 112. 
address is 
and the 
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describes what an ideal society in which all men loved God 
and obeyed his commandments would be like.l To this extent, 
then, the kingdom for Bowne is non-eschatological. 
The kingdom will not come of itself; we must 
work to bring it in. We must gird ourselves 
for strenuous effort both in the inner life 
of the spirit and in the outer life of society. 
• • • This means work, unslumbering, untiring, 
aggressive work; and this is ucpleasing to our 
native and acquired indolence.2 
b. The kingdom as the church. 
Bowne notes that there were historically two definitions 
of the kingdom. One, resting on the Gospel accounts, speaks 
of the kingdom as society broadly conceived. The other, based 
on usage, in the remainder of the New Testament, conceives of 
the kingdom primarily as the Church. "Both terms," says 
Bowne, "refer to the same spiritual society, in which the 
doing of God's will and the realizing of his gracious and 
righteous purposes ••• is the supreme aim."3 Bowne believed 
that the kingdom was "confounded with the visible church,"4 
but that the grace of God extended beyond the bounds of an 
institution. 
As far as any sacramental function is concerned, 
Bowne is quite silent. No institution could provide the 
regeneration of the spirit and the acceptance of the filial 
1. Bowne, Theism, p. 278f. 
2. ~ewne, Essence of ReltSion, P• 265. 
3· Ibid., P• lOO. 
4• Ibid., p. 105. 
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attitude toward the commandments of God. This is a personal 
metter, end cannot be assumed by anyone for any other. The 
function of the Church then becomes the function of any 
institution which seeks to provide "helpful conditions."l 
"We might conceivably have holy men and women apart from any 
church, but a church without holy men and women would be 
either an abstraction or a synagogue of Satan."2 
A two-fold definition of the Church is thus given here. 
As a redeemed society, it may include all who consciously or 
unconsciously do the will of God in the filial spirit. To 
this extent the Church is the kingdom of God. On the other 
hand, the Church may be a tutorial institution, revealing 
the nature end will of God, but providing no sacramental or 
other mediation. This view is that of pure instrumentalism. 
The value of the Church is to be seen solely in the service 
it renders to its members. 
We distinguish then the ideal church, or the 
kingdom, from any and all ecclesiastical 
organizations. We recognize no divinely 
instituted ecclesiastical body, no divinely 
dictated and fixed polity, but solely the 
one bond of union with Christ and of loyalty 
to him. Wherever this is present in any 
religious body we have the church; and where-
ever it is absent we have no church of Christ. 
Thus unity of the Spirit is the great and 
essential thing. The ecclesiastical forms it 
shall take on are matters to be decided by 
circumstances view in the light of experience.3 
1. Ibid., P• 113. 
2. Ibid •• p. 1J.4. 
3· Ibid., p. 121, 
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c. The kingdom as eschatological, 
Bowne's appropriation of the scriptural statements about 
the kingdom illustrates the attitude of most late nineteenth 
century theologians. The rationalistic temper of New Testament 
studies had yet to give way to the fresh insights of Albert 
Schweitzer after the turn of the century. Ritschl 1 s influence 
in shaping the idea of the kingdom of God in society was being 
strongly felt. Higher critical work being done at this time 
had not yet been felt in social thought, 
Bowne, despite his kingdom categories, does have a mild 
eschatological reference to this notion, especially seen when 
he links the idea of the kingdom to the "government" of the 
Son. "The whole world is under the government of the Father 
1n the Son." 1 This thoroughgoing Christological emphasis 
serves to save Bowne from absolute immanentalism in his 
kingdom theories. 
The Son it is by whom are all thin@ and for 
whom are all things. He is at once the source 
and goal of our life. The deeper we penetrate 
into the highest views of God and his purposes 
the better, neither can that which is perfect 
come until we have entered into some apprehension 
of the good news of the Gospel; yet we must hold 
that all true goodness is moving Godward, though 
men may be at different stages on the road, and 
may not know the origin or the goal of their 
movement. A vast amount of historical theology 
has drifted away, not because of better grammar 
and exegesis, but because the growing insight of 
lo l2!£•t Po lllo 
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the Christian community into the mind of Christ 
has made it impossible.l 
Bowne warned that any concept, regardless of the form of 
its manifestation, had to be thought of as thoroughly moral. 
What would it mean if the kingdom of God should 
come--that is, be fully realized on earth tomorrow? 
With our native unspirituality and liking for 
scenic effects, we think first of all of some 
great manifestation to the senses. These might be 
rainbow rafters supporting the sky, and celestial 
visions and mighty voices and ineffable music, and 
this would be the kingdom of God. But such a per-
formance would have no religious quality; it would 
be simply a celestial circus, unworthy of both God 
and man. The coming of the kingdom of God would 
mean something very different. It would mean 
simply and solely that men were seeking to do the 
will of God as it is done in heaven. They would 
be loving God with all their hearts and their 
neighbors as themselves. The work of life would 
go on, in its main lines and in most of its details, 
ss now; but it would be 2nformed end inspired by 
a new and divine spirit. 
1. Ibid., P• 111. 
2. B:P7 Bowne, "Obedience the Test of Discipleship," Zions 
Herald, 81(1903), 10. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
I. Summary 
Borden P. Bowne bas had a wide influence in American 
philosophy and theology, especially in the schools related to 
The Methodist Church. But fairly widespread confusion exists 
as to Bowne's treatment of specific Christian doctrinal prob-
lems. This dissertation seeks to summarize and collect his 
thought under the classical theological divisions of apologetics, 
dogmatics, and ethics. 
A. Apologetics.--Commentators have expressed the opinion 
that it was as an apologist that Bowne made his most impor-
tant contribution. His philosophical position lent itself 
to a Christian theological interpretation. At the same time, 
his thoroughgoing Christian piety was expressed in his con-
cern for a more thoughtful religion. 
Bowne's epistemology and his metaphysics posited a 
universe of persons. He rejected both a crude realism or an 
absolute idealism as being ultimately untenable. However, his 
system allows for an ingenious balance of realism and idealism. 
There is an "ineradicable dualism," between thought and thing. 
This can only be resolved metaphysically in the category of 
the self-active person. Being is defined as activity. The 
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problem of change and identity is solved only in en abiding 
intelligence. 
In all his philosophical works, Bowne posited a "world-
ground," an ultimate abiding intelligence which he identified 
with "the God of religion." Thus the self-directing and 
intelligent world-ground became an apologetical basis for the 
construction of religious faith along philosophical lines. 
He developed this apologetic in his "theism." Were Bowne 
writing today he might call his system "philosophical theology," 
but the word "theism" admirably expressed the balance achieved 
between religious and philosophical concerns, and was a widely 
used designation in the nineteenth century. God is the intel-
ligent "world-ground" and, as such, "personal." The term 
"personal" indicates only the presence of "self-knowledge" 
and "self-control." God is (1) the source of the finite in 
all its determinations; (2) the causal source of substan-
tiality; and (3) the source of purpose and direction. Spec-
ulation can tell us nothing about the motive of creation, but 
Bowne asserted that we cannot be satisfied with anything lower 
than the motive of "ethical love." 
Regarding revelation, Bowne was anti-thaumaturgical. His 
consistent view of immanence made possible a fresh approach to 
the supernatural/natural dichotomy. Because all causation is 
volitional, then the phenomenal world is but a revelation of 
the activity of the "Supreme Will." The world is God's act 
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as well as his idea. Therefore events may well be "super-
natural" in terms of causation but "natural" in terms of 
appearance. This enabled him to affirm the possibility of 
miracle in faith, if one granted the priority of experience. 
Bowne's method was both rationalistic and empirical. 
Reason is the "tool" of experience. It enables the organi-
zation of thought and experience, Ultimately, however, reason 
flounders upon what Bowne called "limit notions"--the 
mysterious and difficult problems of life and existence 
beyond complete rationality. Faith becomes operative at this 
point. Bowne believed that absolute reason was at the center 
of the universe, but that human reason was neither at the 
center nor absolute. Christianity deals with the problems 
of existence by "outflanking them" in the understanding of 
a revelation of a God of love whom it is possible to trust 
despite the mystery. 
The strong pragmatic strain in Bowne is clearly seen in 
the way he dealt with the Christian faith. Logic is correct 
in pointing out the non-demonstrable character of many 
Christian affirmations, but faith is based on "illicit process," 
the conclusions being too big for the premises. Without non-
demonstrable ideals, progress in any field would be impossible. 
Ramsdell has indicated that Bowne's methodology is essentially 
an unresolved dualism. On the one hend, there is the field of 
thought which rests upon objective grounds, and on the other, 
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that which rests on subjective grounds. In a case of conflict, 
the practical must be given supremacy. Bowne affirmed life 
over logic, interests or feelings against theoretical reason, 
the useful against the merely consistent. 
Bowne's contribution to Christian apologetics was 
considerable in the field of biblical studies. In the midst 
of a turbulent dispute regarding the interpretation of the 
Bible, Bowne managed to walk the tightrope between the type 
of radical skepticism of critics like David Friedrich Strauss 
end the simple literalism demanded by many American church-
men. His writings are full of biblical allusions. He 
warned against setting up e religion of the spirit against a 
"religion of the book." The Bible was for him the essential 
revelatory agent in faith. His defense of Mitchell in the 
metter led to his own involvement in the heresy trial of 
1904. He viewed the Bible as the "language of faith.'' 
Although indispensable to faith and Christian belief, for 
him the Bible was not itself revelation. The content of 
revelation, for Bowne, was always the self-revealing God 
who initiated the movement out of Which the Bible came. He 
viewed it as "the supreme religious treasure of the race," 
and believed that it would withstand the honest work of 
biblical scholarship. 
B. Dogmatica.--Bowne wrote no systematic treatise on 
Christian dogmatics. It is possible, however, to o~ganize his 
228 
work under traditional headings of dogmatics to evaluate 
it. Regarding the nature of God, he rejected many of the 
"traditional" attributes or categories normally found in a 
dogmatic theology, He divided the discussion of the nature 
of God into metaphysical attributes, outlining the "divine 
nature," and ethical attributes, outlining the "divine will." 
The metaphysical attributes are unity, unchangeability, 
omnipresence, eternslity, omniscience, and omnipotence. The 
ethical attributes are moral goodness and holiness. The 
metaphysical attributes might well be the attributes of a 
world-ground 1n a non-theological system. But men have de-
manded a religious conception because the purely metaphysical 
conception is "ethically barren." Bowne demonstrated the 
necessity of an ethical character in God by (1) an appeal 
to experience to prove that the world-ground proceeds accord~ 
ing to ethical principles, and (2) an argument from the 
Christian affirmation of faith in the perfect ethical char-
acter of God. Bowne used both methods in his writing. 
Despite his contribution to the discussion of the doc-
trine of immanence, Bowne c·leal!'Iy dedlar~d that the concept 
was limited, God is both immanent !E£ transcendent. Events 
are natural in that they are related to a system of law; but 
they are also supernatural in that they are rooted in the 
divine will and causality. Transcendence is for Bowne the 
affirmation that all finite existence depends for its being 
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upon the activity of God. 
Bowne was insistent that piety could not be separated 
from ethics. Faith cannot be severed from morals. Obedience 
to the will of God became for him the •test of faith." The 
late nineteenth century emphasis upon emotional or physical 
signs of God's presence and favor was vigorously challenged 
by Bowne. There was a place for honest emotion in his system; 
but stern, ethical righteousness was the one essential in-
gredient of his faith. God's presence in one's life will be 
validated by moral proof. God himself, according to Bowne, 
is the most morally obligated being in the universe, obligated 
because he created it. 
At his trial, Bowne vigorously affirmed his "trinitarian 
faith." Essentially he arrived at a trinitarianism from two 
approaches. First, he argued from God's nature. Moral life 
must be communitarian life. Only by providing for a community 
of personal life within the divine unity itself may the ethical 
absoluteness of God be assured. The second approach was the 
"empirical• one, based on tha work of the Holy Spirit in 
human experienue and the necessity of providing for its ex-
istence in the economy of the Godhead. 
Bowne's anthropology began with a study of the knowledge 
process. The surest fact of human experience is awareness 
of self. Self-direction and self-control imply identity as 
a person. In this discovery, man also discovers his finiteness, 
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Epistemology illustrates both men's independence and his 
dependence. He is independent with respect to self-direction; 
he is dependent with respect to his finiteness. In his 
psychology, Bowne used the expressions "automatic form of 
life" and the "rational, moral activity of life." Man is 
viewed as created with both mechanical end volitional sides 
to his nature. He stands determined from the point of view of 
his body but free from the side of his will. 
In juxtaposition to this analysis, Bowne posited the 
Christian idea of the "image of God." Man shares with God 
the freedom of self-direction and self-control within the 
limitations of his nature. He is e pert of the animal world, 
but is given the ability to respond with obedience to God's 
purposes. Man's freedom is to be distinguished from radical, 
unbounded freedom end the freedom within the limitations of 
human insight end nature. Freedom is not metaphysical 
necessity without law or rationality. 
His doctrine of freedom lends itself to a discussion of 
the meaning of sin. Bowne rejected "sub-volitional" theories 
of the nature of sin. He was critical of soteriologicel 
thought based on forensic arguments. He distinguished between 
formal end material sin without specific use of the latter term 
as it has been developed by L. Harold DeWolf. Denying Pelagian 
self-sufficiency, he yet affirmed the volitional basis for 
a definition. Men 1 s problem is "executive ebili ty" re ther then 
"natural depravity." 
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Bowne's thoroughgoing moral emphasis led him to deal 
with the problem of ultimate justice after death. At various 
times he considered asserting doctrines of annihilation, 
second probation, and retribution. Always, as before, he 
posed a problem of a combination of speculative sk~pticisrn 
and moral concern. In the last analysis, practical solutions 
present themselves in the absence of speculative proof. 
While outlining arguments for immortality, he finally rested 
in an argument of faith, expressing the best hopes of Christian 
personal eschatology. "Love met us and prepared the way when 
we came into this life; similarly love meets us when we pass 
into the next. • • !' 1 
Bowne's Christo logy was of the 11kenosis 11 type in the 
nineteenth-century use of that term in biblical studies. It 
had two dimensions: first, a sublime faith that in Jesus 
Christ life found meaning; second, that moral obedience to 
God's will was essentially discipleship with Christ. Bowne 
consistently pointed out the futility of a separation between 
the "Jesus of History" and the "Christ of Faith." He affirmed 
the common origin of both movements in the fact of the In-
carnation. 
Bowne always asserted the priority of fact over theory 
about fact. The historicity of the Incarnation is undoubted; 
1. Bowne, 11The Mortal Shall Put on IIJimortality," Zions Herald 
88(1910), 449. 
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but the various rationalizations of it are not to be confused 
with the fact of the event. 
With the use of the kenotic Christology, Bowne sought to 
preserve both the ethical and metaphysical dimensions of faith. 
By making Jesus subject to forma servi, the problem of example 
for humanity is solved. By thk voluntary self-emptying, the 
distinction between the two natures is preserved. 
Other Christological problems ere dealt with by Bowne. 
Pre-existence is provided in the kenosis theory. The Virgin 
Birth, while not a metter essential for faith, was felt by 
Bowne to be personally useful so he included it in his theology. 
The resurrection, for him, was also a metter of conviction 
grounded in the fullest understanding of the nature of God's 
revelation in Christ. 
Bowne 1 s atonement doctrine is assent ia lly "exemplary." 
He speaks of the atonement as the "essential doctrine of 
Christianity." Bowne felt many "orthodox" or "traditional" 
a tenement doctrines were dis tort ions while the "libere 1 11 
theories were sentimental, if not outright denials of the 
feet. He rejected any atonement doctrine which made the 
event of Christ's death the cause of God's love rather than 
the effect of God's love. Bowne celled for e "moralizing" of 
the morel theory of atonement. The grace of forgiveness of 
sins 1s to be followed by obedience to the will of God as 
revealed in the Son. 
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The Christian life, for Bowne, would be a good balance 
between three types of Christian tradition: the "ethical," 
the Pauline, and the "mystical." Overemphasis on the ethical 
leads to Pharisaism. Overemphasis on the Pauline leads to 
antinomianism. The mystical may degenerate into contemplative 
and quietistic indifference. The ethical, however, is 
central and needs the corrective and deepening of the other 
two elements. 
Bowne was suspicious of excessive doctrines of conversion. 
He was critical of those who asserted a non-morel mechanical 
theory. There is no conversion that does not issue in 
obedience to the will of God and the creation of authentic 
Christian persons. It is never properly understood aestheti-
cally, but simply morally. Gonversion and redemption are 
thoroughly moral end ethical both in implication and experience. 
Preyer for Bowne was the point et which man's sense of 
dependence upon God end his desire to relate himself to God 
met. Petitionary prayer was conceived by Bowne in purely 
psychological terms. 
The Church for Bowne was the agent of the Kingdom of God. 
Primarily he sew it as the practical solution to the problem 
of providing for the organization of worship, instruction, end 
administration of religious ordinances. There is no clear 
doctrine of the sacramental nature of the Church as the body 
of Christ in his writing. 
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C. Ethics.--While Bowne did not write a "Christian" 
ethics, his ethical work is de.finitely Christian in intention. 
Discussion of ethical problems engaged him throughout his 
career. He spoke of the task of ethics as simply "the moral-
i%ation of life.• 
McConnell's suggestion that Bownian ethics is a recon-
ciliation o.f the intuitional and utilitarian bases of the 
ethical li.fe, is a clear statement o.f Bowne's method. The 
approach by Bowne in ethics as in other departments was to 
balance the good will of intuition with the practical wisdom 
of experience. Emphasis upon virtue to the exclusion of good 
has held to the "vacuum view of moral life." Emphasis upon 
good to the exclusion of virtue, has led to shrewdness without 
moral character. The reconciliation of these two views Bowne 
found in the activity of the free spirit. The ethical life 
is based on the nature and needs of the human spirit and the 
response of rational freedom to the life situation. 
Obedience to the will of God becomes the ethical test of 
Christian faith. Man's perfection is the fulfillment of the 
end for which he was crested, namely, to be a child of God. 
In practice, s received code often takes the place of this 
ideal end this conventionalized conscience is undoubtedly 
necessary. Institutionalized morality needs periodical 
revision based on reappraisal of the inner roots of dynamic 
ethical idealism. 
235 
Bowne made a distinction between the "ethical" side of 
life and the "religious" side. The former is based on our 
freedom while the latter is based on our dependence. These 
two opposite aspects of the human situation need to have 
equal legitimacy in understanding the human situation. The 
important contribution of Christianity to ethics, according 
to Bowne, was in the "extra-ethical conceptions" which 
condition ethical theory end application. The "inspirational 
test" is another important way in which Christianity has 
conditioned ethics. 
The Kingdom of God is an ethical-eschatological term for 
Bowne, as indeed it was for most of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century theologians. Bowne had an optimistic 
view of progress, enabling him to posit the Kingdom of God 
as the moralization of human society. 
II. Conclusions 
An assessment of the contribution of Borden Parker Bowne 
to American theology has been needed for some time. His work, 
not systematic in theological categories, has left room for 
considerable confusion as to his essential position in 
Christian thought. Albert C. Knudson, writing in 1917, 
affirmed that Bowne was "by far the greatest philosophic 
thinker that Methodism in its entire history has 
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produced."1 He has been more widely noted as a "metaphysician" 
than a theological thinker. After his trial in 1904, the ~ 
York Observer editorialized: 
Professor Borden P. Bowne is known in every 
college classroom in America as a profound 
and subtle metaphysician. As such he has 
no superior in America and few if any equals.2 
Partly due to Bowne's own iconoclastic tendencies, partly 
due to his heavy teaching and administrative load in the Grad-
uate School at Boston University, Bowne was not widely accept-
ed as a thinker outside Methodist university and church circles. 
There is only the briefest mention of contacts with other 
philosophers. He seems to have had only infrequent contacts 
with William James of Harvard.) This neglect was noted by 
James Hastings, writing in his Expository Times in 1915: 
We know of no philosopher, ancient, medieval, .or 
modern, who has been so neglected as Bowne. Says 
Eucken: "Bowne was a philosopher of America, and 
as such all America may be proud of hiM and of 
his memory." But America does not know him. 
Neither America nor any other English-speaking 
country can be said to have discovered him. He 
died quite recently, and recognition will come 
with time; but it ought to have come before he 
died. 
What is the cause of the disparagement?---for 
neglect is disparagement. It is due to his reli• 
1. A.C. Knudson, "Borden Parker Bowne," Bostonia, 18(1917), 68. 
2. J.M. Buckley, "Bohoea of the Trial and Acquittal of Professor 
Bowne," New York C~istian Advocate, 79(1904), 657. 
3. McConnell, Boraen Par~er Bowne, pp. 274-278. 
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giousness. That is the fetal flew in e philosoPher. 
Bowne came by the way of philosophy to believe 
in the God of the Bible. He believed in the God 
of our Lord Jesus Cirist. And the philosophers 
would not have him. 
Bowne's religious zeal undoubtedly contributed to the 
confusion over an understanding of his position in philosophy 
and his philosophical work certainly led to misunderstanding 
in the religious world. Chancellor Daniel L. Marsh of Boston 
University recalled in conversation with the author that 
Bowne was "always present and always gave simple end effective 
testimony at St. Mark's Wednesday prayer meetings." The 
bitterness of the attacks on Bowne by George A. Cooke, rep-
resenting entrenched end powerful Methodist forces, 2 witnesses 
to the misunderstanding over his essential position. The 
suspicion of the philosopher toward Bowne's work is expressed 
in a general criticism of personalism made in 1928 by 
philosopher Henry Nelson Wieman. Personalism, according to 
Wieman 
is a philosophy built up to defend certain 
pre-established moral and religious convictions. 
The convictions came first, end the philosophy 
was built up to shelter t~em and make it un-
necessary to change them. 
Bowne's own assertion that his method was "apodictic" and 
proceeded upon the basis of "illicit process" might lend 
some support to the argument of Henry Nelson Wieman's 
1. James Hastings, Expository Times, 27(1915), 85. 
2. Cf. unsigned editorial, Independent, 56(1904), 869. 
3. H.N. Wieman, "The Philosophy of Personalism," Journal of 
Religion, VIII-2(1928), 275. 
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criticism. 
A. The Intellectual Milieu of Bowne's Generation.--It is 
necessary in any assessment of a thinker to view the general 
cultural and intellectual environment in which his contribution 
was made. Bowne's career spanned the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth. That 
period was characterized by expansion and prosperity in the 
United States and almost universal acceptance of optimistic 
political philosophy. 
Ramsdell indicates three important trends in the thought 
w.orld of Bowne 1 s period having direct influence upon him.l 
First, the doctrine of evolution, with its biological emphasis 
of adaptation and survival; second, empirical psychology, with 
ita·emphssis upon feelings and interests in the life of the 
mind; third, utilitarianism in ethical theory with its emphasis 
upon consequences as the moral criterion. Each of these 
contributed to the "pragmatic" element in Bowne's work. 
Evolutional philosophy with agnostic themes was the main in-
tellectual interest of that era. The materialistic philosophy 
of men like Herbert Spencer, Tyndall, and Thomas Huxley was 
on the ascendancy in the United States when Bowne began to 
write. Writing of Spencer and assessing his enormous popular-
ity, a contemporary critic notes that 
l. E.T. Ramsdell, Pragmatic Elements in the EpistemologY of 
Borden P. Bowne, Boston University Ph.D. dissertation, 
1932, PP• 161-162. 
the explanation of his popularity is probably 
to be found in the appeal which he made to 
thoughtful people who were aot trained philos-
ophers and by his offering them a system which 
had an ordered set of beliefs capable of being 
directly applied to life and taking account of 
the changed intellectual climate, He may be 
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said to have supplemented the biological theories 
of Darwin, which concerned the individual, by 
extending evolution to organic life in all its 
departments. His ideas, too, of political and 
social freedom were in a line with the progressive 
thought of his day, end he may be said to have 
been their spokesman. But his dogmatism and other 
limitations told against him,l 
It is to be noted that Bowne very early in his career 
launched into a sustained attack on Spencer, whom Bowne 
realized was the high-priest of materialistic philosophy 
in that day. Flewelling suggests how influential these 
attacks were: 
The naturalistic school itself now sees the 
untenability of Spencer's favorite positions. 
By no one of any school has he been more sharpl¥, 
arraigned than by Mr. Bergson. But this arraign-
ment comes forty years after the clean-cut crit-
icisms of the young Bowne. Bowne's criticisms 
were offered at a time ~en the empirical philos-
ophy was both in physics and metaphysics in 
the ascendant. It was the unpopular thing to 
venture criticism. Forgiveness was never accorded 
him in the minds of some for his sacrilegious 
daring in the presence of this idol of their 
thought. To take an attitude of criticism seemed 
at the time opposed to all that judgment and right 
sense, science and reality dictated. The posses-
sion of clearer idees by the philosophical world 
today upon the limits of scientific investigation 
1. L.E. Elliott-Binns, English Thought 1860-1900: The 
Theological As;ect (Greenwl&h, Connecticut: Seabury Press, 
1956), pp. 66- 7. 
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is doubtless in some measure due to the pitiless 
criticism and constructive thought of Bowne. 
On the other hand, ecclesiastical forces were equally 
under the influence of what Coe has called "another muddy 
metaphysics."2 This was a traditionalism in theology which 
was suspicious and distrustful of any innovations in method-
ology and particularly aroused at the intellectual approach 
of men like Bowne. Cooke's statement that being a "rationalist" 
is to be an "infidel"3 is characteristic of the thoughtless 
attack from the churches. 
The beat summery statement of the atmosphere in which 
Bowne worked was written by Flewelling in 1953. He observed 
that Bowne was faced with two overaimplifications: scientific 
materialism on the one hand, and oversimplified religious 
faith on the other. 
Bowne raised his voice against both of these over-
simplifications and incurred criticism from both 
sides. By the scientist and the materialistic 
philosopher he was dubbed a mere theologian in 
spite of the logic of his argument; by the theologian 
he was called to account in the last of the heresy 
trials. Revolt from the concept~of an irate Deity 
led on the one hand to a spineless Pollyanna ism and 
on the other an attempt to reinvest the God of 
primitive Judaism with a more modern reasonableness.4 
1. R.T. Flewelling, Personalism and the Proplems of Philosophy 
(New York: Methodist BC»k·con~rn, 1915), p. 60. 
2. G.A. Coe, "The Empirical Factor in Bowne's Thinking," ed., 
E.C. Wilm, Studies in Philosophy and Theology (New York: 
Abingdoll Press, 1922), p. 21. 
3. Cf. above P• 7. 
4. R.T. Flewelling, "Brightman: Ex Umbras 1n Lucem," 
Personalist, 34(1953), 343. 
B. Bowne's Answering Theology.--In the face of the 
necessity to speak to both oversimplifications, Bowne pro-
ceeded. His contribution must be understood in this con-
text. His theological work was an attempt to raise religion 
to the plane of ethical purpose and clear thinking and to set 
forth and defend the rationality of its fundamental concepts. 
In doing this, he appeared to his detractors as a radical in 
religion. To his colleagues in philosophy, he appeared as a 
conservative. Throughout Bowne's writings one is conscious 
of this dual audience. One will look in vain for a detailed 
"Christian" theology in Bowne's Theism, yet there is regular 
allusion to Christian solutions throughout the work. An 
example would be the passing reference to the Christian doctrine 
of the Trinity which Bowne indicates may be deduced from the 
speculative theistic argument of his book. A survey of the 
subjects which he dealt with in his career, as seen in the 
chronological and annotated bibliography in this dissertation, 
indicates the extensive treatment of Christian theological 
problems outside of his major published works. 
Bowne consciously affirmed his stance as a Christian. 
But the rationalization of the concepts led to confusion in 
the popular mind. Emphatic assertions such as 11 I am a Trin-
itarian of the Trinitarians," made at his heresy trial, and 
1 
"We are the orthodox," emphasized his personal religious 
1. G.A~ Coe, "Borden Parker Bowne," Methodist Review, 92(1910), 
519. 
faith and confused the issue regarding his theological work. 
George Albert Coe, one of Bowne's most influential 
students, was one of his most penetrating critics. Writing in 
1937, after a career which led him through philosophy to 
psychology to educational philosophy, Coe noted the essential 
imbalance of a position which seeks to be both religiously 
orthodox and theologically free. 
It seems to me now that the liberal evangelicism 
with which I have had many contacts has attempted 
to be religiously orthodox but theologically free. 
In this there is neither intellectual nor spiritual 
consistency, and of course there cannot be in it 
power to guide the course of events even within 1 the Church, to say nothing of society at large. 
Something of this dualism is evident in Bowne, who did rework 
essential meaning in some theological areas, but clung to the 
main tenets of orthodoxy. This dualism is apparent in the 
tradition stemming from Bowne. It is a church tradition, 
essentially within the Methodist organization. It is con-
cerned with orthodox Christian thought, but is more thorough-
going in rational methodology than most historical Christian 
revelation would imply. Above all, the Bowne tradition is a 
dual tradition; one wing sees Bowne primarily as a teacher of 
theology of a metaphysical type; the other wing sees him 
primarily as a teacher of metaphysics of a theological type. 
1. G.A. Coe, "My Own Little Theater," ed v. Farm, Religion 
in Transition, (New York: Macmillan, 1937), p. 99. 
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The characteristic emphases of Bowne mediated through Albert 
c. Knudson on the one hand and Edgar S. Brightman on the 
other illustrate this situation. 
c. Unresolved Methodologz.--Due in part to Bowne's two 
interests, theological and ecclesiastical and philosophical 
and scientific, and his desire to speak in both directions, 
there is an unresolved methodology in Bowne's work. Ramsdell 
noted this tension when he pointed out the rationalistic and 
pragmatic strains and the difficulty Bowne had in reconciling 
them. As Ramsdell has written, for Bowne 
the field of thought was fundamentally divided 
between that portion which rested upon objective 
grounds and that portion which rested on subjective 
grounds. And this reflected ·.an essential dualism 
in Bowne's view of the mind, for it set interests 
and feelings over against the theoretical reason, 
life over against logi• ••• Bowne attempted to 
harmonize the two sides of the mind-life by making 
the theoretical riason instrumental with respect 
to the practical. 
Bowne's twofold interest in religion and metaphysics was 
never successfully harmonized. He assumed that there was no 
fundamental contradiction. He found the ground for harmony 
in the unity of personality. For himself, of course, the 
deep personal piety inherited from his own religious past, 
the influence upon his thinking of Lotze, 2 the practical 
1. E.T. Ramsdell, Pra matic Elements in the E istemolo 
P. Bowne, Boston n vera ty .D. dissertat on 9 , 
2. Elliott-Binns quotes Hastings Rashdall: "LLotze1'is the one 
philosopher of our time who is at once a thinker of the highest 
rank and wholly and unexceptionally Christian in his thoughts." 
English Thought 1860-1900: The Theological Aspect, p. 69. 
244 
exigencies of teaching in a graduate school closely related 
to the main stream of American Methodist seminary education, 
all these had their influence in keeping Bowne's interests in 
the field of "practical" theology. Ramsdell concludes that 
Bowne's method broke down at just this point. 
The identity of his doctrine with that of Kant 
could not be demonstrated; the determining interests 
and feelings of the mind were not established as 
rational; pragmatic method was not assimilated to 
his otherwise rigid rationalism; determinism was 
not reconciled with freedom. These failures in 
consistency and lack of fundamental unity do not, 
of course, affect Bowne's contribution to the 
metaphysics of personalism, but they certainly 
indicate portions of his work that are of unequal 
value with the rest. ln his empirical rationalism, 
he was on substantial ground; in his ventures into 
pragmatism he1was confused, inconsistent, and uncomrincing. 
D. Some Contributions to Theological Thought.--There is 
widespread agreement that Bowne has made considerable con-
tribution to American, particularly Methodist, thought. 
Testimony by Knudson and others indicates that Bowne saved 
religion for many troubled students in the heated controveruy 
between science and religion. Certainly a major contribution 
of Bowne was just this establishment of the possibility of a 
reconstructed Christian theology that could cope with the 
changing intellectual patterns of the time. 
Bowne's philosophy thus laid anew the foundation 
for a theistic theology at a time when materialistic 
1. E.T. Ramsdell, 8 Pragmatism and Rationalism in the Philosophy 
of Borden Parker Bowen," Personalist, 16(1935), 35. 
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evolutionism, hif.her criticism, and comparative 
religion threatened the very existence of Christian 
theology itself, Small wonder, therefore, that 
Bowne's influence in the field of religion was 
profound and far-reaching, and that it has lasted 
to our own day,l 
It is difficult for the contemporary generation properly 
to assess the extent of the sway of atheistic speculation in 
intellectual circles in Bowne's time, Bowne's contribution 
was the challenging of inadequate philosophical and theological 
concepts as a preface to the reconstruction of theology which 
began soon after his death. The work of Bowne did much to make 
such reconstruction possible, His influence upon hundreds of 
college professors and several thousand incipient ministers 
who passed through his classrooms was enormous, 2 
Some of the particular features of his work have had 
widespread influence in theology and philosophy, Among them, 
these are prominent: 
1. Reality is concrete and individual. He was particularly 
critical of the tendency in theology to use generic rather than 
individual terms of reference. He was a bitter foe of the 
"falls cy of the universal," which, he fe 1 t, vitiated responsible 
action in religion, Contemporary theology with its emphasis 
upon "existentialism" reflects a reaction against a world-view 
1, W,H, Werkmeister, A Histo of Philoso hical Ideas in 
America, (New York: Ronald ress, 19 9 , p.l 1. 
2. R,T. Flewelling, "Studies in American Personalism II: 
Boston Personalism," Personalist, 31(19.50), 349. 
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in which the individual was simply a part of a universal, a 
generic integer rather than a person. 
2. Life is deeper than logic. Bowne is quite clear that 
all knowledge rests upon faith-claims. Life is not simply a 
syllogism to be understood on the basis of logical premises. 
A response that transcends logic is necessary. This enables 
a theology to be empirical rather than scholastic. The 
validation of theological claims is to be accomplished in life 
situations rather than in the confines of deduction. 
3. Intellectual and moral life have a volitional basis. 
Bowne had a strong synergistic foundation for the moral dimension 
of his theology. This is an emphasis that needs to be kept in 
tension with fundamental Christian affirmations about man's 
need of God. But the nerve of vital Christian social actiac 
needs the affirmation of man's need for vigorous response. 
4• God is immanent in the world yet a person. Bowne's 
solution to the immanence/transcendence dilemma allows both 
for God's participation in the world end his otherness from 
it. The extremes of pantheism and total transcendence are 
thus resolved in a dynamic theory in which all things are 
supernatural in causation but natural in event. 
5. The nature of a law is formal and descriptive. The 
unfortunate analogy of nature "obeying" laws in a way similar 
to citizens obeying civil codes was and continues to be a 
problem in philosophical or theolorical discussion. For 
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Bowne, laws ere merely a method of organization of reality, 
the expression of a rational will. They have no rigid 
necessity in themselves. 
6. The resolution of utilitarian and intuitive ethics is 
found in a system of moral rigorousness. This contribution, 
declared by McConnell to have been the most important of Bowne, 
allowed for a new approach to ethical problems that took into 
account both the intuition of the morally committed person 
and the insights of society. 
Metaphorical theology needs the corrective of experience. 
Bowne was thoroughgoing in his criticism of the type of 
thought that moves from metaphors without seeking the fact or 
experience that originally created the metaphor. This is a 
profoundly important contribution to Christian thought, 
regardless of Bowne's own solutions to certain problems. 
Again, it is to be noted that contemporary theology has sought 
to do just this very thing. Much of the interest in the early 
church among twentieth century theologians is based on the 
desire to find new meaning to old analogies and metaphors. 
~ Gustav Aulen's method, characteristic of the Scandinavian 
theological work of this generation, is based on the revital-
ization of the meaning of historic metaphors.! 
/ 1. For Aulen, method is typolo~cal. A theolo~ien must go deep-
er than the outward form of doctrine, but penetrate to the 
underlying motive. Cf. J.L. Neve end O.W. Heick, A Histor1 
of Christian Thought (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1946 , 
II, 183; also Gustav Aulen, The Faith of the Christian Church, 
trans. Eric H. Wahlstrom & G. Everett Arden (Philadelphia: 
Muhlenberg Press, 1946), chapter 6. 
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Bowne's contribution in Christian theology is still 
being made through the teaching and writing of men who call 
him their philosophical master. It was his vocation to be 
a force in American thought when the foundations for recon-
struction needed to be lait. It was for other men to complete 
the work after Bowne's untimely 4eath in 1910. Judgment as to 
the adequacy of his theological and philosophical positions 
needs to be considered in relation to the bitter intellectual 
and religious controversies in which he was embroiled. The 
limited exposition of definite doctrinal positions in his 
work needs to be balanced against the fact of his sudden 
death at the height of his intellectual powers and the rigid 
limitations under which he labored in an overworked university 
faculty community. 
There is that in the work of Bowne that answers 
to the deepest spiritual questionings, and in 
death as in life he can await the judgment of 
the years unhumiliated and unafraid.l 
1. Flewelling, Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy, p. 196. 
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Zions Herald, 62(1885), 17. 
It Comments on translation of Max Muller's (ed~ Sacred Books 
of the East. 
•concerning the 'Christian Consciousness.•" 
Independent, 37(1885), 35-36. 
Comments on a paper by Dr. Harris in Andover Review, 
October, 1884. Deals with Bible, Moral theology. 
"Paradise Found." 
Zions Herald, 62(1885), 97e 
Review of w. F. Warren's faradise Found: A Study of the 
Prehistoric World. -when we first heard that Dr. Warren 
was hunting for Eden and locating it at the North Pole, 
we feared in our heart of hearts that much learning 
had made him mad," 
"The College Must Go." 
Zions Herald, 62(1885), 169. 
Defense of classical education. 
"A Word About the 'New Education.•" 
Independent, 37(1885). 449. 
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Defense of classics in A.B. program in higher education. 
"Nerves as Scientists." 
Independent, 37(1885), 1029-1030. 
Attack on assumptions of "advanced" thinkers like 
Huxley, Clifford, Strauss, and mechanistic psychology. 
"Concerning Liberality." 
Zions Herald, 63(1886), 25. 
Deals with limitations of theological "liberalism." 
"Religion in Education." 
Zions Herald, 63(1886), 97. 
Bowne opposes religious instruction in public schools. 
"An American Philosoph¥•" 
Independent, 38{1886), 134. 
Review of James McCosh: "What an American Philosophy 
Should Be," New Princeton Review, January, 1886. 
McCosh was former President of Princeton University 
and a leading Scottish Realist in this country. 
"Conn on Evolution." 
Zions Herald, 63{1886), 169. 
Review of 
no date). 
of Modern 
Conn: Evolutions of To-day, (N.Y.: Putnams, 
For Conn's position, see his "The Claims 
Biology," Zions Herald, 63{1886), 145. 
~aligion in the Schools." 
Zions Herald, 63(1886), 217. 
Bowne fails to see that 'religious' schools are any 
more so than so-called 'God-less' public schools. 
"Second Probation." 
Zions Herald, 63{1886), 353. 
Comments on the debate in Congre~ational circles on 
the problem of "second probation for the heathen in 
missionary lands. 
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"The Mind Cure.• 
Independent, 38(1886), 875-876. 
Satirical blast at patent medicine and gullible people. 
"The Significance of the Body tor Mental Action." 
Methodist Review, 68(1886), 262-272. 
Deals with epistemological, psychological, and 
metaphysical problems, including possibility of 
immortality. 
"About Tips." 
Independent, 38(1886), 1105. 
" ••• NlO one could do the subject justice who had 
less than an omnipotent power or contempt." 
"Religion and Theology.• 
Ipdependent, 38(1886), 1296. 
Bowne urges clear distinction between fact of revelation 
and experience and theories about fact. 
"Some Shortcomings of the Labor Debate." 
Independent, 38(1886), 1619-1620. 
A plea for reasonableness in the passionate social 
questions debate. Here Bowne appears conservative. 
"Realistic Philosophy." 
Zions-nerald, 64(1887), 121. 
Review of McCosn; Realistic Philosophy. 
~at is Rationalism?" 
Independent, 40(1888), 99-100. 
An important article in Bowne's development. A major 
statement dealing with the limitations of reason in 
both philosophy and religion. Emphasis upon the 
distinction between tact and theory, experience and 
construction. 
"Theology and Reason." 
Zions Herald, 66(1888), 401. 
The substance of an address delivered before the students 
of Boston University School of Theology, December 10, 1888, 
in response to the question, "How far may we go in attempts 
to rationalize our theology1" 
256 
11 If It Were So, What Of It?" 
Independent, 40(1888), 641-642. 
A criticism of simple evolutionary theories of origin 
of ethics and religion. Some evolutionists denounced 
religion because of its primitive origins. 
"Physiological Psychology." 
Independent, 40(1888), 1062. 
"Explanation: A Logical Study." 
Methodist Review, 70(1888), 649-665. 
"on Evolving Something From Nothing." 
Independent, 40(1888), 1332. 
"Evolution metaphysics is little more than the 
resurrection, in a somewhat degraded form, of the 
ghost of scholastic realism." 
"The Natural History of Atheism." 
The Andover Review, lO(July-December, 1888), 169-182. 
"what Is It To Be A Christian?" 
Zions Herald, 67(1889), 353. 
One sentence in a symposium. 
"Philosophical Idealism." 
Methodist Review, 71(1889), 395-412. 
Bowne's mature metaphysical statement. 
"A=A." 
Independent, 41(1889), 788. 
Critical appraisal of Spencer, !! !!•• from viewpoint 
of law of identity. 
"Notes on Philosophy." (A series) 
Basic }ililosophical exposition stimulated by a series 
in the Independent by James McCosh, "The Prevailing 
Types of Philosophy: Do They Reach Reality Logically?" 
(cf. Independent 42(1890), 305; 338; 374; 413; 446; 480. 
The following articles all appeared in the Independent, 
42(1890). 
I. "The ~uestion,• 651. 
II. "Idealism--What Is It?" 687. 
III. "The Problem of Knowledge," 772. 
IV. "The Problem of Knowledge," 806-807. 
v. "Space and Time as Ideal," 871-872. 
VI. "Skepticism," 952-953. 
VII. "Pantheism," 1018-1019. 
VIII. "Natural and Supernatural," 1050-1051. 
IX. "The Fallacy of the Universal," 1155. 
•cardinal Newman and Science.• 
Independe:n~, 42(1890), 1401-1402. 
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Bowne defends Newman from critics who attacked his 
shift to Rome on arguments from science and logic. 
"Science, Ignorance and Religion." 
Independent, 45(1893), 137-138. 
A section in a symposium on "Science end Religion." 
"Evolution and Evolution." 
Methodist Review, 75(1893), 681-696. 
First of two articles on evolution. This deals with 
"general idea." 
"Some Popular Mistakes Respecting Evolution." 
Methodist Review, 75(1893), 849-866 • 
... ' Secg:nd oi':two:a:~~ticl'EIIiO:·· lncrludes r.eb,;rttal Q!'.argument 
against religion by noting its primitive origins. 
"Natural and Supernatural." 
Methodist Review, 77(1895), 9-24· 
"The Foundations of Belief." 
Zions Herald, 73(1895), 274. 
Review of The Foundations of Belief by Arthur Balfour. 
Criticis• of "naturalism" and praise for Balfour's work. 
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11The Speculative Significance of Freedom." 
Methodist Review, 77{1895), 681-697. 
Assertion that freedom is as necessary for rational 
life as it is for moral life. Note that this title 
is also the title of the dissertation by Hildebrand. 
"Faith in Our I111111ortality. 11 
Independent, 48(1896), 439. 
"The Christian Revelation." 
Zions Herald, 74(1896), 374. 
Baccalaureate address delivered before the graduating 
class of Boston University, 1896. {Note: This article 
is missing from Zions Herald file in Boston University 
School of Theology.) 
"The Inerrancy of the Scriptures." 
Zions Herald, 76{1898), 7. 
"Ethical Legislation by the Church." 
Methodist Review, 80{1898), 370-386. 
Bowne attacks the so-called "recreation" clauses of 
the Methodist discipline. "Recreation" meant dancing. 
Bowne considered this business utterly foolish. 
"Divine I111111snence. 11 
Independent, 50{1898), 841 
Bowne indicates limitations of this doctrine. 
11Distinguo." 
Independent, 50(1898), 695•697. 
Strange title means "I separate" in Latin. Bowne 
seeks to distinguish between natural and super-
natural in revelation. 
"Secularism and Christianity." 
Methodist Review (Nashville), 48(March, 1899), 203-217. 
Not found in bibliographies of Ramsdell and Hildebrand. 
"Studies of the Christian Life." {A aeries) 
This important aeries of articles was to be incor-
porated into the small book The Christian Life and 
later expanded into Studies in Christianity, Bowne's 
moat important doctrinal source. 
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All articles appeared in Zions Herald, 77{1899). 
I. "Studies on the Christian Life," 78-79. 
II. {Sin, Hew Birth.), 108-109. 
III. {Holy Spirit), 142-143. 
IV. {Christian Life), 172-173. 
v. {Ethics), 206-217. 
"The Atonement" {a series) 
Also incorporated 
in Christianity. 
77(1899). 
I. 942-943· 
II. 1006-1007. 
III. 1038-1039. 
IV. 1072-1073. 
into a small book and later into StuQies 
All articles appeared 1n Zions Herald, 
"comments on Dr. Steele's Paper." 
Zions Herald, 77{1899), 1265. 
Reply to critical article by Daniel Steele, long a 
leading writer and educator in New England Methodism. 
Steele took Bowne to task for some interpretations 
of the Atonement. Bowne's reply denies completely 
subjective atonement. 
"Aberrant Moralizers." 
Methodist Review, 82{1900), 247-261. 
Excellent article. Calls for balance in ethics 
between abstract and theoretical work on the one 
hand and the practical application of ethical prin-
ciples on the other. Discusses international relations. 
"Thoughts For the Present Distress in Matters Biblical." 
Zions Herald, 78{1900), 298-300, 331-333. 
Paper read at the Methodist Episcopal Church Congress, 
St. Louis, Mo., November 27, 1899. 
"The Incarnation." 
Zions Herald, 78{1900), 1631-1632. 
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"what Is Of Faith Respecting the Scriptures?" 
Independent, $2(1900), 919-921. 
~hat is 'Special Creation'?" 
Independent, $2(1900), 919-921. 
Argument from continuity of the world and from the 
natural/supernatural. Philosophical. 
"Pray-er" 
Zions Herald, 79(1901), 363-36$. 
Sermon delivered at Lasell College. 
"The Supremacy- of Christ." 
Zions Herald, 79(1901), 714-716. 
Also printed in Methodist Review, 92(1910), 881-889. 
Forms Chapter I in Essence of Religion. Printed 
here with an unusual photograph of Bowne in his study-
on Longwood. 
"Christian Casuistry-." 
Zions Herald, 79(1901), 1131-1133. 
Deals with ethics, law of love, Pauline exegesis. 
"Obedience the Test of Discipleship." 
Zions Herald, 81(1903), 10-11. 
Chapter in Essence of Religion. 
"Supernatural in Religion.• 
Zions Herald, 81(1903), 44-43. 
"Religious E~perience." 
Zions Herald, 81(1903), 74-7$. 
Attack on "unwholesome and artificial subjectivities." 
"Childhood Piety." 
Zions Herald, 81(1903), 138-139. 
Discussion of Christian nurture. Bowne was quite 
a bit ahead of his day- in his attitudes toward 
religious education. 
"But Are They Converted?" 
Zions Herald, 81(1903), 301-302. 
Another discussion of the dangers of evangelizing 
children with adult techniques. 
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"As To Miracles." 
Independent, .5.5(1903), 1.50-1.52. 
"Recession of Mechanism." 
Ineependent, .5.5(1903), 24.5-248. 
"Tribute to Bishop Randolph s. Foster." 
Zions Herald, _81 ( 1903), .5.55. 
Bowne notes that he lived for eight years in the 
Foster home. Foster was one bishop with whom': Bowne 
had cordial,even affectionate relations. Bowne had 
great respect for Foster's interest in philosophy. 
"The Supernatural•" (a series) 
An important series of articles, later expanded into 
The Immanence of God. 
All articles appeared in Zions Herald, 81(1903). 
I. "The Supernatural and Nature," 1270-1271. 
II. "The Supernatural and the Bible," 1302-1303. 
III. "The Supernatural and Religion," 1334-133.5. 
Faith as a method; anti-thaumaturgical. 
"Spencer's Nescience." 
Independent, .56(1904), 67-71. 
"Spencer's Agnosticism." 
Zions Herald, 82(1904), 77-78. 
Abridged from Independent, .56(1904), 67-71. 
Not in Ramsdell's bibliography. 
"Mr. Spencer's Philosophy." 
Methodist Review, 86(1904), .513-.531. 
"Law of Successful Living." 
Zions Herald, 82(1904), 748-749, 758-759. 
Kingdom of God, Goa's will, etc. 
"Address on Behalf of the University Faculties." 
Zions Herald, 82(1904), 1392-1393. 
Given at the inaug~ation of President Huntington of 
Boston University. Not in Hildebrand or Ramsdell lists. 
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"A Remarkable Book." 
Zions Herald, 82(1904), 1518-1519. 
Review of Byron Palmer: God's White Throne. Expresses 
Bowne's faith in God's love In midst of suffering. 
"God's White Throne." 
Bostonia, 5(1905), 18. 
"The Divine Immanence." 
New York Christian Advocate, 80(1905), 1465-1466. 
"The Value of Philosophy in Education." 
New York Christian Advocate, 80(1905), 1216-1217. 
"Dr. Bowne's Address." 
Zions Herald, 84(1906), 1483-1484. 
Abstract of the address of Bowne before the Boston 
Preachers' meeting, November 5, 1906. Reflections 
on his world tour, 1905. 
"Philosophy of Christian Science." 
New York Christian Advocate, 83(1908), 450-451. 
Published in pamphlet form by Ea1lon and Mains and 
reprinted in Christian Advocate, 83(1908), 665. 
"Morals and Life." 
Methodist Review, 91(1909), 708-722. 
Good essay. Calls for synoptic approach to ethics, 
including life situations as well as formal ethics. 
"Dr. Bowne on 1 Jesus or Christ'." 
Zions Herald, 87(1909), 1382-1383. 
Review of c. F. Dole: What Wa Know About Jesus. Dole 
was a Unitarian minister In Jamaica Plain, Boston. 
This article is abstract of paper Bowne read to 
preachers' meeting. The paper is published complete 
in Methodist Review, 92(1910), 177-193. 
"Darwin and Darwinism." 
Hibbert Journal, 8(1909-1910), 122-138. 
Clear exposition and criticism of "survival of fittest" 
aspects of Darwin's thought. Bowne notes that survival 
of fittest does not explain arrival of fittest. 
"Address to Methodist Social Union: Students• Night." 
Zions Herald, 88(1910), 267-270. 
This address is included in a covering article 
entitled "Remarkable Gathering--Rare Address." 
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The late Professor Charles M. McConnell was present 
for this address and said to the author of this 
dissertation that the speech is the best summary of 
Bowne's late thought and definitive for his theological 
contribution. Noted in neither Ramsdell nor Hildebrand. 
"Why I Believe in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ." 
Zions Herald, 88(1910), 364. 
Q.uotation from "The Miracle of the Resurrection," 
which became chapter 12 in Essence of Religion, 
287•298. Not in Ramsdell or Hildebrand. 
"On Miracles." 
Harvard Theological Review, 3(April, 1910), 143-166. 
"Present Status of the Argument for Life After Death." 
North American Review, 191(1910), 96-104. 
"Woman and Democracy." 
North American Review, 191(1910), 527-536. 
"The Mortal Shall Put on Immortality." 
Zions Herald, 88(1~10), 449. 
Portion of an address given by Bowne at the funeral 
of Henry B. Blackwell. Printed as the cover of 
Zions Herald the week after Bowne's death. Not in 
Ramsdell or Hildebrand. 
"Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation." 
Living Age, 266(1910), 451-456. 
"Jesus or Christ?" 
Methodist Review, 92(1910), 177-193. (Post.) 
Complete text of paper read by Bowne before Boston 
preachers' meeting. Noted above as "Dr. Bowne on 
•Jesus or Christ•." 
"A Letter from Professor Bowne." 
Methodist Review, 92(1910), 619-620. 
Also In New York Christian Advocate, 88(1913), 222; and 
in Bostonla, lO(Aprli, 1937), 14. 
A personal letter, written October 1, 1900, to a 
grri'eving friend. 
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"The Supremacy of Christ." 
Methodist Review, 92(1910}, 881-889. 
Sermon on the text, John 6:68. 
Essence of Religion, printed in 
Forms Chapter 1 in 
Zions Herald, 79(1910}, 
714-716. 
"Gains for Religious Thought in the Last Generation." 
Hibbert Journal, 8(1909-1910), 884-893. 
Also in Living Age, 266(1910}, 451-456. 
Mature pragmatism. 
Bowne and Others, "Noteworthy Opinions Upon the Deity of Jesus 
Christ." 
Zions Herald, 88(1910}, 1037. 
"Present Status of the Conflict of Faith." 
Methodist Review, 105(1922}, 358-369. 
This essay, previously unpublished, included in the 
Bowne Memorial Issue of the Review which is one of 
the most valuable sources of knowledge of Bowne. 
Articles by McConnell, Hocking, Knudson, Coe, Elliott 
(transcript of the heresy trial), and others are 
included. 
"The Passing of Educational Fiatism." 
Personalist, 4(1923), 77-89. 
"Two Bowne Letters." 
Zions Herald, 109(1931}, 1457-1458. 
Letters to Rev. c. Julian Tuthill of Atkinson, New 
Hampshire, November 17, 1894, November 22, 1894. 
Dealing with problem of judgment, annhilation, 
probation. 
"Bowne on Immortality." 
Zions Herald, 120(1942), 1063. 
Letter dated February 27, 1884. 
"Letters to a Student." 
This important series includes a number of letters 
written by Bowne to the late Bishop Hartman during the 
years that Hartman was working on his dissertation under 
Bowne's direction. The letters were published anony-
mously with names deleted, but the originals are in the 
possession of Rev. Richard Hartman and copies in the 
Boston University School of Theology Library. The 
Hartman-Bowne letters include others not published. 
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I. Zions Herald, 125(1947), 714, 717. 
II. Zions Herald1 125(1947), 764. 
III. Zions Herald, 125(1947), 860. 
"Letters to William Torrey Harris " ed. 
Philosophical Forum, 13(1955), B9-95. 
by Daniel S. Robinson. 
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II. The Published Books of Borden P. Bowne 
The PhilosophS of Herbert Spencer. 
New York: T e Methodist Book Concern, 1874. 
Studies in Theism. 
New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1879. 
Metaph;sics: A Studl in First Principles. 
New ork: Harper Brothers, 1886. 
Introduction to Psychological Theory. 
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1886. 
The Philosophy of Theism. 
New York: Harper & Brothers, 1887. 
The Principles of Ethics. 
New YoPk: Harper & Brothers, 1892. 
The Theor~ of Thought and Knowled~e. 
New Yor : Harper & Brothers, 18 7. 
ers, 1898. 
The Christian Revelation. 
New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1896. 
The Christian Life. 
New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1899. 
The Atonement. 
New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1900. 
Theism. 
New York: The American Book Company, 1902. 
The Immanence of God. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1905. 
Personalism. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1908. 
The PhilosophS of Christian Science. 
New York: T e Abingdon Preas, 1968. 
Studies in Christijiji}Y• 
Boston: Houghton i flin Company, 1909. 
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The E%sence of Reliiion. 
Bos on: Houghtoniftlin Company, 1910. 
Kant and Sftencer. 
Boston:oughton Mifflin Company, 1912. 
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ABSTRACT 
Commentators have recognized the religious 
interests of the American philosopher Borden Parker 
Bowne (18~7-1910). His influence in the development 
of the theological climate of The Methodist Church has 
been considerable. However, no thoroughgoing attempt 
has been made to organize systematically his doctrinal 
work. His theology has been mediated through his students 
who presented a variety of solutions to the theological 
problems raised by Bowne. The intention of the writer 
is to discover and expound the main features of Bowne's 
Christian theology, to relate them to historic Christian 
doctrine under the classical categories of apologetics, 
dogmatics, and ethics, and to appraise the nature and 
significance of his theological contribution. 
Apologetics.--Bowne's philosophical position is 
congenial to a Christian world view. He posits a 
universe of persons in which the world-ground is also 
personal and characterized by self-direction and volition, 
and he identifies this philosophical world-ground with 
the "God of religion." 
His metaphysics presents a unique immanentalism in 
which the phenomenal world is God's act as well as idea. 
A bitter foe of pantheistic immanentalism, his personalism 
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posits a world in which events are supernatural in 
causation, natural in appearance. Emphasis upon the 
person of God protects transcendence. 
Bowne's methodology is 11 pragmatic, 11 affirming life 
over logic, interest-satisfaction over reason, and the 
useful over the merely consistent. As most Christian 
faith-claims are non-demonstrable, they need more than 
consistency for affirmation. 
Dogmatics.--The theological attributes of God are 
moral goodness and holiness. Purely metaphysical 
conceptions of God are 11 ethically barren. 11 He demonstrates 
the necessity for an ethical character in God by 
(1) an appeal to experience to prove that the world-ground 
proceeds according to ethical principles; and (2) a 
11 pragmatic11 argument from the Christian faith-claim in 
God's perfect ethical character. 
His Trinity is founded on logical and empirical 
arguments. He asserts, first, the necessity for a 
11 community of personal life11 within the divine unity in 
order to posit moral life for God. He also affirms 
trinitarian belief from the experience of the presence of 
the Holy Spirit and the necessity for its provision in 
the divine economy. 
Bowne's anthropology is based upon man's awareness 
of his own self-direction and his dependence. He asserts 
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the Christian view of the "image of God" as man's 
possibility of self-direction, but equally emphasizes 
man's finiteness, dependence, and sin. Freedom, despite 
its great speculative significance, is always limited by 
nature. Denying Pelagian "self-sufficiency, 11 nevertheless 
he defines sin as volitional. Consistent moral concern 
leads him provisionally to accept the doctrines of 
retribution and annihilation and to reject the doctrine 
of second probation. 
Bowne's Christology is "kenotic11 and has two 
practical dimensions: first, a sublime faith that in 
Jesus Christ life finds meaning; second, a definition 
of 11 discipleship with Christ11 as moral obedience to God's 
will. Bowne rejects some classical atonement doctrines 
as forensic distortions and some liberal interpretations 
as sentimental denials. His own doctrine is 11 exemplary, 11 
emphasizing the notion that Christ's death was the effect 
rather than the cause of God's love. 
Christian life is a balance between "ethical," 
"Pauline, 11 and "mystical" traditions in Christian thought. 
The 11 ethical" is central although it needs the corrective 
of 11 Pauline11 and 11 mystical11 elements to keep it from 
Pharisaism. 
Ethics.--Consistent ethical concern is apparent 
throughout Bowne's entire work. Formal ethics is a 
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synthesis of intuitionism and utilitarianism in which 
the judgments of intuition and the ideals of utility are 
absorbed into the commandments of religious duty. 
To be a Christian means "to live in loving submission 
and active obedience to the will of God, trusting in 
his mercy in Jesus Christ." This faith-claim, in 
dialectic with moral intuition, is expressed in society 
through the ethics of righteousness. 
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